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Abstract 
 
Since Sept. 11, 2001, there has been great interest in the military and intelligence 
communities in using Social Network Analysis (SNA) to support the disruption and 
destruction of global terrorist networks.  SNA results, however, tend to be descriptive and 
are limited due to the lack of advantageous properties of the relationship measures 
applied to the arcs in a social network.  Further, SNA techniques generally focus on a 
single network context while real relationships are based in multiple contexts.  This thesis 
develops a new proxy measure of pair-wise potential influence between members of a 
network, a Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM).  The HIIM considers the 
topology of the multiple formal and informal networks to which group members belong 
as well as non-network characteristics such as age and education level that may indicate 
potential influence.  The HIIM, once constructed results in a network of pair-wise 
potential influence between group members.  Further, the numeric properties of the HIIM 
are appropriate for use in Operations Research Network Flow models, which will enable 
analysts to provide prescriptive analysis focused on specific actions and their outcomes.  
In addition to an overall measure of influence, the HIIM methodology provides important 
intermediate results such as the development of operational group profiles. 
The methodology is applied to open source data on both Al Qaeda and the Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI) terrorist networks.  Key leaders are identified, and leadership profiles are 
developed.  Further, a parametric analysis is performed to compare influence based 
on individual characteristics, network topology characteristics, and mixtures of network 
and non-network characteristics. 
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MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF CLANDESTINE NETWORKS 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Operational Problem 
After a half century of focusing on a Major Theater War with a near-peer 
competitor, the nation awoke on Sept. 11, 2001 to find out that a new principal threat to 
the U.S. is terrorism.  Terrorism has been defined by the Office of the President of the 
United States (OPOTUS) as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated 
against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”  The history 
of the U.S. has been punctuated by terrorist activity, and it appears that for the 
foreseeable future the nation will be engaged in a battle against terrorism (OPOTUS, 
2003: 1-5).  To be successful, the military (and other organizations) must continue the 
effort to uncover the individuals and groups engaged in terrorist activities (OPOTUS, 
2003: 1-5).   
At the conclusion of the Cold War, military planners in the U.S. made the 
assumption that a military organized, trained, and equipped to fight a near-peer 
competitor would be able to handle any type of conflict, which would, after all, be 
considered a subset to a Major Theater War (Barnett, Mar 2004).    The pattern that has 
emerged since the end of the Cold War, however, is not one of conflict with powerful 
industrialized nations; rather the U.S. has been engaged in locations that were considered 
to be no immediate threat to national survival, the Third World.  It is the Third World that 
has spawned the “gravest threat we face”, the threat from trans-national terrorism 
(Barnett, Mar 2004).  U.S. military operations since the end of the Cold War also suggest, 
1-1 
by their mixed results, that the U.S. military is not fully prepared to handle the threats 
from trans-national, clandestine terror organizations.  This fact was most emphatically 
highlighted on Sept. 11, 2001 (Barnett, Mar 2004). 
Combating terrorism and protecting the Homeland have now become the top 
priorities of U.S. national security, the focus of which is now the “identification and 
diffusion of [terrorist] threats before they arise” (OPOTUS, 2003: 1-2, 15).   Global 
operations against terror organizations in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq and elsewhere 
have had significant impact on terrorist capabilities, forcing them to adapt to the new 
security environment.  The terrorists have responded by organizing into loose flexible 
networks with smaller, informal groups, increasing the difficulties in combating them 
(OPOTUS, 2003: 1-2, 15).  A thorough understanding of these networks is required to 
mount an effective counter-terror campaign (Sageman, 2004: vii). 
The understanding of terror networks is critical in planning precision, effects 
based operations.  The ability to uncover individuals and subgroups critical to the 
operations of the network are instrumental in “influencing” terrorist operations.  In order 
to focus operations on terror networks, the U.S. defense establishment requires tools to 
assist in analyzing the structure of terror networks; these tools should be able to highlight 
strengths and weaknesses of the network (robustness) as well as uncover individuals and 
subgroups that are critical to network operations. 
1.1.2. Understanding the System 
“A new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined 
to inflict maximum civilian and economic damage on distant targets in pursuit of their 
extremist goals.”—Marc Sageman 
 
1-2 
Our operational focus on the near-peer competitor for the past half century has led 
to the development of large scale mathematical models and simulations with the primary 
goal of helping us to organize, train, and equip to win a Major Theater War.  With our 
focus now shifting to a war against trans-national clandestine organizations, the 
operations research community is faced with the challenge of developing tools 
appropriate for supporting a war on terrorism. 
A defining characteristic in the global war on terrorism is that global jihad is “an 
emergent quality of the social networks formed by alienated young men who become 
transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom, and eager to kill” (Sageman, 2004: 
vii).   Further, it is the “shape and dynamics of these networks that affects their 
survivability, flexibility, and success” (Sageman, 2004: vii).  For example, the social and 
organizational networks of terrorist can be evaluated on many levels or layers, and the 
combinations, or interactions, of these relationship layers is critical to the understanding 
of terror networks. 
The threat posed by terrorists today grows out of the flexible, trans-national 
networks enabled by modern global telecommunications.  Different terror organizations 
also appear to be mutually supporting each other through a loose interconnectivity both 
within and between groups (OPOTUS, 2003: 8).    Because of these interconnected, 
mutually supportive, dynamic networks, terror groups are becoming much more resilient, 
and, over time, terror groups have begun working together in “funding, sharing 
intelligence, training, logistics, planning and executing attacks” (OPOTUS, 2003: 8).   
The membership size, organizational structure, and availability of resources may 
determine a terrorist organization’s capabilities and reach, but it is the ability to bring the 
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members and resources together at the right place and the right time, along with the 
practice of good operational security (OPSEC) that ultimately determines the success of a 
terrorist organization.  Conventional wisdom tells us that leadership is a key to bringing 
personnel, resources, and operations together, and that the loss of a leader can cause 
many organizations to collapse.  Experience in the war on terrorism has shown, however, 
that many terror organizations can withstand the loss of a leader and still operate 
efficiently (OPOTUS, 2003: 6-7).  Unlike a rigid, centralized, hierarchical structure that 
is highly susceptible to an attack on the leadership, terrorist networks, with their dense 
interconnectivity, are robust enough to withstand significant losses with limited impact 
on network integrity (Sageman, 2004: 140).  There is also the possibility that a lost leader 
who becomes a martyr, will actually strengthen a terrorist organization.  Despite these 
difficulties, knowing who the leaders are, and understanding how their influence flows 
through the network is still vital in understanding and defeating terror operations. 
Clandestine networks must constantly balance the desire for organizational 
effectiveness with the need for OPSEC.  By definition clandestine networks are 
organizations that must operate in secrecy.  Simmel (Simmel, 1906: 470), in his seminal 
work on secret societies, states that when a group chooses “secrecy as part of its 
existence”, it has then determined the nature of relationships that must exist between 
persons who possess the secret.  Erickson (Erickson, 1981: 188) further states that “risk 
enforces recruitment along lines of trust,” which forces clandestine networks to use pre-
existing networks of relationships.  The use of pre-existing social networks sets limits on 
the social structure of the clandestine network (Erickson, 1981: 188).  The trust premium 
paid by clandestine organizations is their reliance on pre-existing networks.  This enables 
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analysts tasked to understand and influence clandestine network operations to bound the 
problem space by focusing on the trusted relationships of a particular group. 
The primary concerns of any clandestine network are organizational effectiveness 
and OPSEC.  In order to disrupt or eliminate the organizational effectiveness of a 
clandestine network, one must understand how leadership influence flows through the 
network to manage operations.  Groups practicing good OPSEC make it difficult for 
analysts to uncover the influence relationships within their network.  However, the 
reliance of clandestine networks on trusted, preexisting relationships to maintain OPSEC 
places limits on their size and structure.  By focusing analysis on group leadership 
influence and trusted pre-existing social networks, analysts may help to uncover critical 
“hubs” across the networks.  Operations focused on identified centers of gravity may be 
able to induce systemic failures across the system thereby reducing or removing the 
threat posed by a clandestine network or networks. 
The Global War on Terrorism, the War on Drugs, the fight against street gangs, 
organized crimes and other ongoing operations against clandestine networks highlights 
our need for improved analysis tools.  These tools need to enable analysts to identify 
positions of power and “attribute them to specific individual traits or structural roles that 
these individuals fulfill” (Klerks, 2001: 53).   
1.1.3. Current Strategies  
 Researchers (ex. Simmel, 1906; Gross, 1980; Geis and Stotland, 1980; Erickson, 
1981; Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Klerks, 2001) have conducted psychological and 
sociological analyses of clandestine networks for the past century, however since Sept. 
11, 2001 there has been a dramatic increase in the number of publications (ex. Krebs, 
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2001; Carley et al, 2003, Sageman, 2004) on clandestine networks, specifically terror 
networks.  These recent researchers have chosen Social Network Analysis (SNA) to help 
them “map,” (Krebs, 2001) “uncloak,” (Krebs, 2002) “identify key players,” (Borgatti, 
2002) “destabilize,” (Carley et al., 2003) and “understand” (Sageman, 2004) terror 
networks. 
SNA is based on the assumption that the relationships between and amongst 
individuals is important.  The focus of SNA on formal and informal networks of 
relationships makes it an appropriate tool for the analysis of terror organizations.  In 
addition to relationships, Wasserman and Faust (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 4) outline 
the following major concepts important to SNA: 
• Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, 
autonomous 
• Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or “flow” of 
resources (material or non-material) 
• Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural 
environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action 
• Network models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and so 
forth) as lasting patterns of relations among actors 
 
What is clear from early analysis of terrorist groups is that the major SNA 
concepts are appropriate assumptions.  Individuals become members of terrorist groups 
based primarily on the strength of prior relationships.  Their actions and capabilities are 
supported by the interdependent relationships between members.  Communication and 
resources are able to move through the network through relational ties, and the location 
of the member in the organization does have the effect of empowering or inhibiting 
(Krebs, 2001; Krebs, 2002; Borgatti, 2002; Carley et al., 2003; Sageman, 2004). 
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The focus of SNA on relationships requires that the theoretic concepts be 
relational, that relevant data be relational, and statistical testing use distributions based on 
relational properties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 6).  In SNA individuals are tied to 
other individuals who are tied to still other individuals.  The analysis of the network of 
individuals focuses on depicting the structure of the group, the key members of the group, 
the impact of the structure on the operations of the group, as well as the influence of the 
structure on individuals (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 9).  SNA provides the analyst tools 
to evaluate the importance of individuals and groups to the network and the means to 
analyze the structure of the network that can enable effects based operations focused on 
reducing or removing the threat posed by a group. 
1.1.3.1. Operations Research Support to SNA 
SNA results, however, are limited due to the “lack of advantageous properties” of 
the relationship measures applied to the arcs in a social network (Renfro, 2001; Renfro 
and Deckro, 2004).  SNA studies typically produce descriptive results such as which 
actor is the most “central”, which actors belong to which “cliques”, and which actors are 
“structurally equivalent”.  Renfro and Deckro (Renfro, 2001; Renfro and Deckro, 2004) 
state that Operations Research (OR) techniques can extend and refine SNA with results 
that are “measurable, quantifiable, and organized in a manner that allows for specific 
courses of action to be evaluated.”   
The key to extending SNA to classic OR flow problems is having the relationship 
measures applied to the arcs represent “potential influence” between individuals (Renfro 
and Deckro, 2004).  By mapping social networks to network flow models, analysts are 
able to provide prescriptive results such as a “minimum cut set” required to isolate 
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particular actors.  Renfro (Renfro, 2001: 47) outlines the required property assumptions 
of measures for use in network flow models (proportionality, additivity, divisibility, 
certainty) as well as a discussion of the impacts of violating these assumptions.  What is 
left to researchers is to develop methods to produce valid measures of potential influence 
that satisfy these assumptions. 
1.1.3.2. Descriptive vs. Prescriptive Analysis 
Descriptive measures focus on providing results that will enable analysts to 
describe their problem context.  SNA measures of individual importance and cohesive 
subgroups help analysts to describe the network on the basis of its topology.  Analysts 
can determine who is the most central, who belongs to certain subgroups, and which 
members are structurally similar, to name a few.  What SNA measures do not do is 
provide results that suggest specific actions to be taken against the network and their 
potential outcomes. 
Prescriptive measures focus on specific actions and their outcomes.  OR network 
flow models, in contrast to SNA, provide specific, quantifiable results that are actionable.  
The results are tied to specific outcomes, and can be tested for robustness through post 
optimality analysis.  Using network flows, analysts can determine the maximum flow of 
influence through a network, recommend cut sets to separate specific network members, 
or determine the optimal locations to deploy intelligence assets.  Further, network flow 
models will highlight alternate optimal solutions if they exist, thereby providing alternate 
courses of action of equal value. 
SNA measures were designed to help describe the network and its topology, not 
on highlighting opportunities to influence the networks.  For the social scientist 
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descriptive network measures are fine, but for the military, intelligence, and law 
enforcement analyst, results that can prescribe courses of action to influence a group are 
desirable.  While SNA measures fall short on prescriptive results, many Operations 
Research techniques were designed with actionable results in mind.  Many of these 
techniques can be extended to support analysis of social networks, and are discussed 
further in Chapter 5. 
1.1.4. Measuring Influence 
“Being perceived as a leader allows one to exert greater influence.”—Robert G. Lord 
 
In order to map social networks into network flow models the arc measures must 
represent pair-wise interpersonal influence between members.  Researchers have been 
studying leadership, power, and influence since the beginnings of civilization (Bass, 
1990: 3).  The terms leadership, power, and influence have occasionally been used 
interchangeably in the literature.  Cartwright (Cartwright, 1965: 13) equated leadership 
with the “domain of influence,” and the concept of influence was used by researchers as 
an attempt to generalize the definition of leadership (Bass, 1990: 13).  Bass (Bass, 1990: 
227) further stated that “power is the potential to influence.”    The vast amount of 
research on leadership, power, and influence provide an excellent starting point for the 
development of measures of potential influence in social networks.  For the purposes of 
this paper, leadership and power are used interchangeably and are defined as ones 
potential to influence others. 
There have been two primary threads of research on leadership, power and 
influence.  One thread, the psychological perspective, focuses on the personal 
characteristics of the individual, and ultimately tries to determine “how much individual 
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differences account for the emergence of leadership and its effectiveness, and if the 
effects transcend situational circumstances” (Bass, 1990: 87).  Trait theories fell out of 
favor with leadership researchers because of the literature reviews by Stogdill (Stogdill, 
1948) and Mann (Mann, 1959) that reported “no traits consistently differentiated leaders 
from non-leaders across a variety of situations” (Lord, De Vader and Alliger, 1986: 402).  
Lord et al. (Lord, De Vader and Alliger, 1986: 402) noted, however, that the conclusions 
of the Mann and Stogdill reviews have been misinterpreted because there were many 
“consistently significant” relationships between individual characteristics and leadership 
in both reviews.  It is clear from a review of the literature that individual characteristics 
are important in determining potential influence; however, analysts must also consider 
the situational context. 
The other primary thread of research on leadership, power, and influence, the 
sociological perspective, focuses on structural characteristics of the organization, and 
tries to determine “the relative net influence of each group member on others based on 
the structure of the network” (Friedkin, 2003: 90).  Hanneman states that “all 
sociologists” would argue that influence is fundamental property of social structure 
(Hanneman, 2001: 60).     
Power in a social network arises from occupying an advantageous position.  SNA 
researchers have developed a number of specific definitions and measures of different 
notions of influence based on positions in social structures (Hanneman, 2001: 61).  The 
limitation of these definitions is that they are only concerned with influence based on the 
network structure.  It is very likely that individuals will have power that is not dependent 
on connections, but rather based on personal characteristics.  
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The history of study in leadership, power, and influence provide a starting point 
for developing measures of potential influence in social networks that meet the required 
assumptions for use in OR flow models.  Further, “as we discover methods which help us 
to understand the relationships which exist among the members of any group, we shall 
also gain better insight into the factors important to the leadership role of that group” 
(Browne and Cohn, 1958: 213).  The potential limitation in extending the psychological 
and sociological research is the assumption that theories and concepts developed in the 
U.S. have universal application (Marshall and Gitosudarmo, 1995: 6).  One must be 
careful to consider the culture of the group, their situational context, and their OPSEC 
practices when developing measures of potential influence. 
1.1.5. Nature of Intelligence 
To collect the necessary data required to measure potential influence in a 
clandestine network, it must recognized that one is facing an enemy focused on practicing 
good OPSEC.  Social network analysts “approach empirical situations armed with 
questionnaires for participants to fill out, unfortunately criminals in their natural habitat 
seldom fill in researchers’ questionnaires” (Klerks, 2001; 58).  The difficulty in collecting 
data places limits on the results from SNA.  Measuring and counting presuppose that 
there is something to measure and groups practicing good OPSEC are not readily 
exposing themselves to intelligence collectors, much less sociologists (Klerks, 2001: 58).  
The difficulty collecting data, the means of collecting data, and the nature of the data 
itself are going to play a role in making the data imprecise. 
The measurement of relationships in a terror network requires a flexible 
methodology able to distinguish the influence between father and son, the influence 
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amongst a group of friends, and the influence of an Imam.  Unfortunately, almost all of 
our current mathematical tools are based on data from rigid constructs.  For modeling 
purposes, Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1991:1-7) highlights two main problems for rigid 
constructs: 
• Real situations are very often not crisp (rigid) and deterministic and they 
cannot be described precisely 
• The complete description of a real system often would require by far more 
detailed data than a human being could ever recognize simultaneously, 
process and understand 
 
Often when one thinks of uncertainty in a mathematical system, one thinks of the 
stochastic nature of unknown future states of a system and this stochastic uncertainty has 
long been studied and understood by statisticians and operations researchers 
(Zimmerman, 1991: 1-7).  Stochastic states however, are still based in a rigid “set theory” 
universe.  Zimmerman contrasts stochastic uncertainty with the “vagueness concerning 
the description of the semantic meaning of the events, phenomena, or statements 
themselves,” which he termed fuzziness (Zimmerman 1991: 107).  When faced with the 
task of modeling terms such as relationship, influence, trust, and belief there is a clear 
need for a more flexible construct.  Fuzzy set theory was developed to provide the 
necessary flexibility required to measure these relational concepts. 
1.1.6. Social Influence Network Theory 
“Social influence network theory is a mathematical formalization of the process of 
interpersonal influence that occurs in groups.”—Noah Friedkin 
 
Social influence network (SIN) theory attempts to describe how a network of 
interpersonal influences enters into the process of affecting attitudes and opinions within 
a group, and it enables an analysis of the impact of the structure of the influence network 
on individual and group level outcomes (Friedkin, 2003: 90).  SIN theory focuses entirely 
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on the topology of the social networks underlying a group to explain the interpersonal 
influences.  For Friedkin (Friedkin, 2003) the social structure consists of 
• members initial opinions 
• susceptibilities to influence 
• interpersonal influences; which is represented by a matrix (W) 
 
While Friedkin and Johnson (Friedkin and Johnson, 1997; Friedkin, 2001; Friedkin, 
2003) are focused on describing attitude and opinion formation, Leenders (Leenders, 
2002: 21) states that many social phenomena are embedded within networks of 
interpersonal influence.  In addition, the representation of interpersonal influence 
assumed to be present in a network can be “operationalized” in many ways (Leenders, 
2002: 22).  The results and conclusions based on the analysis of a SIN are completely 
dependent on the specification of W, the matrix of interpersonal influence.  Friedkin 
(Friedkin, 2003) and Leenders (Leenders, 2002) are both concerned with the lack of 
“attention and justification paid” to the development of meaningful measures of 
interpersonal influence input into the W matrix. 
1.1.7. Operational Definition of Influence 
 Influence is defined as the power to sway or affect based on prestige or position.  
Understanding influence within an organization can be simplified by considering two 
extreme cases, “E. F. Hutton” and “Ma Bell” as shown in Figure 1-1.   
E. F. Hutton has influence over everyone in his network because of his prestige.  
Prestige can be based on personal traits such as intelligence, judgment, knowledge, piety, 
accomplishments, aggressiveness, age, wealth, and popularity (Bass, 1990:  76).  The 
consequence of his prestige is that “when E. F. Hutton speaks, people listen.”  From an 
influence operations perspective, knowledge of E. F. Hutton and who has access to him 
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presents an array of potential opportunities including discrediting him or disrupting his 
messages. 
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Figure 1-1:  Operational Definition of Influence 
 Ma Bell, on the other hand, has influence not because of her personal traits, but 
solely because of her network connections.  The ability to “reach out and touch” every 
other network member personally, makes Ma Bell a high value target for influence 
operations.  Ma Bell also presents an array of opportunities, including serving as an 
informant or delivering our messages. 
 Measures of interpersonal influence should be able to uncover, quantify, and 
explain the nature of influence possessed by E. F. Hutton and the mail clerk, as well as all 
other network members.   
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1.2. Problem Statement 
 To provide measurable, quantifiable, and actionable results based on the analysis 
of clandestine networks the relationship arcs between actors must meet the required 
assumptions for OR flow models.  In order to map SNA models into OR flow models the 
relationship arcs must represent potential influence (Renfro and Deckro, 2004, pp).  
Potential interpersonal influence within a group is a function of both individual 
characteristics and the social structure.  OPSEC practices by clandestine networks make 
data collection difficult and can lead to imprecise individual characteristic and social 
structure data.  This thesis advances the modeling and analysis of clandestine networks 
by developing a methodology to create a valid measure of interpersonal potential 
influence based on individual characteristics and social structure that captures the 
uncertainty of imprecise data.  The new measure of interpersonal potential influence is 
appropriate for SNA studies, OR flow models, and Fuzzy Linear Programming models. 
1.3. Problem Approach 
 A tenet of this thesis is that interpersonal influence is a combination of one’s 
personal characteristics and one’s position in his/her networks of relationships.  Given 
this assertion, a measure of interpersonal influence, then, must capture the functional 
relationship between influence, and the non-network and network characteristics of 
individuals in its development. 
Current SIN theory literature accounts for a measure of non-network influence, 
but offers no method to develop such a measure.  Stogdill’s (Stogdill, 1948) review of 
leadership studies from the early 20th century highlights multivariate data analysis as the 
primary tool for determining individual characteristics that were associated with 
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influence.  Therefore, Discriminant Analysis was used to develop a measure of non-
network influence.  In addition to a proxy influence measure, Discriminant Analysis was 
used to profile, differentiate, and classify clandestine network members on the basis of an 
observed set of characteristic data.  Discriminant Analysis was chosen because it is easy 
to implement and interpret; however it is based on assumptions of multivariate normal 
predictor variables with constant variance across multiple subgroups.  If these 
assumptions are  violated, one could apply Logistic Regression, which has no 
distributional assumptions, with no impact to the overall methodology. 
Influence in social networks is attained by possessing advantaged positions.  
There are three primary techniques for calculating pair-wise measures of interpersonal 
influence based on the topology of a social network.  Each technique has its advantages 
and disadvantages.  Based on the elements of the measure and its intended use in 
modeling clandestine networks, Information Centrality was used to calculate pair-wise 
measures of interpersonal influence for groups in this study.    Information Centrality 
produces a measure of interpersonal influence that is based completely on network 
topology for each informal social network to which clandestine network members 
belong. 
Clandestine networks are based on the pre-existing, trusted, informal social 
networks to which they belong.  Measures of pair-wise interpersonal influence can be 
calculated and analyzed for each informal social network for which there is data, but to 
develop a more accurate understanding, the information from each of these networks 
must be considered simultaneously.  To capture the influences from multiple network 
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contexts, this study used a linear combination of the interpersonal influences from each 
informal network. 
Combining the individual influence results from Discriminant Analysis with the 
combined topology based influence results from Information Centrality enables the 
creation of a new measure of interpersonal influence within clandestine networks. This 
new measure was termed the Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM), because it 
attempts to measure the functional relationships and interdependence between the parts 
(individual characteristics and social network characteristics) and the whole 
(interpersonal influence) of social influence. 
1.4. Research Scope 
 The general focus of this paper is on terrorist networks.  It is realized that many 
clandestine networks share common traits with terror networks, yet there are fundamental 
differences in some areas that may not be captured within the current model. 
 The ongoing war on terrorism has focused the intelligence community’s research 
efforts on certain organizations.  The focus of this research is to support the analysis of 
the most important groups to U.S. forces. 
 Due to classification levels of some of the data concerning clandestine networks 
this analysis will rely on open source demographic and social network data. 
1.5. Assumptions 
The methodology utilized in this thesis assumes the following: 
• There exists a means to collect individual demographic and social 
network data 
• The data collected is complete and correct 
• Social network connections are undirected 
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• Individual characteristic data is distributed multivariate normal with equal 
variance across various subgroups 
 
Each of these assumptions and their potential impacts are discussed in detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
1.6. Overview and Format 
The structure of this thesis begins with a review of social influence modeling 
literature in Chapter 2.  In particular, Chapter 2 reviews Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
theory, Social Influence Network (SIN) theory, Discriminant Analysis, and methods for 
developing pair-wise interpersonal influence measures.  Chapter 3 develops a 
methodology to create the HIIM, a new measure of interpersonal influence that considers 
non-network and network characteristics.  Chapter 4 provides a demonstration of the 
Discriminant Analysis methodology developed in Chapter 3, Section 3 based on open 
source Al Qaeda data.  Chapter 5 provides a demonstration of the complete HIIM 
methodology developed in Chapter 3 based on open source Jemaah Islamiah data.  
Chapter 6 presents conclusions from this analysis, highlighting key results, and presents 
recommendations for future research.  
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2. Social Influence Modeling Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the pertinent literature relating to Social Influence Network 
(SIN) Modeling, specifically focusing on techniques for developing meaningful pair-wise 
measures of influence between individuals in a clandestine network.  Social Influence 
Network Theory is an extension of Social Network Analysis (SNA), therefore a brief 
introduction to SNA is provided.  The chapter then sets out the underlying assumptions 
and rational for Social Influence Network (SIN) theory, followed by an overview of 
Discriminant Analysis, which has the potential to aid development of non-network 
influence measures.  The chapter concludes with a review of the development of pair-
wise measures of social influence.  
2.2. Introduction to Social Network Analysis (SNA) Measures 
 SNA focuses on depicting the structure of a group, the critical members of the 
group, the impact of the structure on the operations of the group, as well as the influence 
of the structure on individuals (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 9).  SNA measures tend to 
focus on identifying the key members of the network and uncovering any cohesive sub-
groups.   
Uncovering critical individuals is important when analyzing terror networks; 
however, groups practicing good operational security (OPSEC) make it very difficult to 
locate critical individuals through SNA techniques.  Many of the assumptions made by 
social scientist about individual importance to a network are based on the members’ 
connections; more connections imply greater importance.  Leaders of clandestine 
networks practicing good OPSEC, however, by design will likely have very few 
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connections, and may not be uncovered through classic SNA techniques.  Because of the 
potential difficulty in finding key individuals, it is important to also search for key 
subgroups within organizations.  Knowledge of these subgroups, highlighted by tight 
bonds, can also be critical in influencing a terror organization.  The remainder of this 
section details the classic SNA measures of individual importance and measures for 
detecting cohesive subgroups.   
2.2.1. SNA Measures of Individual Importance 
SNA Measures of individual importance tend to focus on the location of the 
individual within the network topology, and attempt to quantify the importance of the 
individual (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 169).  SNA measures of individual importance 
within the network are basic extensions of Graph Theoretic measures that have, in 
practice, revealed actors of high importance to the network.  In open organizations such 
as a business these measures can reveal individuals of high importance.  However, when 
faced with an organization practicing good OPSEC individuals in leadership positions 
may, through the use of cutouts and other planned efforts, have extremely low values on 
standard SNA measures. 
 A formal discussion of SNA measures of individual importance is provided in 
Social Network Analysis:  Methods and Applications (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Table 2-1 provides an overview of each of the standard SNA measures used in this thesis.  
Table 2-1 highlights what each measure calculates, what it attempts to measure, and 
appropriate references: 
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Table 2-1:  Comparison of SNA Individual Centrality Measures 
 
Calculates Measures References
Degree 
Centrality
Number of direct connections to 
other nodes
Connection to others; 
network activity; power
Freeman, 1979;           
Wasserman and Faust; 1994 
Hanneman, 2001
Closeness 
Centrality
Inverse of the sum of the shortest 
paths to all other nodes in the 
network
Members "key" to network 
communication; reach; 
reachability
Freeman, 1979;           
Wasserman and Faust; 1994 
Hanneman, 2001
Betweenness 
Centrality
Proportion of times a node is on the 
shortest path between other pairs of 
nodes
Information control; role as 
an intermediary; brokers; 
"gatekeepers"
Freeman, 1980;           
Wasserman and Faust; 1994 
Hanneman, 2001
Information 
Centrality
Proportion of times a node is on any 
path between other pairs of nodes
Information control; role as 
an intermediary; brokers
Sthepenson and Zelen, 1989; 
Wasserman and Faust; 1994 
Hanneman, 2001
Eigenvector 
Centrality
Nodes assigned loading on first 
principal component, calculations 
identical to Principal Components 
Analysis
Overall importance to the 
network; how close am I to 
actors who are close to 
others 
Bonacich, 1972;               
Bonacich, 2001
SNA Measures of Individual Importance
 
 The social network perspective suggests that an individual’s influence is not an 
individual attribute, but rather that it arises from their relations with others (Hanneman, 
2001: 75).  Each of the aforementioned measures is limited because the calculations are 
based on the assumption that influence within a network is based solely on the occupation 
of privileged positions within the topology of the network.  Currently there is no method 
to validate the results obtained using these measures.  To improve the usefulness of SNA 
measures of individual importance there must be a means to validate their results. 
2.2.2. SNA Measures for Sub-Group Detection 
Measures for subgroup determination were developed to help explain the intuitive 
idea of social groups using SNA properties (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 249).  Social 
groups have been described structurally by Freeman and Webster (Freeman and Webster, 
1994: 225) as “collections of individuals who are linked by frequent interaction and often 
by sentimental ties.”  The idea of the social group used by social and behavioral scientists 
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is quite general, with numerous network properties that suggest group cohesiveness.  
There are, therefore, many different possible definitions of cohesive subgroup.  Having 
multiple definitions can, in general, be undesirable, however, when using SNA to model 
terror organizations, having multiple options for uncovering cohesive subgroups may 
have advantages. 
A formal discussion of SNA measures for subgroup detection is provided in 
Social Network Analysis:  Methods and Applications (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
Table 2-2 provides an overview of the primary measures from SNA literature; the types 
of groups found, the implications of these groups, and appropriate references: 
Table 2-2: Comparison of SNA Measures for Subgroup Detection 
 
Finds Implication References
Clique
Groups in which each member is directly 
connected to every other member in the 
group
Completely connected groups; 
Impossible to distinguish between 
group members
Luce and Perry, 1949; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Hanneman, 2001;
n-clique
Largest group such that each member is 
within n connections of any other group 
member
Larger more prevelant groups; 
long stringy groupings;
Luce, 1950;                         
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Hanneman, 2001;
n-clan      
n-club
Restriction to n-clique, all connections 
must remain within the group
Larger more prevelant groups; 
tighter groupings than n-clique
Mokken, 1979;       Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994; Hanneman, 
2001;
k-plex In a group size g, each member must be connected to at least g-k other members
Large number of small groupings; 
focus on overlaps and co-
membership
Seidman and Foster, 1978; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Hanneman, 2001;
k-core Subgroup in which each node is adjacent to at least k other nodes
relationships based on 
connection; id's areas where 
interesting subgroups may exist
Seidman, 1983           
Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Hanneman, 2001;
SNA Measures for Subgroup Detection
 
 The potential difficulties in uncovering critical individuals presented by 
clandestine networks make techniques for uncovering cohesive subgroups important.  
Cohesive subgroups within clandestine networks, often based on friendship, kinship, and 
worship ties (Sageman, 2004: pp 107-114), identified by these SNA measures, may 
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indicate leadership counsels, logistics cells, or operational cells.  Identification of these 
subgroups may provide additional insight into the influence process of a clandestine 
network. 
2.3. Fuzzy Cliques 
 As discussed in the previous section, one of the major concerns of SNA is the 
identification and analysis of cohesive subgroups (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 249).  
The graph theoretic subgroup detection and analysis techniques discussed previously, 
however, are all limited to binary undirected networks. Yan provides a taxonomy of the 
limitations of traditional subgroup detection and analysis techniques (Yan, 1987: 364).  
Yan classifies five limitations of traditional clique detection and analysis techniques: 
Redundant Connection Limitation, Membership Limitation, Structure Limitation, 
Network Limitation, and Computation Limitation (Yan, 1987: 361-363).   
 To form a clique requires n(n-1) connections, where n is the cardinality of the 
clique.  This requires each member be directly connected to every other clique member, 
and the absence of a single connection will preclude someone from clique membership.  
Further, for a node and any given clique there exist only two possibilities, the node is 
either a member of the clique or not (Yan, 1987: 360).  Further, because each member 
must have the same number of connections, members within a clique cannot be 
distinguished.  In addition, analysis of relationship strength or the amount of social 
interactions is precluded by a limitation to 0-1 connections (Yan, 1987: 361).  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the detection of cliques as defined by Luce and Perry 
(1949) is an NP-complete problem. 
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To overcome the identified limitations of traditional subgroup detection and 
analysis techniques, Yan defines a fuzzy clique as “a maximum strongly connected node 
subgroup in which each node is connected to all others directly or indirectly, regardless 
of the number of intermediate nodes” (Yan, 1987: 378).  Based on this definition and an 
assumed relationship measure, Yan defines three subgroup analysis techniques.  Table 
2-3 provides an overview of Yan’s fuzzy clique analysis measures; the purpose of the 
measure, the implications of the results, and appropriate references: 
Table 2-3:  Fuzzy Clique Analysis Measures 
Finds Implication Reference
Node 
Membership 
Value
Measure of how important a member is 
within his own subgroup
Core of subgroup; Percent of members 
over which one has above average 
influence
Yan, 1987;                 
Sterling, 2004
Node-Clique 
Coefficient
Measure of ones relationship to a 
subgroup of which he is not a member
Identifies key deputies; members who 
have the most access to a subgroup of 
interest
Yan, 1987;                 
Sterling, 2004
Clique-Clique 
Coefficient
Measure of the relationship between 
two separate subgroups
How do different subgroups relate; 
Informal leadership structure
Yan, 1987;                 
Sterling, 2004
Fuzzy Clique Analysis Measures
 
By enabling an analysis of subgroups based on valued relationship measures, 
Yan’s technique may enable analysts to identify critical relationship structures within 
clandestine networks.  The Node Membership Value may highlight a groups core leaders.  
Further, the Node-Clique coefficient has the potential to identify key deputies and cut-
outs with privileged access to the leadership group.  Finally, the Clique-Clique coefficient 
may help to uncover the informal leadership structure within a given network. 
Highlighting key individuals and uncovering key subgroups are two of the 
primary objectives for any SNA study.  In addition to these objectives, there has been a 
movement within SNA, starting with French (French, 1956), to measure interpersonal 
influence based on social structures.  Over time this movement has evolved into what is 
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referred to as Social Influence Network (SIN) theory.  The next section briefly discusses 
the development of SIN theory. 
2.4. Introduction to Social Influence Network Theory 
 Social Influence Network (SIN) Theory is a mathematical formulation of the 
process of interpersonal influence that occurs in groups (Friedkin, 2003: 89).  SIN theory 
attempts to link the structures of social networks to the attitudes and behaviors of the 
individuals in those networks (Marsden and Friedkin, 1994: 3).  While SIN theory is 
primarily concerned with modeling information diffusion and opinion formation, 
Leenders (Leenders, 2002: 21) states that many social phenomena are embedded within 
networks of interpersonal influence.  This section focuses on the most current literature 
concerning SIN theory, which is dominated by Friedkin.  The methods proposed by Katz 
and Hubbell are, however, highlighted in the last section of the chapter. 
SIN theory is rooted in the work of Katz (1953), French (1956), Harary (1959), 
Hubbell (1965), and Friedkin (1997, 1998, 2001, 2003), and can be summarized by its 
two fundamental equations. The first equation is concerned with the initial opinions of 
the actors on a particular issue, and the second is concerned with the subsequent 
transformation of actor opinions (Friedkin, 1998: 2-3): 
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In the first equation, Y(I) is an )1( ×n vector of initial opinions, X is an matrix of 
exogenous (non-network) variables that affect actor opinion, and B is a  vector of 
coefficients for the exogenous variables.  In the second equation, Y
)( kn×
)1( ×k
(t) is an matrix 
of opinions at time t, A is a diagonal matrix of weights of the endogenous characteristics, 
and W is an  matrix of the endogenous interpersonal influences in the network. 
)( mn×
)( nn×
 Despite the inclusion of the exogenous influence equation, Y(I) = XB, which is 
designed to capture non-network measures of influence, Friedkin offers no information 
about how to develop or use the equation (Strang, 2000: 162).  Further, Strang comments 
that there is no discussion of “actual opinions, no indirect measures of opinion similarity, 
and no measures of influence” in Friedkin’s (1998) book (Strang, 2000: 162).  When 
Friedkin offers example problems, he uses W to develop X, thereby using endogenous 
(network structure) relationships to develop his exogenous measure of initial opinion.  
Without the proper application of the exogenous equation, Friedkin’s method becomes a 
purely structural based measure of influence.  Friedkin (Friedkin, 2003: 90) later 
concedes that his work is a built from a “distinctly sociological perspective.” 
 To improve upon the current state of the art in SIN theory there must be a focus 
on the development of exogenous (non-network) measures of individual influence.  If one 
assumes that within a network there exists a group of individuals with more influence 
than ordinary network members that can be identified, Discriminant Analysis may be 
able to identify the characteristics of this influential group.  Further, if there are 
identifiable differences between influential network members and non-influential 
network members on some measurable set of characteristics, then Discriminant Analysis 
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may enable researchers to develop meaningful exogenous measures of influence.  The 
next section details the development and application of Discriminant Analysis. 
2.5. Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant Analysis is a statistical technique used to classify individuals into 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups on the basis of a set of 
independent variables (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 360; Lattin et al., 2003: 426-7).  It 
does this by developing a weighted average of each individual’s scores on the 
independent variables and transforming them into a posteriori probabilities used to 
determine the likelihood of an individual belonging to each of the groups (Dillon and 
Goldstein, 1984: 361). 
Dillon and Goldstein assert that Discriminant Analysis, as a methodology, is 
principally concerned with two things, explanation and prediction (Dillon and Goldstein, 
1984: 364).  A principle measure of the quality of a Discriminant Analysis function is its 
ability to classify individuals into the correct groups.  If one develops a “good” 
Discriminant function, meaning it classifies well, the function will help to explain the 
dimensions on which groups differ and also serve as an assignment rule for predicting to 
which group new individuals belong. 
Lattin et al. (Lattin et al., 2003: 427-8) ascribe three primary objectives to 
Discriminant Analysis; profiling, differentiation, and classification.   
“When the purposes of a study are primarily exploratory in nature, the first 
objective of Discriminant Analysis is usually descriptive:  How do groups 
differ with respect to the underlying variables?  Once the groups have 
been profiled, it may be important to ask whether the apparent differences 
across groups are, in fact, significant; Discriminant Analysis allows us to 
test for differences in means between and across groups.  In addition to 
profiling and differentiation, one might also be interested in predicting 
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group membership—that is using the Discriminant function to categorize 
observations when the value of the dependent variable is unobserved.”  
  
2.5.1. Discriminant Analysis Overview—Two Group Problem 
 Assume that one has a population G consisting of 2 subgroups, G1 and G2 and a 
set of measurements on p characteristics.  Let X = [xij] be the ( pn× ) matrix of 
measurement characteristics.  Let Y = [yi] be the ( 1×n ) vector of a priori classifications 
of G into G1 and G2.  The purpose of Discriminant Analysis, then, is to create an 
assignment rule for X that will classify individuals into groups such that the 
misclassification rate is minimized. 
 Given the pooled sample variance-covariance matrix S, and group means 1x and 
2x , the assignment rule is created by calculating b = [bi], the ( p×1 ) vector of 
discriminant weights associated with each independent individual characteristic where: 
)( 21
1 xxSb −= −  
A Discriminant Function is defined by the following equation: 
XbY '=  
Each element of Y, then, is a linear combination of the discriminant weights and each 
individual’s personal characteristics: 
ippiii xbxbxby +++= ...2211  
Figure 2-1 provides a graphical depiction of the two-group Discriminant Analysis 
problem. 
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G2
G2
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Figure 2-1:  Graphical illustration of two-group Discriminant Analysis 
A detailed discussion of the calculations and assumptions for Discriminant Analysis is 
provided in Multivariate Analysis (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984) and Analyzing 
Multivariate Data (Lattin, et al., 2003).  The next section discusses the limitations of 
Discriminant Analysis 
2.5.2. Limitations of Discriminant Analysis 
The optimality of the classifier created using Discriminant Analysis is conditional 
on the following assumptions outlined in Dillon and Goldstein (1984): 
• The independent predictor variables are from a multivariate normal 
distribution 
• The variance-covariance matrix of independent variables is the same 
across the two (multiple) subgroups 
 
Discriminant Analysis is known to be robust to violations of normality due to 
skewness (Pohar, et al., 2004: 157), however violations of these assumptions, in general, 
have an adverse impact on statistical tests of significance and classification accuracy 
(Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 380-381).  When the Discriminant Analysis assumptions are 
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violated, Logistic Regression provides an alternative approach to group discrimination 
that does not rely on any distributional assumptions.  Further, application of Logistic 
Regression in place of Discriminant Analysis will not impact the methodology presented 
in Chapter 3.   
Pohar et al. (2004), provide a comparison of appropriate situations for applying 
Discriminant Analysis and Logistic Regression.  For a complete discussion of Logistic 
Regression, the reader is referred to Analyzing Multivariate Data (Lattin et al., 2003).  
The next section discusses the potential of Discriminant Analysis to support the modeling 
and analysis of clandestine networks. 
2.5.3. Differentiation, Profiling, and Classification 
 Recall that the three primary objectives of Discriminant Analysis are to 
differentiate between groups, profile the characteristics that distinguish the groups, and 
classify group members into appropriate groups (Lattin et al., 2003: 427-8).  
Differentiation, profiling, and classification of clandestine network members have many 
potential operational impacts such as identifying leaders or potential recruits.  Whether 
one’s mission is to profile network members and non-members, or to distinguish group 
leaders from the rank and file, Discriminant Analysis techniques can support the analysis.  
Discriminant Analysis results enable analysts to determine if subgroups differ 
significantly based on the observed set of individual characteristics.  If a significant 
difference between groups exists, Discriminant Analysis is able to highlight which 
variables were important in differentiating between the groups.  The relative 
contributions of each characteristic in discriminating between groups can then be used to 
develop a profile for each subgroup.  Finally, the Discriminant Function developed can 
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be used to assign members to the appropriate subgroup.  A “good,” accurate, classifier 
can then be used to predict group membership for newly identified members.  
 In addition to providing methods to differentiate, profile, and classify, 
Discriminant Analysis has a series of statistical tests to determine the significance of each 
of these results.  A formal discussion of the statistical testing associated with 
Discriminant Analysis is provided in Multivariate Analysis (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984). 
2.5.4. Individual Influence Measure 
 A Discriminant Function produces a score for each group member based on the 
set of characteristics they possess.  Given subgroups G1 and G2, assume G1 is the 
leadership group of an organization and G2 is the rank and file.  The Discriminant 
Function created to distinguish between G1 and G2 can be used to develop a proxy 
measure of influence within a group.  To the extent that leadership is associated with 
influence (Browne and Cohn, 1958; Cartwright, 1965; Lord, De Vader and Alliger, 1986; 
Bass, 1990), an individual possessing leadership characteristics can be assumed to have 
influence within the group.   
Discriminant Analysis can be used as a stand alone approach to differentiating, 
profiling, and classifying social groups.  In this study Discriminant Analysis will also 
serve as an input to a new measure of interpersonal influence.  A technique to develop a 
proxy measure of influence based on individual characteristics using Discriminant 
Analysis is developed in Chapter 3.   
2.5.5. Section Summary 
 This section has provided a brief overview of Discriminant Analysis and its 
applications for modeling and analysis of clandestine networks.  Discriminant Analysis 
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enables analysts to distinguish between subgroups, profile groups, and classify group 
members on the basis of an observed set of characteristics.  The ability to profile and 
classify group members has many operational implications.  In addition, Discriminant 
Analysis can also be used to develop a measure of individual influence within a group. 
 Using Discriminant Analysis to develop a measure of influence based on 
individual characteristics is a psychology based approach.  Hanneman, however, states 
that “all sociologists” would argue that influence is a fundamental property of social 
structure (Hanneman, 2001: 60).  The next section reviews the development of pair-wise 
measures of social influence based on network topology. 
2.6. Modeling Pair-Wise Influence  
 SNA has many proxy measures to identify key individuals based on their 
positions in the overall topology of the network.  Much of SNA theory ascribes power or 
influence to these key individuals.  While these measures may, under certain conditions, 
offer a rank ordering of the importance of individuals, they do not give insight into the 
interrelations between the individuals.  Katz (Katz, 1953: 39) recognized this limitation, 
lamenting, that researchers were “forced to accept the popularity index as valid, at least a 
first approximation, or to make a near-anthropological study of a social group in order to 
pick out the real leaders.”  Including Katz’s initial development of a pair-wise measure of 
social influence, there are very few measures of pair-wise influence.   
 Critical to the development of each measure of interpersonal influence is the 
consideration of “paths” between network members (Katz, 1953; Hubbell, 1965; 
Freeman, 1980; Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Leenders 2002).  The term path used by 
these authors is equivalent to the Graph Theoretic term chain.  A chain is a sequence of 
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undirected arcs , such that the endpoints of are nodes xneeee ,...,,, 321 ie i and xi+1 (Minieka, 
1978: 5).  Node x1 is called the initial node of a chain, and xn+1 is called the terminal node 
of the chain (Minieka, 1978: 5).    A chain is said to extend from its initial node to its 
terminal node, and the length of a chain is the number of arcs in the chain (Minieka, 
1978: 5). 
 The term path is used throughout this study to maintain consistency with 
traditional SNA research; however, the term path as used in SNA research is considered 
equivalent to Minieka’s definition of a chain.  Network members are represented as 
nodes, and identified relationships or connections are represented as arcs.  Network 
members are said to be adjacent if they are connected by a chain of length one; adjacent 
nodes are said to have a direct connection.  Network members connected, through 
intermediaries, by chains of length n are said to be connected by an n-step path; nodes 
connected through intermediaries are said to have indirect connections.  If no chain exists 
between two members, they are not connected.  The remainder of this section discusses 
the development of each of the pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence as well as 
their capabilities and limitations. 
2.6.1. Katz Influence 
 Katz’s development of a measure for evaluating importance in a network was 
motivated by the failings of “popularity contest” measures such as degree centrality 
(Katz, 1953: 39).  When modeling a friendship network, if person x lists person y as a 
friend on a questionnaire, then person y has been “chosen” by person x.  Katz’s measure 
is based not only on how many persons “choose” an individual, but also who chooses 
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them (Katz, 1953: 39).  In other words, Katz’s measure is based on the direct and indirect 
connections within a network.   
 Katz formulation begins with a binary (0-1) node-node adjacency matrix, A = 
[aij].  For the purposes of his development, Katz assumed that aij represented person i 
“choosing” person j.  The powers of A (A2 = [ ]; A)2(ija
3 = [ ]; etc.), then, represent the 
number of paths of corresponding lengths from one individual to another (Katz, 1953: 
40).  The Katz measure is a combination of all the one-step, two-step, three-step, and so 
forth paths (chains) appropriately weighted and added together (Katz, 1953: 40). 
)3(
ija
 To build appropriate weights, Katz, introduced the concept of “attenuation” in a 
link of a chain.  While attenuation is generally defined as the loss of signal strength 
during transmission, for Katz, it represents the loss of influence as path lengths between 
individuals increase (Katz, 1953: 30-41).  Attenuation requires the assumption that the 
researcher has complete and correct data.  Links between members identified in the data 
represent the potential for influence flow, and where there is no path between members in 
the data, there is no potential for influence to flow between them (Katz, 1953: 40).  
Further, Katz assumes that the links (arcs) in the network are independent and have the 
same probability of being effective.  Note, however, that paths are not necessarily 
independent, and Katz’s formulation does not account for path dependencies.  Katz 
realizes that these assumptions may not be valid; however, he asserts that they are 
reasonable for developing a first order approximation of the true situation (Katz, 1953: 
40). 
Define attenuation, α , as the probability of the effectiveness of a single link.  A 
k-step chain, then, has probability of being effective.  At the extremes, kα α  = 0 implies 
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complete attenuation; α  = 1 implies no attenuation.  Assuming complete attenuation in a 
network implies that only adjacent nodes have influence over each other.  For example, 
the Sergeant can only influence the men in his platoon.  Assuming no attenuation in a 
network implies that indirect connections have the same amount of influence as direct 
connections.  For example, the Force Commander can influence every soldier under his 
command. 
To calculate Katz’s measure one needs to create the following matrix T which is a 
linear combination of all weighted paths in the network: 
IAIAAAT kk −−=++++= −122 )(...... αααα  
Katz was concerned with calculating the column sums of the T matrix, which 
would serve as an alternative measure of influence to the classic SNA measures of 
centrality.  Katz’s formulation is based on the sum of an infinite geometric series.  The 
calculations will not work, however, if 1/α  is not larger than the largest eigenvalue of A, 
because (I-α A) will not be full rank and its inverse will not exist (Katz, 1959: 42).  Katz, 
based on his experiments (Katz, 1959: 42), suggests values of 1/α  between the largest 
eigenvalue and twice the largest eigenvalue.  Katz standardizes his measure by dividing 
by the following term, .   αα /11)!1( enm n−−=
The adjacency matrix, A, in Table 2-4 was used by Katz to highlight the new 
capability his measure provides: 
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Table 2-4:  Katz (1953) Example Node-Node Adjacency Matrix 
 
A B C D E F
A 0 0 0 0 0 1
B 0 0 1 0 0 1
C 0 1 0 1 0 1
D 1 0 0 0 1 0
E 0 0 0 1 0 1
F 1 0 0 1 0 0  
Based on Katz’s definition of “choosing”, for the group of six persons in this example, A 
chooses F; B chooses C and F; C chooses B, D, and F; D chooses A and E; E chooses D 
and F; and F chooses A and D.  Figure 2-2 shows the graph of this network: 
A
B C
E
DF
 
Figure 2-2:  Network Representation of Katz (1959) Example 
 
The context of this network makes in-degree centrality an appropriate measure of 
individual importance (Katz, 1959: 41).  Katz sets α  = 0.5 before calculating his results 
which are compared to in-degree centrality in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5:  Comparison of In-Degree Centrality and Katz Centrality Results 
 
In-Degree 
Centrality
Katz 
Centrality
A 0.4 0.4692
B 0.2 0.0361
C 0.2 0.0361
D 0.6 0.4114
E 0.2 0.2238
F 0.8 0.4547  
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 Analysis of the in-degree centrality scores suggests that F is the most influential 
network member followed by D and then A.  It also suggests that B, C, and E have an 
equal amount of influence.  Inspection of the graph, however, reveals that A is chosen by 
both F and D, the “most influential” members in the group, suggesting that A’s status 
should be higher.  In addition, B, C, and E have equal in-degree centrality scores, but are 
structurally much different.  B and C each choose each other, but are not chosen by any 
other members of the group, while E on the other hand has contact with the rest of the 
group through D.  Comparison of Katz’s measure to degree centrality “indicates that 
every change is in the appropriate direction to overcome the short-comings” of in-degree 
centrality and that the Katz measure ranks the individuals in a better relative position 
(Katz, 1959: 43). 
Later authors (Hubbell, 1965; Taylor 1969) recognized that there was value in the 
T matrix itself because it represented influence between network members based on their 
positions within the topology of the network.  The T matrix in Table 2-6 highlights the 
pair-wise influence between members of this group: 
Table 2-6:  Katz T-matrix, Measures Pairwise Influence 
 
A B C D E F
A 1 0 0 0.8 0.4 1.2
B 2.6667 0.3333 0.6667 2.4 1.2 2.9333
C 3.3333 0.6667 0.3333 3.2 1.6 3.4667
D 2 0 0 1.4 1.2 1.6
E 2 0 0 2 1 2
F 2 0 0 1.6 0.8 1.4  
Cell Tij represents the influence of j over i, based purely on the topology of the network, 
and the given attenuation factor, α .  There are, however, two limitations of Katz’s 
formulation for developing pair-wise measures of structural influence, however: 
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• Selection of arbitrary attenuation factor 
• No discussion of the meaning of the diagonal values of T 
 
The attenuation factor, α , chosen for different networks, represents the value of 
indirect connections in the network.  The choice of α  should be made based on the 
context of the network; that is, based on the importance of indirect connections.  
Intelligence analysts could provide a subjective value of α  based on repeated 
observation of group operations and interactions.  A centralized command structure 
would suggest small values for α , while a distributed command structure might suggest 
larger values of α .  Figure 2-4 provides a comparison of influence attenuation for 
various values of α .  The selection of α , however is governed not by the context of the 
network, but rather by its structure.  If the largest eigenvalue is greater than the context-
based attenuation factor, the calculations call for taking the inverse of a singular matrix, 
which does not exist.  In the absence of better information, choosing α  according to 
Katz’s recommendations provides a reasonable starting point.  As ones understanding of 
group influence increases however, researchers are forced to choose values of α , based 
on purely structural reasons that may in fact be contrary to the context of the network.   
In addition, the diagonal values of T do not have a clear meaning.  Interpreting 
the values as influence over oneself is counter to the SNA convention of no self loops.  
Further, the implication that structural characteristics give one more or less influence 
over oneself does not appear to be backed by current SNA literature.  The values of Tii do 
appear to be perfectly correlated with Katz’s measure of influence; however he offers no 
discussion of this fact or its implications. 
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2.6.2. Hubbell Influence  
Hubbell (Hubbell, 1965: 377) states that interpersonal links in social network 
structures could be interpreted as input-output channels for the transmission of influence.  
Hubbell’s intention, when developing his influence measure, was the determination of 
cohesive subgroups (Hubbell, 1965: 377-378).  His goal was to move away from the rigid 
definition of a clique based on mutual connections in a social network defined by a 
binary adjacency matrix.  Hubbell’s clique definition enables the consideration of indirect 
links, is able to handle valued connections (positive or negative), and determines cliques 
based on a predefined influence threshold. 
Hubbell’s model of influence begins with A, an adjacency matrix representing a 
social network, and it is specifically concerned with the following sum: 
1
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The convergence of the geometric series requires that all aij values be fractional (Hubbell, 
1965: 378).  Node-node adjacency matrices, however have only binary (0-1) values, 
requiring Hubbell to adopt Katz’s attenuation factor α .  Thus, Y = (I – α A)-1.  Once 
calculated, Hubbell (Hubbell, 1965: 379) states that Yij is j’s total influence on i based on 
all direct and indirect ties.   
Hubbell then develops his input-output model of influence.  Let vij represent j’s 
contribution to i’s status, and let vi0 represent i’s exogenous (non-network) influence.   In 
a group of n persons, define si as the status score of member i, such that: 
)...( 210 iniiii vvvvs ++++=  
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Simply stated, ones status is the sum of their exogenous influence and the contributions 
of other network members to ones influence based on the topology of the network.  
Hubbell (Hubbell, 1965: 381) terms this the influence input for i.   
To make the status relationship between network and non-network influence 
clearer, Hubbell defines the vector, E = [ei], as one’s exogenous contribution to influence 
and sets .  He further assumesii ev =0 jijij sav )(α= , that is, the value of j’s contribution 
to i is proportional to j’s own status.  Substituting these terms into the input-output model 
yields the following linear equation: 
ijv
)...( 2211 niniiii sasasaes ++++= α . 
This model now considers both the status of the chooser as well as the strength with 
which he chooses (Hubbell, 1965: 382).  The model can be written in vector notation as 
follows: 
ASES α+=  
Simplification of this equation yields: 
YES
EAIS
=
−= −1)( α
. 
 Once the structure of A is specified and the attenuation factor α  is chosen, Y is 
fixed, which allows for quick analysis of the changes in the exogenous influence on the 
status of individuals in the network.  To reap this benefit, however, there are assumptions 
that must be made about the structure of α A.  To guarantee a solution to this model 
Hubbell assumes that: 
( ) 1...21 ≤+++ njjj aaaα , 
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which he believes is reasonable because “a person in society is faced with the fact of 
limited resources,” and “must decide on the proportion in which he will distribute his 
influence” (Hubbell, 1965:  384).  The above equation sets the column sums to one; 
however, in situations where weights are determined by the receiver of the influence, 
analogous row restrictions are more appropriate (Hubbell, 1965:  385).  Hubbell’s input-
output model is the basis for Friedkin’s social influence network model discussed in 
Section 2.3. 
 The limitations of Hubbell’s model stem from his lack of discussion in the 
development of E.  Hubbell’s discussion of exogenous variables suggests that his model 
is able to incorporate non-network influences, however he does not suggest how to 
develop these exogenous influences and for his example he uses arbitrarily chosen values 
(Hubbell, 1965:  386).  Given that ii ev =0 , by arbitrarily choosing ei, researchers are 
arbitrarily assigning value to the Aα  matrix.  Hubbell, distributed the remaining (1-ei) 
evenly across the remaining )a( ijα  that represented a connection.  For these reasons, it is 
common to set E = [1].  Solving the geometric series for this problem yields: 
1
1
)(
]1[)(
−
−
−=
−=
=
AIS
AIS
YES
α
α  
The off-diagonal cells of this matrix are identical to Katz’s T matrix, and the diagonals 
are larger by 1 (one). 
2.6.3. The Gatekeeper (Betweenness Centrality Revisited)  
 Freeman (Freeman, 1980) developed a measure of pair-dependency specifically to 
measure the gatekeeper phenomenon in social networks.  The measure is based on the 
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assumption that if one is located between others in a network, then he or she has the 
potential to control the flow of information and is somehow central to the network 
(Freeman, 1980:  585).  Freeman defined a gatekeeper as an “individual located in a 
communication structure so as to control messages flowing through a communication 
channel” (Freeman, 1980:  586).  The definition of gatekeeper is analogous to a cut out. 
 Freeman bases his measure on the shortest paths (geodesics) between each pair of 
points in the network.  To calculate pair-dependency, first define gik as the number of 
geodesics between i and k.  Then let gik(pj) be the number of geodesics between i and k 
that contain j as an intermediary point.  The proportion of geodesics between i and k 
containing j can be expressed as: 
ik
jik
jik g
pg
pb
)(
)( = . 
Simply stated, Betweenness Centrality is the ratio of the number of geodesics between 
nodes i and k containing node j to the total number of geodesics between nodes i and k. 
Freeman then defines the pair-dependency as the degree to which an individual 
must depend on another to relay messages along geodesic paths to other individuals in the 
network.  For a network with n members the pair-dependency of i on j is: 
∑
=
=
n
k
jikij pbd
1
)(  
)( kji ≠≠  
 
where dij measures the dependence of node i on node j to reach all other nodes k in the 
network.  The results of this calculation can be expressed in a matrix, D, in which each 
cell represents the dependence of i on j (Freeman, 1980:  588). 
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 Freeman’s model has limited applicability to the calculation of pair-wise 
influence.  First, Freeman implicitly assumes that geodesics are critical for the flow of 
information through a network.  While this may be true in general, for groups practicing 
good OPSEC communication paths may be intentionally routed through longer paths.  
The shortest path assumption, however, may be appropriate for the informal networks 
upon which clandestine networks are built.  Second, while pair-dependence may imply a 
certain amount of influence, Freeman’s measure is focused on control of information on a 
local level and does not account for the broader context of indirect connections. 
2.6.4. Stephenson and Zelen Centrality (Information Centrality Revisited) 
Stephenson and Zelen were motivated by the limitations of both closeness and 
betweenness centrality based on their reliance on geodesic paths (Stephenson and Zelen, 
1989: 1).    They were concerned with the very real possibility that communications may 
be intentionally channeled through many intermediaries to hide information (Stephenson 
and Zelen, 1989: 1).  Stephenson and Zelen, like Katz and Hubbell, consider weighted 
combinations of all possible paths between nodes to develop a measure of influence.  
Unlike Katz and Hubbell who calculate the sum of a geometric series that requires an 
arbitrary weighting, Stephenson and Zelen’s technique is motivated by statistical designs 
of experiment.  
Stephenson and Zelen (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989:  28-31) develop their 
measure structuring social networks as incomplete statistical block designs with two 
treatments per block.  The foundation for their proof lay in the assertion that any social 
network can be represented as an incomplete block design by constructing a node-arc 
incidence matrix X.  The proof of their formulation is given in the appendix of their paper 
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(Stephenson and Zelen, 1989:  28-34).  Their solution is an augmentation of the inverse 
of the information matrix, 2
)'(
σ
XX .  By assuming , the inverse of the information 
matrix is , the large sample covariance matrix for maximum likelihood 
estimates.   
12 =σ
1)'( −XX
Empirical testing performed for this thesis has shown that does not exist 
for various network structures.  Stephenson and Zelen, therefore augment  so that 
it is always invertible.  The measure concludes that the amount of influence in a path is 
the inverse of the variance in a path.  Stephenson and Zelen define the variance in a path 
equal to the length of the path (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 29).  Pair-wise information 
flow then is the sum of the information in all paths between i and j.  The construction of 
pair-wise Information Centrality begins with an adjacency matrix, A, representing a 
social network.   
1)( −XX T
)( XX T
To calculate pair-wise Information Centrality first define a matrix B = [bij], where 
bij = 0 if points i and j are adjacent, and 1 otherwise; and where bii = 1 + degree of point i. 
The next step is to calculate the matrix C, .  The matrix of pair-wise Information 
Centrality I, can then be populated through the following equation: 
1−= BC
1)2( −−+= ijjjiiij cccI . 
 Information Centrality can only be calculated for undirected networks.  Table 2-7 
contains the undirected social network, A, which are used to compare the results of 
Katz’s influence measure and Information Centrality: 
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Table 2-7:  Example Undirected Node-Node Adjacency Matrix 
 
A B C D E
A 0 1 0 1
B 1 0 1 0
C 0 1 0 1
D 1 0 1 0
E 1 1 0 0
1
1
0
0
0  
Matrix A, shown in Table 2-7 can be represented by the graph in Figure 2-2 below: 
E
D
C
B
A
 
Figure 2-3:  Graph Representation of Sample Undirected Network 
 
In general, Katz and Information Centrality calculate the same relative influence for each 
member. Table 2-8 compares the top-level influence measures produced using Katz’s 
method (α  = ½) with Information Centrality for matrix A.  It is clear from Table 2-8 that 
Katz and Information Centrality produced the same relative influence for each member in 
the sample network. 
Table 2-8:  Comparison of Katz Centrality and Information Centrality Top-Level Measures 
of Influence 
 
Katz 
Centrality
Information 
Centrality
A 0.941 1.7742
B 0.941 1.7742
C 0.6385 1.4103
D 0.6385 1.4103
E 0.7393 1.375  
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Table 2-9 and Table 2-10 show the pair-wise measures of influence for Katz Centrality 
and Information Centrality respectively.   
Table 2-9:  Pairwise Influence (Katz Centrality) 
 
A B C D E
A 1.2 1.4 0.8 1 1.2
B 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 1.2
C 0.8 1 0.6 0.8 0.6
D 1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6
E 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.8  
Table 2-10:  Pairwise Influence (Information Centrality) 
 
A B C D E
A 0 1.8333 1.1 1.375 1.5714
B 1.8333 0 1.375 1.1 1.5714
C 1.1 1.375 0 1.375 0.8462
D 1.375 1.1 1.375 0 0.8462
E 1.5714 1.5714 0.8462 0.8462 0  
The pair-wise matrices again show that Katz and Information Centrality assign the same 
relative influence weightings.  Information Centrality produces very similar results to the 
Katz method for this small matrix; however because Information Centrality attenuates 
influence much slower than Katz’s method; it is better able to model influence due to 
longer paths.  Figure 2-4 compares Information Centrality influence attenuation with 
Katz influence attenuation for various values of α : 
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Figure 2-4:  Comparison of Information Centrality Influence Attenuation with Katz 
Influence Attenuation for multiple values of alpha 
 
 The development of B suggested by Stephenson and Zelen is only appropriate for 
undirected networks.  To highlight this limitation, consider the following directed 
network in Figure 2-5: 
A
CB  
Figure 2-5:  Sample Directed Network 
 
This directed social network can be represented by the following node-node adjacency 
matrix: 
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⎥
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A  
Table 2-11 shows the Information Centrality scores produced for this network.  The 
results indicate that nodes B and C both have influence over node A, however there is no 
directed path from either B or C to node A.  According to Stephenson and Zelen’s 
development, however, if no path exists between two nodes there should be no influence 
flow between them. 
Table 2-11:  Information Centrality Scores for Sample Directed Network 
A B C
A 0 1.2 1.2
B 0.8571 0 1
C 0.8571 1 0  
2.6.5. Section Summary 
The Katz and Hubbell methods consider all possible paths, and use the sum of an 
infinite geometric series to produce their influence measures.  Both of their techniques, 
however, require the analyst to choose an arbitrary attenuation factor to ensure that the 
geometric series converges.  Hubbell’s formulation is the only one to consider non-
network and network characteristics in an influence model, although it is not clear where 
E comes from.  Betweenness Centrality only considers shortest paths in its development, 
and is better suited to measuring pair-wise dependence.  Information Centrality produces 
results comparable to Katz and Hubbell for undirected networks without requiring the 
analyst to choose an arbitrary attenuation value.  In addition, Information Centrality is 
able to capture the impact of longer paths than the Katz or Hubbell methods.  Information 
Centrality, however, is only appropriate for undirected networks.  This section has 
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described the development of the current methods to develop pair-wise measures of 
interpersonal influence.  An improved model of social influence should incorporate the 
best of each of these models, avoiding arbitrary value assignments, and enabling the use 
of non-network characteristics in the calculation of social influence. 
2.7.  Chapter Summary 
 The review of literature provided in this chapter provides a foundation for 
understanding the relevant techniques for modeling pair-wise interpersonal influence 
within clandestine networks.  Social Influence Network (SIN) theory provides a 
mathematical formulation of the process of interpersonal influence that occurs in groups.  
To accurately model social influence one must consider both network and non-network 
measures of influence.  The techniques discussed in Chapter 2 provide a starting point 
from which an improved measure of pair-wise interpersonal influence can be developed. 
 The next chapter defines a methodology for creating an improved measure of 
pair-wise interpersonal influence based on non-network characteristics as well as the 
topology of the multiple formal and informal networks to which clandestine network 
members belong.  Chapters 4 and 5 provide demonstrations of the methodology 
developed in Chapter 3, highlighting the key results. 
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3. Methodology for Developing an Improved Measure of Interpersonal Influence 
3.1. Introduction 
 A tenet of this thesis is that interpersonal influence is a combination of one’s 
personal characteristics and one’s position in his/her networks of relationships.  Given 
this assertion, a measure of interpersonal influence, then, must capture the functional 
relationship between influence, and non-network and network characteristics of 
individuals in its development.  A review of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Social 
Influence Network (SIN) theory (Katz, 1953; French, 1956; Harary, 1959; Hubbell, 1965; 
Taylor, 1969; Granovetter, 1973; Freeman, 1980; Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Friedkin, 
1997, 1998, 2001, 2003; and Leenders, 2002) has revealed three primary shortcomings 
that this thesis overcomes: 
• Inadequate development of non-network measure of influence 
• No consideration of multiple networks and network contexts in measures 
• Focus on Descriptive analysis not Prescriptive analysis 
 
Modeling and analysis of interpersonal influence in clandestine networks must 
consider personal characteristics as well as the trusted pre-existing social networks from 
which members and leaders are drawn.  Further, the measures of interpersonal influence 
developed must enable analysts to provide specific, quantifiable results that are 
actionable.  Chapter 3 outlines the development of a new, proxy measure of interpersonal 
influence that is based on the personal characteristics and social structural characteristics 
of a group.  This new measure are referred to as the Holistic Interpersonal Influence 
Measure (HIIM), because it attempts to measure the functional relationships and 
interdependence between the parts (individual characteristics and social network 
characteristics) and the whole (interpersonal influence) of social influence.  Section 3.2 
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details the data requirements for the development of the HIIM.  The development of non-
network influence measures is outlined in Section 3.3.  Section 3.4 outlines the 
development of a measure of interpersonal influence based on network topology.  Section 
3.5 details methods to combine the outputs of multiple social network layers into a single 
influence network.  Section 3.6 then explains how to combine the information gained in 
sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 into an improved measure of social influence, the HIIM.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the development of the HIIM. 
An overview of the HIIM development process is shown in Figure 3-1.  Analysts 
begin with individual demographic data and social network data from multiple informal 
networks to which clandestine network members belong.  Individual characteristics and 
SNA centrality measures are used as inputs to develop a Discriminant Function that will 
serve as a proxy measure of individual influence.  Connection data from each informal 
social network are used to develop pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence based 
solely on network topology.  The contributions of each informal network to overall 
influence are considered simultaneously by creating a linear combination of their effects.  
The relative importance of each informal network, to the clandestine network, will serve 
as network weights in the linear combination.  Finally, the individual influence measures 
and combined interpersonal influence measures are combined to produce a new proxy 
measure of interpersonal influence that considers both non-network and network 
contributions to influence in its development, the HIIM. 
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Figure 3-1:  Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure Methodology Framework 
3.2. Data Requirements 
 To calculate the HIIM, two types of data are required, individual characteristic 
data and social network data.  Critical to the development of individual measures of 
influence are demographic type characteristic data.  The history of psychology based 
leadership research (Cartwright, 1965; Lord et al. 1986; Bass 1990) has shown that 
demographic characteristics, such as age, wealth, education level, and so forth, can be 
predictive of influence in many different types of groups.  In addition to personal 
characteristics, sociologists have long investigated the impact of social network topology 
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on influence.  Sociologists agree that influence is a fundamental property of social 
structures (Henneman, 2001: 60). 
 Analysts calculating measures of interpersonal influence based on personal and 
social structural characteristics often must make certain assumptions about their data.  
The literature in both psychology and sociology generally assume that the data sets are 
complete and correct.  Having complete psychological data implies that one has 
information on all group members under investigation for all of the personal 
characteristics being incorporated in the evaluation.  Complete social network data 
implies that one knows all group members and has identified all possible interactions 
between the members of the group.  Correct data implies that each characteristic or social 
connection has been accurately observed and quantified.  These assumptions, difficult to 
meet in a clinical experiment, are highly unlikely to be satisfied for an analysis of any 
real world group, let alone an uncooperative real world group.  Further, analysis of 
clandestine networks practicing good OPSEC makes satisfying these assumptions even 
more difficult.  A good measure of interpersonal influence, however, should enable post 
optimality analysis to highlight the potential impacts of incomplete or incorrect data.  In 
this chapter, it is assumed one has access to complete and correct individual characteristic 
and group social network data from multiple formal or informal network contexts.  This 
assumption is relaxed later in this thesis.  The next section begins the development of a 
new measure of interpersonal influence, focusing specifically on individual influence 
based on personal characteristics. 
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3.3. Individual Influence Measurement 
 Social Influence Network (SIN) theory literature (Friedkin, 1997, 1998, 2001, 
2003; and Leenders, 2002) accounts for exogenous (non-network) influence in its 
development.  Friedkin (Friedkin, 1998: 24) suggests that an individuals’ non-network 
influence can be modeled as a weighted combination of an actor’s non-network 
characteristics.  Friedkin (Friedkin, 1998: 24-25) further states that the exogenous 
influence values must be normalized to be between zero and one.  Friedkin’s model can 
be written as: 
XB=Ε  
where E is an vector of exogenous influence measures; X is an  matrix of p 
characteristics for n group members; and B is a
)1( ×n )( pn×
)1( ×p vector of coefficient weights for 
the characteristics. 
Construction of an appropriate measure of exogenous influence, however, is not 
discussed.  In addition, in the examples of the works cited above, exogenous influence is 
assumed to be equal (ei = 1) across all members.  For most networks, including 
clandestine networks, this is an inappropriate assumption.  This section describes the 
development of an individual influence measure using Discriminant Analysis. 
3.3.1. Techniques to Develop a Measure of Exogenous Influence 
The equation, E = XB , is in the form of a multiple linear regression equation 
(Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 215; Bartholomew, et al., 2002: 149; Lattin et al., 2003: 44).  
Regression is primarily used for assessing the relationships between a dependent 
response variable, E, and a set of independent predictor variables, X (Dillon and 
Goldstein, 1984: 209).  The key to building a regression model is the estimation of the 
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coefficient weights, B.  To estimate the coefficients, however, requires observed values 
of E, the individual influence measure that one wishes to calculate.  In the absence of an 
ability to fully observe and accurately measure E, one must choose an alternative to 
regression. 
Discriminant Analysis involves a qualitative, dependent response variable, and a 
set of independent predictor variables.  The categorical variable serves to group the 
individuals into mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive a priori groups (Dillon and 
Goldstein, 1984: 360).  Based on the a priori groupings, Discriminant Analysis produces 
B coefficients such that the linear combination of the independent variables, X, provides 
“maximally different” discriminant scores across groups (Lattin et al., 2003: 429).  Using 
Discriminant Analysis to develop a measure of influence based on leadership, then, 
requires that one assigns individuals to an influential (leadership) group and a less-
influential (non-leadership) group (Any groupings of interest can be investigated).  
Discriminant Analysis can then be used to calculate the coefficient weights, B, that are 
needed to create a measure of individual influence. 
3.3.2. Data Requirements 
To perform a Discriminant Analysis one must have, individual characteristic data 
and an a priori classification of individuals into mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive groups.  Individual characteristic data typically implies demographic data 
such as age and education level, but this thesis also considers an individuals score on 
classic SNA measures, such as a degree centrality, as appropriate. In addition, the 
classification of individuals into groups implies that one has enough understanding of the 
group to make an initial classification of its members.  For the remainder of this chapter, 
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it is assumed that there exists a data set with N members on P characteristics, and the data 
has been divided into two groups, G1 and G2 of sizes n1 and n2 respectively. 
3.3.3. Discriminant Analysis Overview 
Discriminant Analysis is a statistical technique used to classify individuals into 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups on the basis of a set of 
independent variables (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 360; Lattin et al., 2003: 426-7).  It 
does this by developing a weighted average of each individual’s scores on the 
independent variables and transforming them into a posteriori probabilities used to 
determine the likelihood of an individual belonging to each of the groups (Dillon and 
Goldstein, 1984: 361).  Discriminant Analysis has many practical applications for use in 
modeling clandestine networks.  This study focuses on group leadership in an effort to 
develop a measure of individual influence.  The methodology, however, could be used to 
analyze a variety of subgroups within a clandestine network. 
A thorough Discriminant Analysis can be completed by performing the following 
steps (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 360-380): 
1. Divide the data into Test and Validation Sets 
2. Test for underlying assumptions of Discriminant Analysis 
3. Perform Discriminant Analysis Calculations 
4. Test Hypothesis—Are the group means different? 
5. Interpretation of Betas and Discriminant Loadings 
6. Validation 
 
Once performed, the Discriminant Analysis provides the analyst with a great deal of 
information in addition to a measure of individual influence.  Discriminant Analysis will 
help the analyst to answer the questions (Lattin, et al., 2003: 427-428): 
• Are the leaders (influential persons) different than the followers on the 
observed set of characteristics? 
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• If so, on which characteristics do they differ? 
• Can we predict leadership based on these differing characteristics? 
 
The answers to these questions not only help an analyst to determine the “quality” of the 
measure of individual influence, but can also be used to build an operational profile of 
group leaders. 
 Hypothesis testing determines if there is sufficient statistical evidence to support 
the contention that the two groups differ on the set of observed characteristics.  If the 
groups are not statistically different, there are two possible conclusions.  It could mean 
there is no difference between the influential and non-influential group on the basis of 
individual characteristics and thus assigning them equal influence scores such as Friedkin 
and Leenders suggest is appropriate.  On the other hand, it may only suggest that the 
groups are not statistically different on the basis of the observed characteristics.  This 
could suggest that one or more key characteristics were missed or that there is insufficient 
data available. 
 If the groups are statistically different however, the Discriminant Analysis results 
can support a variety of analysis.  First, assigning equal influence scores to all members 
is no longer appropriate.  The ability to distinguish between the influential and non-
influential members of a group enables the calculation of meaningful influence scores.  In 
addition, the discriminant loadings can be used to identify the most important 
discriminating characteristics.  The discriminating characteristics can then be used to 
build a profile of group leaders (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 372-373).  This profile can 
be used by operators in the field to identify potentially influential group members. 
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 Finally, Discriminant Analysis produces a function which can be used to predict 
into which group newly identified individuals should be classified.  The predictive 
quality of the Discriminant Function is tested during the validation step.  A Discriminant 
Function that classifies well gives further credibility to the hypothesis testing and to the 
group profile (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984:  363-364).  Once completed, the Discriminant 
Analysis results can be used to develop a proxy measure of individual exogenous 
influence.  The next section details the final calculation of this measure.   
3.3.4. Determination of Individual Influence Measure 
Assuming the data set has satisfied the Discriminant Analysis assumptions, and a 
Discriminant Function that is a “good” classifier has been created, the new proxy 
measure of individual influence can be calculated.  While the discriminant scores could 
be used as this new measure, the a posteriori probability of belonging to the leadership 
group is a more appropriate choice.  Posterior group membership probabilities are a 
function of the discriminant scores (Lattin et al., 2003: 453-454), which have two 
primary advantages over the discriminant scores.   
First, discriminant scores for an individual are difficult to interpret without 
reference to discriminant scores of other individuals.  Posterior probabilities, however, 
have very clear interpretations.  They represent the likelihood of membership in the 
leadership group (Lattin, et al., 2003: 453-454).  A known leader with a high posterior 
probability of membership or a known non-leader with a low posterior probability helps 
to confirm the Discriminant Analysis results.  Posterior probabilities that agree with the a 
priori classification give confidence that the Discriminant Analysis was successful.  
Misclassifications, however, if there are few enough to analyze, can offer very interesting 
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interpretations.  An individual a priori classified as non-influential who has a high 
posterior probability suggests several possibilities; for example this may suggest a 
potentially disgruntled member who has been passed over for promotion, or an up and 
coming leader who has yet to be discovered.  In addition, a known leader with a low 
posterior probability of membership may indicate that the analysis has not yet identified 
all of the key leadership characteristics, or simply, that Discriminant Analysis may be 
inappropriate for the given data set.  If Discrimimant Analysis assumptions are violated, 
Logistic regression offers a suitable alternative that will not change the overall 
methodology. 
The other advantage of posterior probabilities over raw discriminant scores is due 
to the compatibility with SIN theory.  SIN theory requires that exogenous influence 
measures be between zero and one.  Producing discriminant score values between zero 
and one would require scaling or normalization.  Posterior probabilities are again 
attractive because they are the discriminant scores scaled based on a priori probabilities 
of group membership.  The remainder of the section details the calculation of the 
posterior probability of membership in the influential group. 
Given a population G with N members, divided into two groups, the influential 
members in group 1 (G1), and the less-influential members in group 2 (G2), with group 
sizes n1 and n2 respectively.  The discriminant scores using Mahalanobis’ method can be 
calculated as follows (Lattin, et al., 2003: 453): 
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is the a priori probability of membership in group i, , xo are the characteristic values of a 
particular individual, and Ci is the variance—covariance matrix of group i.  If it is 
appropriate to pool the covariance of the two groups, the pooled estimator is used.  If it is 
not appropriate to pool the covariance, the appropriate variance—covariance matrix from 
each group is used.  Once the discriminant scores are calculated for each individual for 
each group, posterior probabilities can be calculated as: 
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where e is the base of the natural logarithm, sometimes called Euler's e. The posterior 
probability of belonging to the influential group, then, may serve as a proxy measure of 
individual influence that satisfies the requirements of SIN theory.  There are several 
current statistical software packages such as JMP, SAS, SPSS, and S-PLUS that perform 
a complete Discriminant Analysis, providing the posterior probabilities as a standard 
output.  The next section supports the addition of traditional SNA measures of individual 
importance as independent predictor variables used during Discriminant Analysis. 
3.3.5. Inclusion of SNA Measures in Discriminant Analysis 
SNA measures of individual importance, such as degree centrality, attempt to 
measure influence based on an individuals’ position within the overall topology of a 
social network.  All such measures attempt to describe and measure properties of actors’ 
locations within a network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:  169).  Further, each of these 
measures attempts to assess the importance or prominence of an individual based on their 
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position.  The question of the validity of the measures remains however; that is, “do they 
really capture what we substantively mean by ‘importance’ or ‘prominence’?” 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994:  172). 
In general, sociologists suggest that individuals with high centrality scores in 
relation to the other members of their network are important.  It has consistently been 
shown, however, that individual centrality measures are fallible when analyzing real 
organizations (Taylor, 1969; Bonacich, 1972; Freeman, 1980; Mizruchi, 1981; 
Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Renfro, 2001; Ashworth, 2003).  In the analysis of 
clandestine networks practicing good OPSEC, it is likely that these measures may 
perform even worse.   
Using individual centrality measures as inputs into a Discriminant Analysis can 
help to overcome the potentially invalid assumptions of importance made by these 
measures, and it may also help to improve the Discriminant Function by uncovering 
structural characteristics common to group leadership.  An example using Krackhardt’s 
High Tech Manager (Krackhardt, 1987) data has been used to highlight the potential 
benefits of using SNA centrality scores as independent predictor variables.  Krackhardt’s 
High Tech Manager data is available in Appendix B of Social Network Analysis:  
Methods and Applications (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 740-743). 
Krackhardt’s data consists of three social network structures, an “Advice” 
relation, a “Friendship” relation, and a “Reports to” relation, as well as individual 
characteristic data.  For the purposes of this example, a Discriminant Analysis using Age 
and Tenure (number of years employed by the company) alone is compared with a 
Discriminant Analysis using Age and Tenure as well as member in-degree, out-degree 
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and eigenvector centrality measures from the “Advice” and “Friendship” networks as 
independent variables.  The “Reports to” network and the “Level” characteristic were 
used to develop the classification into influential and less-influential groups.  For the 
purposes of this demonstration, Level 1 and 2 managers were assumed to be leaders; 
Level 3 managers were assumed to be non-leaders. 
In both cases, the null hypothesis that the group means were equal was rejected at 
the 05.0=α level.  Table 3-1  shows the confusion matrix created by the classifier using 
Age and Tenure alone has a classification accuracy of approximately 63%.   
Table 3-1:  Demographic Characteristic Confusion Matrix 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2
Actual Group 1 2 3
Membership Group 2 3 13
Predicted Membership
Table 3-2 shows the confusion matrix created by the classifier using Age, Tenure and 
SNA centrality measures, displayed 100% classification accuracy. 
Table 3-2:  Demographic and Social Network Data Confusion Matrix 
 
Group 1 Group 2
Actual Group 1 5 0
Membership Group 2 0 16
Predicted Membership
 
The improved classification accuracy in this example suggests that the inclusion of SNA 
centrality measures may reduce both Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) 
classification errors.  A reduction in misclassifications will enable better use of limited 
resources tasked to observe, disrupt, or destroy a given clandestine network. 
 In addition to the confusion matrices, the discriminant loadings can also be 
compared.  Table 3-3 compares the discriminant loadings of the two classifiers: 
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Table 3-3:  Discriminant Loadings for Krackhardt's High Tech Managers Data 
 
Classifier 1 Classifier 2
Age 0.3809 0.0828
Tenure 0.9704 0.2109
Advice-In-Degree -0.0296
Advice-Out-Degree 0.6621
Advice-Eigen 0.1439
Friendship-In-Degree -0.2883
Friendship-Out-Degree 0.0843
Friendship-Eigen -0.231  
The discriminant loading of Classifier 1, using only Age and Tenure, identifies Tenure as 
the key discriminating characteristic.  Classifier 2, however, shows that Out-Degree in 
the Advice Network and In-Degree in the Friendship Network are the best discriminators, 
with Tenure shown to be fourth best.  In addition, Classifier 2 has positive and negative 
Discriminant Loadings which can be used to contrast the two groups.  The positive 
Discriminant Loadings are associated with characteristics for which the leadership group 
had higher values; similarly, the negative Discriminant Loadings are associated with 
higher values for the non-leadership group. 
 The results of this Discriminant Analysis imply leaders score high on Out-Degree 
centrality for the Advice network, but leaders score low on In-Degree centrality for the 
Friendship network.  This suggests that high centrality in an informal network is not 
always indicative of influence or power as suggested by traditional SNA theory.  Further, 
this analysis has provided a measure of validation for each of these measures.  For this 
network high Out-Degree centrality scores for the Advice network identifies leaders in 
the organization, while high In-Degree centrality scores for the Friendship network 
suggests non-leaders.  The high centrality scores for the Friendship network indicating 
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non-leaders is counter to traditional SNA assumptions about high network centrality 
implying influence. 
 This simple example highlights the potential benefits of using individual 
centrality measures as independent predictor variables in a Discriminant Analysis.  The 
results also demonstrate the potential ability to improve the classification accuracy of the 
discriminant function.  In addition, the results can identify the specific individual 
centrality measures for which social networks are important for identifying group leaders.  
The use of a Discriminant Function to check the validity of the assertions of individual 
centrality measures is a new capability for SNA analysts.   
3.3.6. Section Summary 
Current SIN theory literature accounts for a measure of exogenous influence, but 
offers no method to develop such a measure.  Discriminant Analysis can be used to 
develop a measure of exogenous influence.  In addition to a proxy influence measure, 
Discriminant Analysis provides analysts with the ability to profile, differentiate, and 
classify group members.  These results alone improve one’s understanding of the group 
under study.  The addition of SNA centrality measures to the set of characteristics can 
improve Discriminant Analysis results.  If the underlying assumptions of Discriminant 
Analysis are violated, Logistic Regression is an appropriate alternative. 
Using SNA measures as predictor variables also provides the analyst validation of 
which networks and network measures are important to identifying group leaders.  In 
addition to exogenous influence, SIN theory is concerned with interpersonal influence 
based purely on the topology of social networks.  The next section discusses the 
development of a pair-wise measure of potential influence based on network topology. 
3-15 
3.4. Pair-Wise Influence Measurement 
 Development of an appropriate measure of interpersonal influence is critical to 
Social Influence Network (SIN) theory.  One of the primary assumptions of SIN theory is 
that the relative net influence of each group member on others depends on the topology 
of the network (Friedkin, 2003).  Friedkin (Friedkin, 1998: 25) describes W, the 
“influence network,” as the pattern and magnitude of direct interpersonal influence within 
a network.  The specification of W for a network is of “vital importance” to the resulting 
analysis (Leenders, 2002: 27).   
SIN theory has been under development since the 1950’s, beginning with French 
and Harary (French, 1956; Harary, 1959).  In that time, however, there have only been a 
few techniques developed to calculate measures of interpersonal influence based on the 
topology of a network.  Each of the techniques develops W, which is often called the 
weight matrix, where cell wij represents the extent to which actor i influences actor j 
(Leenders, 2002: 33).  The next section discusses the different approaches for developing 
W, the pair-wise influence measures for a single network context, highlighting the 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach.  The reader is reminded that relationships 
exist on multiple levels and in multiple contexts.  To develop the HIIM, the methodology 
outlined in this section must be applied to all formal and informal social networks for 
which there is adequate data. 
3.4.1. Techniques to Develop a Measure of Pair-Wise Interpersonal Influence 
 The matrix, W, is intended to represent potential pair-wise interpersonal influence 
in a social network based purely on network topology (Friedkin, 2003: 496).  Most 
studies of social influence assume communication to be the underlying process 
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(Leenders, 2002: 27).  In addition, it is assumed that influence flows along the paths of a 
network (Katz, 1953; Hubbell, 1965; Taylor, 1969; Friedkin, 1997, 1998; Leenders, 
2002).  Techniques for calculating W, then, have focused on the connectivity of network 
members through the paths in the network.   
There are two primary philosophies for developing the weight matrix.  Katz, 
Hubbell, Friedkin and Leenders (Katz, 1953; Hubbell, 1965; Friedkin, 1988; Leenders, 
2002) consider a weighted average of the paths between group members.  Their 
formulations of W are based on enumeration of paths, which are weighted based on path 
length.  Stephenson and Zelen (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989) consider the information in 
all possible paths; however, their method is based on the structural similarities between 
social networks and Designs of Experiments.  They weight each path based on its 
“potential variation.”  The remainder of this section discusses the development and 
limitations of each of these techniques. 
Katz, Hubbell and Friedkin (Katz, 1953; Hubbell, 1965; Friedkin, 1998) consider 
all possible paths in their development.  As discussed in Chapter 2, these authors rely on 
the solution to the geometric series: 
13322 )(... −−=++++ AIAAAI αααα  
where A is the node-node adjacency matrix representing network structure, and α is an 
attenuation factor.  The benefit of this approach is that it considers all possible paths, 
without the need for complete enumeration.  The limitation of this approach is in the 
selection ofα .  Ideally, α would represent an observed measure of influence loss as the 
structural distance between two members increases; however, α  is governed 
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mathematically by the structure of A.  does not exist if 1)( −− AI α )1()/1( λα < , where )1(λ  
is the largest eigenvalue of A.  In addition, the impact of indirect connections decreases 
exponentially with path length.  If the group under consideration has potentially long 
paths of influence, this formulation may not capture their impact.  For example, the Air 
Force Chief of Staff’s influence over a Captain studying at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology may be inappropriately minimized by these measures. 
 Leenders (2002) considers only a limited number of paths between individuals in 
a group, typically only paths of three or less connections (Leenders, 2002:  35-36).  In 
addition, Leenders considers the impact of direct and indirect paths separately in his 
formulations.  The benefit of Leenders’ approach is the flexibility of weighting path 
lengths individually based on an observed decrease in influence over greater structural 
distances.  This approach, however, is limited because it calls for complete enumeration 
of paths.  As the size of networks increase or the lengths of paths under consideration 
become longer, Leenders’ method requires a great deal of computation.  In addition, the 
ability to apply weights based on observed network characteristics implies that one can 
actually observe and measure accurately the influence loss as path lengths increase; a 
situation that may not be clear when analyzing clandestine networks. 
 Stephenson and Zelen (1989), like Katz, Hubbell, and Friedkin consider all 
possible paths in their measure development.  Stephenson and Zelen, however use the 
similarities between network structures and experimental design methodology to develop 
their measure, called Information Centrality.  A key to the proof of their construction is 
the transformation of a node-node adjacency matrix, A, into a node-arc incidence matrix 
X (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 28).  To calculate information flow through a path, 
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defined as the inverse of the variance in a path (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 12, 29), 
Stephenson and Zelen must determine the variance-covariance structure of the network, 
.  By construction, however,  does not exist.  To enable calculation of 
the variance-covariance matrix, Stephenson and Zelen suggest adding to , the 
diagonal matrix,  with diagonal values equal to twice the degree of each 
node, and an  matrix of ones.  This produces an invertible matrix from which they 
can compute Information Centrality.  The benefit of using Information Centrality is its 
ease of calculation.  The measure is limited however, because it is not appropriate for 
undirected networks.  As shown in Chapter 2, Information Centrality produces 
comparable results to Katz, and Hubbell for directed networks, but it fails on even the 
simplest undirected network. 
1)'( −XX 1)'( −XX
)'( XX
))(2( iddiag
)( nn×
 Each of these techniques can be used to calculate pair-wise measures of 
interpersonal influence.  They each have their benefits and limitations and are appropriate 
in different situations.  The next section briefly discusses the appropriate situations for 
each technique. 
3.4.2. Appropriate Use of Pair-Wise Influence Measures 
When developing a measure of pair-wise interpersonal influence, it is important to 
choose the technique appropriate for the context of the analysis being performed.  The 
methods discussed above can be compared for appropriateness based on three criteria: 
• Network Symmetry 
• Influence of Indirect Connections 
• Computational Complexity 
 
Table 3-4 compares each method on these three factors: 
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Table 3-4:  Comparison of Techniques to Develop Pair-Wise Influence Measures 
 
Network    
Symmetry
Indirect 
Connections 
(attenuation factor)
Computation 
Complexity
Katz, Hubbell, 
Friedkin
Appropriate for 
symmetric and non-
symetric networks
Attenuation factor 
limited by size of 
largest eigenvalue
of A
Calculation of 
inverse, will exist by 
construction
Leenders
Appropriate for 
symmetric and non-
symetric networks
Attenuation factor can 
be specified for each 
path length
Complete 
enumeration of paths
Stephenson       
and Zelen
Appropriate for 
symmetric networks 
only
Uniform attenuation, 
inverse of path length
Calculation of 
inverse, will exist by 
construction
λ
 
The Katz-Hubbell-Friedkin and Stephenson-Zelen methods are attractive because of their 
ease of computation, while the Leenders method is attractive because of its flexibility in 
choosing attenuation factors. 
 The Katz-Hubbell-Friedkin method is appropriate for directed and undirected 
networks.  Further, because of its simple calculations, it is appropriate to use for large 
networks.  This technique is limited by its choice of attenuation factor.  In addition, by 
construction the influence of indirect connections decreases exponentially as path lengths 
increase.  Networks with distributed leadership, operating through long lines of 
communication may not be appropriate for this technique. 
 The Leenders method is also appropriate for directed and undirected networks.  
Leenders’ method is very flexible because it enables analysts to specify a weight for each 
path length.  Assignment of appropriate weights, however, requires greater knowledge of 
the network.  In addition, this technique requires the complete enumeration of paths.  
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This typically limited Leenders to consider paths of no more than length 3.  The 
combinatorial cost of complete path enumeration limits Leenders’ approach to networks 
with short lines of communication.  Improved path finding algorithms or exploitation of 
k-shortest path algorithms, however, could make Leenders’ method practical. 
 The Stephenson-Zelen method is only appropriate for undirected networks.  Its 
ease of calculation and results are comparable to the Katz-Hubbell-Friedkin method.  
Information Centrality, however, considers the impact of indirect connections to be the 
inverse of path length and in general, this technique attenuates much slower. Slower 
attenuation enables greater consideration to indirect connections in overall influence.  
When one has limited information on the impact of indirect connections the inverse of 
path length is a reasonable assumption.  Information Centrality is most appropriate when 
analyzing symmetric networks in which one has limited information about how influence 
diminishes through indirect connections.  The implications of modeling influence in 
clandestine networks is next discussed, along with the selection of the appropriate 
technique for developing pair-wise interpersonal influence measures for clandestine 
networks. 
3.4.3. Appropriate Techniques for Clandestine Networks 
Clandestine networks, because of their need to practice good OPSEC, are built on 
a foundation of pre-existing, trusted social networks.  The use of pre-existing social 
networks sets limits on the social structure of the clandestine network (Erickson, 1981: 
188).  The trust premium paid by clandestine organizations is their reliance on pre-
existing networks.  This enables analysts tasked to understand and influence clandestine 
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network operations to bound the problem space by focusing on the trusted relationships 
of a particular group. 
These pre-existing networks, such as family, friends, and schoolmates, by their 
very nature are two-way relationships.  In addition, current literature offers little 
discussion on the impact of indirect connections in such networks for clandestine groups.  
Given these conditions, Information Centrality is appropriate for the development of 
interpersonal influence measures for clandestine networks. 
3.4.4. Determination of Pair-Wise Influence Measure 
 The informal networks upon which clandestine networks are built are most often 
undirected networks.  Information Centrality, then, can be calculated for these informal 
networks.  Information Centrality calculations however require that the network be 
connected, that is, every member can reach every other member.  Within a single network 
context, this is likely an unreasonable assumption for two reasons.  Relationships may 
exist in several network layers; however, members may not be connected in every layer. 
By focusing on a single network layer such as friendship, there is a possibility that 
different groups of friends are not connected to each other.  In addition, all of the network 
data is based on observation; connections may exist that have not yet been observed.   It 
is therefore necessary to account for the possibility of independent subgroups within 
these networks in the calculation of Information Centrality. 
 Let the matrix, A, represent an undirected informal network to which members of 
the clandestine network of interest belong.  To calculate a pair-wise measure of 
interpersonal influence based on Information Centrality, the following steps must be 
followed.  First define an  matrix B, such that )( nn×
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Define the matrix C = B-1.  The matrix, I, representing pair-wise measures of Information 
Centrality can be calculated as: 
1)2( −−+= ijjjiiij cccI  
Each cell, Iij, represents the combined flow of “information” from node i to node j 
through all possible paths joining i and j.   
 If the matrix A is not connected, however, B will not be full rank and therefore 
cannot be inverted.  If B cannot be inverted, Iij cannot be calculated.  When this occurs 
the additional step of observing the network as separate components must be taken.  The 
first step is to remove isolates; known clandestine network members with no connections 
in a particular informal network.  The second step is to divide the network into its 
separate independent components.  Information Centrality calculations can be performed 
on the independent components.  Once Information Centrality has been computed for 
each component, the network must be rebuilt by rejoining the components and adding in 
the isolates.  Members of independent components are assumed to have no known 
influence over members of another independent component in a given network context.  
Isolates are assumed to have no influence over, and are not influenced by, other network 
members.  Figure 3-2 graphically displays this process: 
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Figure 3-2:  Steps to Calculate Information Centrality 
 
Another practical advantage provide by Information Centrality is the ability to 
quickly assess the number of independent subgroups within a clandestine network.  
Again, if the matrix A is not connected, that is, there are independent subgroups, B as 
previously discussed, will not be full rank, and B-1 will not exist.  Although not proven, 
empirical testing has shown that the rank of B is determined by the number of 
independent subgroups.  If there are k independent subgroups in A, the rank of B are n-k.  
This observation has very practical purposes in the analysis of clandestine networks, 
because it provides the capability to uncover subgroups within the informal networks that 
may be of importance in the clandestine network.  For example, if the informal network 
being analyzed represented friendship, independent groups of friends could be identified 
and potentially exploited. 
3.4.5. Section Summary 
There are three primary techniques for calculating pair-wise measures of 
interpersonal influence.  Each technique has its advantages and disadvantages.  Based on 
the elements of the measure and its intended use, Information Centrality appears to be the 
most appropriate technique to calculate pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence in 
clandestine networks.    Information Centrality produces a measure of interpersonal 
influence that is based completely on network topology. 
3-24 
This section has detailed the steps necessary to develop influence measures for a 
single informal network.  Social networks however exist in more than one context and on 
multiple levels.  There are many informal networks that clandestine networks are based 
on, and pair-wise interpersonal influence measures can be developed for each informal 
network.  The next logical step is to combine the information from each of these informal 
networks to develop an overall measure of pair-wise interpersonal influence.  The next 
section discusses techniques to combine multiple network layers. 
3.5. Multiple Network Layers 
 Most social network analysis studies focus on a single network; however, most 
relationships exist in several contexts.  Social network techniques, in general, do not 
explore these situations (Bonacich et al., 2004: 189).  Effective analysis of clandestine 
networks must consider the impact of multiple social contexts.  Pair-wise interpersonal 
influence measures can be calculated for every formal or informal network for which one 
has connection data.  While the determination of interpersonal influence for each of these 
networks has its own intrinsic value, the ability to analyze these networks simultaneously 
develops a more complete picture of the clandestine network.  A multiple-layered 
network of interpersonal influences can be developed through a linear combination of the 
interpersonal influences from each informal network to which clandestine network 
members belong.  This multi-layered influence measure can be represented by: 
nnIwIwIwW +++= ...2211  
∑
=
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where Ii is the matrix of pair-wise interpersonal influences from network i as defined in 
the previous section, and wi is the perceived importance of network context i in 
determining influence within the group.   
Because the true form of the function is unknown, a linear model was chosen 
based on the Sparsity of Effects Principle, which states that when there are several 
variables, a system or process is likely to be driven primarily by the main effects and 
low-order interactions (Myers and Montgomery, 2002: 155).  Interaction terms are 
generally products of main effect terms, however matrix multiplication is not an 
appropriate transformation for Information Centrality values which are ratio.  
Interactions, despite their likely importance, are not considered in this study because the 
underlying theory remains to be developed.  This section discusses techniques to combine 
the information from multiple network layers. 
3.5.1. Hyper-edges and Multidimensional Centrality 
 Node-arc incidence matrices can be used to represent hypergraphs, defined as 
graphs with hyperedges.  Node-arc incidence matrices for graphs have exactly two non-
zero elements per row; the non-zero elements indicate which nodes are adjacent.  The 
rows in a hypergraph can have more than two non-zero elements, two for the adjacent 
nodes, and the other non-zero elements representing the network context.   
Bonacich et al. (Bonacich et al., 2004), use the concept of hyperedges in a graph 
to develop a measure called multidimensional centrality (MDC).  A hyperedge can be 
used to describe a situation in which “more than dyadic” situations exist, such as actors in 
multiple social networks (Bonacich et al., 2004: 194).  Bonacich et al. are particularly 
interested in modeling events that involve two or more persons such as a “buyer, seller, 
3-26 
and broker,” or that involve important aspects of the setting such as “timing or location” 
(Bonacich et al., 2004: 189).  While not explicitly developed to examine multiple social 
networks, MDC does provide the capability to do so.   
An example situation in which MDC can provide added insight is given in Figure 
3-3.  Consider three individuals A, B, and C, in three separate network contexts; work 
(1), members on same sports teams (2), and members of same professional society (3).   
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
1 2
3
 
Figure 3-3: Multiple Network Contexts--Example Situation 
 
This situation can be represented by a hypergraph using a node-arc incidence matrix.  
Create the matrix, E, where the rows represent arcs and the columns represent the nodes 
and the network contexts.  There are six columns in this matrix, 3 for nodes A, B, and C, 
and 3 for the three network contexts, as shown in Table 3-5.  
Table 3-5:  Node-Arc Incidence Matrix with Hyperedges 
 
A B C 1 2 3
arc a-b 1 1 0 1 0 1
arc a-c 1 0 1 1 1 1
arc b-c 0 1 1 1 1 0
Node Network
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This yields the following node-arc incidence matrix: 
⎥
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⎢
⎢
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011110
111101
101011
E  
 Once a hypergraph has been represented in a node-arc incidence matrix, MDC 
can be calculated.  MDC is an extension of eigenvector centrality applied to hypergraphs.  
To calculate, let EEM T= , then solve the eigenvector-eigenvalue problem for M.  Node 
and network multidimensional centrality scores are given by the eigenvector associated 
with the largest eigenvalue of M. 
 For the sample situation in Figure 3-3,  
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Table 3-1 gives the MDC scores for the three network contexts: 
Table 3-6:  Multidimensional Centrality Scores 
 
Network MDC
1 0.5506
2 0.3816
3 0.3816  
As expected, with this simple network, the scores are very similar.  The MDC scores for 
the networks do highlight the difference between network 1 and networks 2 and 3.  
Network 1 has a higher MDC score because each network member was connected, while 
networks 2 and 3 scores were lower because at least one connection had been removed.  
3-28 
It still remains to clarify what these MDC scores mean.  Bonacich et al., suggest a 
network can be important for two reasons, either it connects many individuals, or the 
individuals it connects are well connected in other network contexts (Bonacich et al., 
2004:  202).  MDC scores can also be calculated for each network member, providing a 
proxy measure of their overall connectivity across multiple networks.  MDC for 
individuals is discussed in Appendix B. 
The MDC scores can be used as weights to create a linear combination of 
interpersonal influence among network layers.   Lootsma (Lootsma, 1999:  36) 
recommends a uniform scaling of weights, suggesting that uniform weighting enables a 
clearer interpretation of the relative importance of the criteria being weighted; in this case 
multiple informal social networks.  In this thesis, the weights are normalized such that 
they sum to one.  This is done by dividing each networks’ multidimensional centrality 
score by the sum of all MDC scores.  Table 3-7 shows the normalized weights for the 
sample network: 
Table 3-7:  Normalized Multidimensional Centrality Scores 
 
Network MDC
Normalized 
Weight
1 0.5506 0.42
2 0.3816 0.29
3 0.3816 0.29  
 MDC with hyperedges enables the creation of normalized network weights that 
can be used to create a linear combination of interpersonal influences based on the 
informal social networks to which clandestine networks belong.  MDC, however, can be 
misleading.  When analyzing clandestine networks it is likely that data for different types 
of informal networks are of varying quality and quantity.  Networks with more 
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connections identified will likely score highly on multidimensional centrality.  This 
“easy” to monitor network, however, may be of little importance to the question under 
consideration for the clandestine network.  In addition, MDC is only shown to work for 
undirected networks.  Therefore, results of multidimensional centrality must be carefully 
considered with regards to the situation before developing weights for the separate layers. 
 There are a variety of techniques available to develop weights for the multiple 
informal networks under study.  The next section briefly discusses other weighting 
techniques and their implications for analysts. 
3.5.2. Other Weighting Techniques 
There are a variety of techniques for soliciting weights from decision makers and 
subject matter experts.  Weighting methods can be separated into two classes, Numerical 
Estimation Methods and Indifference Methods (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986: 274).  
In general, Numerical Estimation Methods are easiest to implement, producing interval 
weights.  Indifference Methods, while more difficult to implement, produce ratio weights.    
The trade-off between ease of implementation and the measurement theory properties of 
the weights produced must be taken into consideration prior to eliciting weights from 
decision makers and subject matter experts.  For a complete discussion of weighting 
techniques, the reader is referred to Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research (von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).   
The purpose of each technique would be to develop a weighted linear 
combination of the pair-wise interpersonal influence measures developed for a 
clandestine network that would enhance one’s understanding of the group.  Given 
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sufficient time, money, and information, subject matter experts should be educated in a 
particular method and have weights solicited by a trained facilitator. 
Mathematically, one would endeavor to produce weights that can be used for 
statistical testing.  Information available for the analysis of clandestine networks, 
however, may be limited, making a number of weighting techniques inappropriate.  
Operational realities, however may suggest that some network contexts are more 
important to group operations and influence than others and should be weighted.  In these 
instances, exploratory analysis performed by selecting reasonable weights and 
performing sensitivity on the weights can also provide great insight into network 
activities. 
3.5.3. Section Summary 
Clandestine networks are based on the pre-existing, trusted, informal social 
networks to which they belong.  To accurately model clandestine networks, these 
multiple, informal networks should be considered simultaneously.  Measures of pair-wise 
interpersonal influence can be calculated and analyzed for each informal social network 
for which there is data, but to develop a more accurate understanding, the information 
from each of these networks must be combined.  The analysis of multiple network layers 
simultaneously is a new capability for SNA analysts.   
A linear combination of the interpersonal influences from each network is 
recommended.  In the absence of weights, the linear combination would simply produce 
an average level of interpersonal influence across the multiple networks.  Averaging 
could provide a reasonable approximation of the combined influence from the multiple 
networks. 
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Multidimensional centrality can be used to develop network weights based purely 
on the topology of the informal networks.  MDC assesses network weights based on 
eigenvector centrality.  A network may be identified as important for two reasons; either 
the number of members connected in a network context are high, or the members 
connected in this context are important members.  MDC, because it is based on network 
topology, is limited by the analyst’s knowledge of the connections within the multiple 
networks.  Using this method, networks with many connections are identified as 
important, however, when modeling clandestine networks it may be safe to assume that 
networks for which a great deal of information exists may be less important to the group. 
There are a variety of elicitation techniques for developing weights based on 
decision maker opinion or subject matter expertise.  von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) 
provides an overview of techniques used to construct weights.  Each of these techniques 
requires time and money to train decision makers and subject matter experts on the 
weighting technique, as well as a trained facilitator to elicit the weights.   
The goal of any weighting technique is to improve one’s understanding of the 
network.  Each technique should be used with caution paid to the potential biases in 
results that it may produce.  Proper weighting of these networks is critical; however an 
analysis of appropriate weighting techniques is beyond the scope of this research.  
Analysts are cautioned to carefully consider the impact and appropriateness of network 
weights and weighting techniques for their decision problem.  Once the weighting is 
completed and the combined weight matrix W is calculated, one has all the necessary 
components to develop a new measure of interpersonal influence.   
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3.6. Improved Social Influence Network Model 
 Interpersonal influence within a clandestine network is a function of each 
member’s personal characteristics, as well as their positions within the structural 
topology of their trusted pre-existing informal networks of relationships.  This chapter 
has detailed how to develop a new measure of individual influence based on personal 
characteristics, and pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence based on multiple 
network topologies.  This section develops how to combine this information into a final 
weight matrix, and discusses the properties of the pair-wise interpersonal influence 
measures and their appropriateness for use. 
3.6.1. The Holistic Interpersonal Influence Model (HIIM) 
 Thus far, it has been shown that Discriminant Analysis can be used to develop a 
proxy measure of individual influence within a group.  Further, it has been shown that 
Information Centrality can be used to develop a pair-wise interpersonal influence 
measure for each informal network from which clandestine network members are drawn.  
Techniques for developing weights to account for the importance of each informal 
networks contribution to overall influence have also been discussed.  What remains is to 
combine the information learned into a single network that is appropriate for Operations 
Research (OR) Network Flow models that will enable analysts to perform prescriptive 
rather than descriptive analysis.  The final calculations are a modification of Hubbell’s 
(Hubbell, 1965: 381) input-output model of social status. 
 Hubbell was concerned with determining ones status based on how many persons 
“chose a member” as well as the status of the choosers (Hubbell, 1965: 381).  His model 
can be summarized by the following equation: 
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jijij eys =  
Where sij represents j’s contribution to i’s status, yij is the ijth cell of the weight matrix, 
and ej is j’s exogenous (non-network) status. 
 A model of pair-wise influence can be created with a slight modification to 
Hubbell’s equation.  Let the matrix, W = [wij], represent the combined pair-wise 
interpersonal influence measures developed from each of the informal social networks of 
a clandestine network: 
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where wij represents the influence of member i over member j based purely on network 
topology.  Let the vector, E = [ei], represent the individual influence measures developed 
based on the personal characteristics of clandestine network members.  The HIIM 
network, represented by H = [hij], can then be calculated as: 
iijij ewh =  
Where hij represents the influence of member i over member j based on personal and 
network topology characteristics.  In simple terms, hij, can be thought of as person i’s 
topological influence over person j scaled by person i’s level of individual influence. 
3.6.2. Parametric Analysis 
The HIIM provides a measure of influence based on network topology and 
individual non-network influences which are equally weighted.  A simple transformation 
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of hij, however, will result in an additive preference structure (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 
91) that can be evaluated parametrically.   
Let max(W) be the maximum element, wij, of the combined social network based 
influence measure.  Then, let 
)max(/
^
Www ijij = . 
An additive preference structure can then be constructed as (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: 
91) 
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 Parametric analysis of the modified HIIM network will enable the evaluation of 
interpersonal influence based on network characteristics, non-network characteristics, and 
combinations of network and non-network characteristics. 
3.6.3. Measurement Theory Properties 
 To determine the appropriateness of the HIIM for use in other analysis techniques 
it is appropriate to discuss the “measurement type” of the measures being developed.  By 
construction Information Centrality produces ratio numbers.  Ratio numbers are such that 
the difference and ratio between the numbers reflects the differences and ratios of the 
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measured attribute (Sarle, 1997: 4).  Examples of ratio measures are distances such as 
feet, time in seconds, and temperature in Kelvin. 
Each cell, Iij, represents the total potential information flow from person i to 
person j.  A value of two implies double the potential flow compared to a cell value of 
one.  The difference between values of 5 and 6 is the same as the difference between cells 
valued at 13 and 14, that is 1 unit of information flow. Further, a cell value of zero 
implies no potential flow between members, and represents a fixed origin. 
 The only appropriate transformation for ratio numbers is a multiplicative 
transformation (Sarle, 1997:  6).  Therefore weighting the pair-wise influence measures 
from multiple networks is appropriate.  Because multiplying by a scalar is an admissible 
transformation, the resultant values will also be ratio.  This implies that a linear 
combination of the pair-wise topology based influence measures is appropriate and will 
produce ratio values. 
 The final step in creating the HIIM is to scale the combined topology based 
influence measures (wij) by the individual influence measure (ei).  Again, multiplicative 
transformations are appropriate for ratio data, therefore multiplying by ei is an appropriate 
transformation.  The final HIIM model will consist of ratio numbers.  Ratio numbers 
make this new measure of interpersonal influence appropriate for use in a variety of 
analysis techniques such as Network Flow models.  The next section discusses the 
appropriateness of the HIIM for a few tools. 
3.6.4. Appropriate Tools for Further Analysis 
 The new HIIM network is a proxy measure of average pair-wise interpersonal 
influences within a clandestine network.  In addition to describing influence relationships 
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in the network, because the measures are ratio, the HIIM is an appropriate input to other 
modeling techniques such as Operations Research (OR) network flow models.  By 
mapping social networks to network flow models, analysts are able to move beyond 
descriptive analysis and provide prescriptive results such as a “minimum cut set” 
required to isolate particular actors.  This section discusses a few of the analysis methods 
and tools that the HIIM is appropriate for. 
3.6.4.1. Operations Research Network Flow Models 
The key to extending SNA to classic OR flow problems is having the relationship 
measures applied to the arcs represent “potential influence” between individuals (Renfro, 
2001).  Renfro (Renfro, 2001: 66-69) mapped social network concepts to network flow 
models.  The mapping was dependent on potential influence measures that were “at least 
ratio in nature” (Renfro, 2001: 66). The HIIM developed in this study produces a proxy 
measure of potential interpersonal influence that is ratio in nature, therefore it is 
appropriate for Renfro’s mapping. 
Renfro’s mapping of SNA concepts to Operations Research (OR) models was 
based on the required assumptions for linear programs (LP).  Winston (Winston, 1991: 
56-57) offers a complete discussion of these assumptions: 
• Proportionality 
• Additivity 
• Divisibility 
• Certainty 
 
Ratio measures satisfy the first three assumptions, however the Certainty 
Assumption is that “each parameter is known with certainty” (Winston, 1991: 57).  In 
many cases, modeling clandestine networks, however, the analysts may be using 
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incomplete or incorrect data which violates the certainty assumption.  The robustness of 
results from network flow models in the face of the certainty assumption can be tested by 
performing post optimality analysis.  If the results of the post optimality analysis indicate 
that small changes in the pair-wise influence measures produce different decisions it 
suggests an intelligence requirement to confirm the value of the input.  Further discussion 
of the benefits of applying network flow models to SNA are given in Chapter 5. 
3.6.4.2. Fuzzy Set Theory 
 Fuzzy Set Theory, in contrast to traditional mathematics, was developed with the 
explicit purpose of solving problems with imprecise data.  The measurement of influence 
relationships within a clandestine network will invariably result in measures that are 
imprecise.  When the Certainty Assumption is violated, Fuzzy Set Theory offers a variety 
of techniques to analyze ones data.  These techniques include Fuzzy Linear Programming 
(FLP), Fuzzy Dynamic Programming (FDP), Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
(FMCDA), and many others.  Each of these techniques is an extension of classic 
deterministic OR techniques modified for situations of uncertainty.  A complete 
discussions of the modifications from standard OR models to Fuzzy OR models in given 
by Zimmerman (Zimmerman, 1992: 241-282) 
Fuzzy Set Theory can also enhance traditional SNA techniques.  Xiaoyan 
(Xiaoyan, 1988) developed a technique for uncovering cohesive subgroups in networks 
based on Fuzzy Set Theory.  Xiaoyan highlights the deficiency of traditional cohesive 
subgroup detection techniques such as the clique, n-clique, and k-plex.  The primary 
limitations of these techniques are that they are NP-complete problems with only two 
outcomes, one is either a member of a clique or one is not (Xiaoyan, 1998: 360-361). 
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Xiaoyan’s method attempts to overcome these limitations through the use of valued and 
fuzzy relations.  Xiaoyan’s cohesive subgroup detection method is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
3.6.5. Section Summary 
This section discussed the final steps necessary to create a new pair-wise 
interpersonal influence measure based on individual and social topology characteristics.  
Modification of Hubbell’s (Hubbell, 1965) input-output status model enables one to 
combine exogenous (non-network) measures with endogenous (network) measures to 
form a single pair-wise measure of interpersonal influence.  The resultant measure is a 
ratio number, which is appropriate for a variety of analysis tools including traditional 
network flow models and fuzzy clique detection.  The extension into network flow 
modeling enables analysts to provide prescriptive results that focus on specific actions 
and their outcomes which is a new capability for SNA analysts. 
3.7. Chapter Summary 
Influence within clandestine networks is a function of the individual 
characteristics of its members, as well as the social structure of the informal networks to 
which the members belong.  This chapter has described the development of a new 
measure of interpersonal influence that captures both network and non-network 
characteristics. 
Discriminant Analysis can be used to develop a proxy measure of individual 
influence based on individual characteristics.  In addition, Discriminant Analysis also 
provides the potential capability to profile, differentiate, and classify network members.  
These intermediate results have the potential to support operations against clandestine 
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networks on their own.  It was also shown that Discriminant Analysis can be used to 
validate SNA measures of individual importance.  The ability to validate SNA measures 
is a new capability for social network analysts. 
There are two primary techniques for determining pair-wise measures of influence 
based on network topology, a geometric series approach and a variance-covariance 
approach.  These techniques have a variety of strengths and weaknesses to consider 
before use.  Information Centrality was determined to be the most appropriate technique 
for measuring influence in the informal networks of clandestine networks.  Information 
Centrality is appropriate because most informal networks by their nature are symmetric. 
In addition, the ease of calculation and greater consideration to indirect influence 
afforded by Information Centrality make it a better measure than the geometric series 
approach of Hubbell and Katz. 
Relationships exist on multiple levels and in multiple contexts.  To accurately 
model social influence, each of these contexts must be considered.  This study suggests 
that interpersonal influence is a linear combination of the pair-wise influence that exists 
between members in multiple contexts.  There are arrays of techniques available to 
develop weights for the linear combination.  Equal weighting produces an average of the 
influence from the multiple networks.  Multidimensional centrality, although it was not 
expressly developed for this purpose, can provide a weighting of multiple networks based 
purely on network structure.  In this case a network would be considered important if it 
connected a large number of members, or if it connected important members.  The 
implications of elicitation techniques to develop weights based on subject matter 
expertise were also discussed.  Simultaneous consideration of multiple network contexts 
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is a new capability for social network analysts.  While weighting is  a critical element, the 
selection of a weighting system are scenario specific and is generally beyond the scope of 
this research. 
Once the individual influence measure and combined pair-wise measures of 
influence are developed one can create the HIIM by scaling the topology based influence 
measures by the characteristic based individual influence measure.  A simple 
modification of Hubbell’s (1965) input-output model of social status enables the 
calculation of interpersonal influence based on individual and social characteristics.  The 
measure created is a ratio number that is appropriate for use in many types of analysis 
techniques including network flow models and fuzzy linear programming.  Extending 
traditional SNA descriptive techniques through the use of network flow models will 
enable analysts to provide prescriptive results focused on specific operational outcomes.  
The ability to provide prescriptive analysis is a new capability for social network 
analysts. 
Chapter 4 details the use of the Discriminant Analysis methodology outlined in 
this chapter, highlighting the potential insights Discriminant Analysis results can 
produce.  Chapter 5 details the development of the HIIM for a sample group, as well as 
highlights the HIIM’s compatibility with different analysis techniques such as network 
flow models and fuzzy subgroup detection. 
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4. Methodology Demonstration and Analysis Results I 
4.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, the Discriminant Analysis methodology developed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3 is applied using the open source data on the Al Qaeda terrorist network 
collected by Marc Sageman (Sageman, 2004).  Special thanks are due to Dr. Sageman for 
graciously allowing the use of his data set.  The following steps are followed in this 
implementation: 
 Step 1:  Description of Sageman’s Al Qaeda Data 
Step 2:  State Analysis Objectives 
 Step 3:  Exploratory Analysis of Data 
 Step 4:  Implementation of Discriminant Analysis Methodology 
 Step 5:  Discuss Analysis Results and Implications 
 
4.2. Description of Data 
 In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Sageman began 
collecting data on Al Qaeda (Sageman, 2004: vii).  Sageman limited his data set to 
terrorist who “targeted the far enemy,” that is, those whose focus was on attacking the 
United States and not their own governments (Sageman, 2004b: vii-viii).  Sageman’s data 
set consists of demographic data, affiliation data from pre-existing informal networks, 
and affiliation data from networks formed after “joining the Jihad” for 366 terrorists.  
Sageman, however, was unable to gather complete information for every Al Qaeda 
member in his data set.  Incomplete demographic data for Al Qaeda members are referred 
to as Missing Data.  Table 4-1 summarizes the data categories collected by Sageman: 
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Table 4-1:  Data Categories Collected by Sageman (2004) 
 
Social Network
Continuous Categorical Affiliations
Age joining the jihad Children Acquaintance 
Date of birth Country Joined the Jihad Friendship
Year joined the jihad Educational achievement Links Post Joining
Family Socioeconomic Status Nuclear Family
Marital Status Operation involvement
Occupation Place joined the jihad
Place of birth Relatives (not Nuclear Fam)
Religious Background Teacher-Student Network
Role in Organization Religious Leader
Social background Ties not in sample
Type of education
Youth National Status
Demographic Data
 
The purpose of Sageman’s analysis was to test the conventional wisdom that 
terrorism comes “from poverty, broken families, ignorance, immaturity, lack of family or 
occupational responsibilities, weak minds susceptible to brainwashing, the religious 
fanatic” (Sageman, 2004b: 2).  Sageman concluded that these assumptions were false.  
Sageman further concluded that “there’s really no profile” for terrorists, “just similar 
trajectories to joining the Jihad” (Sageman, 2004b: 2).  Sageman’s data is based on open 
source literature, and has not been updated since late 2003; all analysis results and 
conclusions in this demonstration are therefore subject to the limitations of the data used.  
The results of this analysis are offered simply to demonstrate the potential of the 
methodology and are not intended to be for operational purposes. 
4.3. Analysis Objective 
 In support of his analysis, Sageman (Sageman 2004) classified Al Qaeda 
members into four categories, Central Staff, Core Arab, Southeast Asian, and Maghreb 
Arab.  The Central Staff, as the name suggests, is the central leadership of Al Qaeda that 
provides spiritual leadership, motivation, training, financing, and often times logistic 
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support to the operations of the other three groups (Sageman, 2004: 70).  The objective of 
the demonstration conducted here is to determine if members of the Central Staff possess 
characteristics that distinguish them from the rest of the Al Qaeda network.  In addition, 
if there are distinguishing characteristics, the goal is to develop a statistically significant 
Discriminant Function for the Central Staff that can be used to profile its members and 
classify members into the appropriate group.  For the duration of this chapter, the Core 
Arabs, Southeast Asians, and Maghreb Arabs are referred to as the Rest of Al Qaeda.  
Sageman identified 38 members as Central Staff, the other 328 members are in the 
grouping the Rest of Al Qaeda.   
4.4. Exploratory Analysis of Data 
“Exploratory analysis is about looking at data to see what it seems to say.  It 
concentrates on simple arithmetic and easy-to-draw pictures.  It regards whatever 
appearances we have recognized as partial descriptions, and tries to look beneath 
them for new insights.  Its concern is with appearance, not with confirmation.”—
Tukey (1977: v) 
 
 In an exploratory analysis, ones’ objective is to examine the data in an attempt to 
identify relationships of interest within the data without imposing a definite model on the 
data.  Tukey suggests that exploratory analysis should proceed “side by side” with 
confirmatory analysis (Tukey, 1977: vii).  For a complete discussion of exploratory 
analysis techniques, the reader is referred to Exploratory Data Analysis by Tukey (Tukey, 
1977).  For the purposes of this demonstration, an exploratory analysis of the 
demographic characteristic data and social network affiliation data is used to develop 
hypotheses.  The hypotheses regarding distinguishing characteristics was then tested 
using Discriminant Analysis.  The exploratory analysis was conducted in three phases, 
first analyzing the continuous demographic characteristics, second analyzing the 
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categorical demographic characteristics, and finally analyzing the social network 
affiliation data. 
4.4.1. Exploratory Analysis of Continuous Demographic Data 
 There are three continuous variables in the Al Qaeda data set.  To identify the 
potential of a “continuous” characteristic to distinguish between groups, simple summary 
statistics such as the mean can be used for comparison (Tukey, 1977: 27).  Figure 4-1 
provides a comparison of the average age of the Central Staff )1.7,5.30( == σµ  with the 
Rest of Al Qaeda )7.6,2.25( == σµ  at the time they “Joined the Jihad”: 
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Figure 4-1:  Comparison of Average Age of Al Qaeda Members When Joining 
 
Figure 4-1 reveals that, on average, Central Staff members were six years older than the 
Rest of Al Qaeda when they joined.  Figure 4-2 provides a comparison of the groups 
based on the “Year Joined Jihad”: 
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Figure 4-2:  Comparison of Years when Al Qaeda Members Joined 
 
Figure 4-2 reveals that, on average, Central Staff )7.1,8.1989( == σµ members joined 
five years earlier than the Rest of Al Qaeda )8.3,8.1994( == σµ .  Further, based on 
Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2, the Central Staff is, on average, 11 years older than the Rest of 
Al Qaeda.  Based on the results of this analysis, the hypothesis to be tested in this chapter 
is that “Year Joined Jihad” and “Age Joined Jihad” can be used to build a statistically 
significant Discriminant Function for Al Qaeda. 
4.4.2. Exploratory Analysis of Categorical Demographic Data 
There are 12 categorical variables in the Al Qaeda data set.  To identify the 
potential of a categorical characteristic to distinguish between groups, simple statistics 
tools such as histograms can be used for comparison (Tukey, 1977: 543).  Figure 4-3 
compares “Education Type” received by the Central Staff to that of the Rest of Al Qaeda.  
It is clear from Figure 4-3 that the Central Staff have primarily Technical backgrounds, 
while the Rest of Al Qaeda has a less technical and more diverse educational background.  
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This suggests that Education Type has the potential to help discriminate between the 
groups. 
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Figure 4-3: Histogram of Al Qaeda Member Education Type 
 
Figure 4-4 compares the occupation types of the two groups.  Figure 4-4 indicates that the 
Central Staff, in general, held jobs requiring more advanced education and training than 
the Rest of Al Qaeda prior to becoming members.  This also suggests that Occupation 
Type has the potential to help discriminate between the groups. 
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Figure 4-4:  Histogram of Al Qaeda Member Occupation Type 
 
Figure 4-5 compares the Criminal Backgrounds of the two groups.   
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Figure 4-5:  Histogram of Al Qaeda Member Criminal Background 
 
Figure 4-5 indicates that the Central Staff participated in both criminal acts and political 
activism at a higher rate than the Rest of Al Qaeda prior to joining the Jihad.  While the 
membership in general, has been involved in criminal activity as a group, Sageman’s data 
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is focused on the background of members before joining Al Qaeda.  These results suggest 
that Criminal Background has the potential to help discriminate between the groups.  
Table 4-2 compares the Place of Birth of the two groups: 
Table 4-2:  Al Qaeda Member Countries of Birth by Percentage 
 
63% Egypt 14% Morocco 3% Malaysia 1% Canada 0.3% Mauritania
13% Saudi Arabia 13% Algeria 3% Britain 1% Philippines 0.3% Poland
8% Kuwait 13% France 3% Singapore 1% UAE 0.3% Qatar
5% Jordan 12% Saudi Arabia 3% Syria 0.3% Bahrain 0.3% Spain
3% Iraq 10% Indonesia 2% Egypt 0.3% Belgium 0.3% Tanzania
3% Lebanon 4% Turkey 2% Pakistan 0.3% Bosnia 0.3% Missing Data
3% Libya 4% Yemen 1% Jordan 0.3% Comoros Islands
3% Sudan 3% Kuwait 1% USA 0.3% Germany
0% Missing Data 3% Tunisia 1% Australia 0.3% Lebanon
Central Staff Rest of Al Qaeda
 
Table 4-2 shows that Saudi Arabia is the only country with relatively equal contributions 
to the makeup of the Central Staff and the Rest of Al Qaeda.  It addition, it shows that 
Egypt has an extremely disproportionate amount of Central Staff members; suggesting 
that Place of Birth has the potential to help discriminate between groups.  Based on the 
results of this analysis Place of Birth was re-categorized into two groups, Core 
Leadership Countries and Other Countries.  The Core Leadership Countries are 
represented by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and 
Sudan. 
Exploratory analysis of the categorical variables revealed four variables with the 
potential to aid discrimination between the two groups.  Based on the results of this 
analysis, the hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that “Education Type,” “Occupation 
Type,” “Criminal Background,” and “Place of Birth” can be used to build a statistically 
significant Discriminant Function for Al Qaeda leadership versus the Rest of Al Qaeda.  
In addition to highlighting the differences between the Central Staff and the Rest of Al 
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Qaeda, these four figures also highlight the amount of Missing Data in the Sageman data 
set.  Techniques to handle missing data are presented in the Discriminant Analysis 
Implementation section. 
4.4.3. Exploratory Analysis of Social Network Affiliations 
There are nine affiliation networks in the Sageman Al Qaeda data set as shown in 
Table 4-1.  For the purposes of this demonstration, only pre-existing social networks 
were considered.  This limited the networks to the Acquaintance, Friendship, Nuclear 
Family, Relatives, Student-Teacher, and Religious Leader networks.  In addition, various 
combinations of these networks were explored to investigate the interactions of the 
relationships between group members.  Figure 4-6 is a network representation of Al 
Qaeda based on the combined Acquaintance-Nuclear Family-Relative Network. 
In Figure 4-6, the Central Staff is represented by circles, the Core Arabs are 
represented by squares, the Southeast Asians are represented by triangles, and the 
Maghreb Arabs are represented by diamonds.  Figure 4-6 highlights the dense 
connectivity of the four groups based on the Sageman data; however it also shows that 
the Central Staff plays an integral role connecting the network.  Without the Central 
Staff, the other three groups would be completely independent of each other based on the 
Sageman data.  The location of the Central Staff suggests that SNA measures such as 
Closeness and Betweenness may be able to help distinguish the Central Staff from the 
Rest of Al Qaeda.  Based on an examination of the informal network connections of Al 
Qaeda, a hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that SNA measures can be used to 
develop a statistically significant Discriminant Function. 
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Figure 4-6:  Network Representation of Al Qaeda based on Acquaintance, Nuclear Family, 
and Other Relative Ties created in UCINET 6 
 
 This section has provided a very brief summary of the exploratory analysis 
performed on the Sageman Al Qaeda data set.  The purpose of the exploratory analysis 
was to identify the relationships that exist in the data set and to develop hypotheses to be 
tested in a more formal confirmatory analysis.  There are a variety of additional 
exploratory analysis techniques available that were not discussed in this section, such as 
Box and Whisker Plots, counts, and trend analysis (Tukey, 1977).  Based on the 
exploratory analysis there appear to be demographic and social network characteristics 
that can be used to build a statistically significant Discriminant Function for Al Qaeda.  
The next section discusses the implementation of Discriminant Analysis as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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4.5. Discriminant Analysis Implementation 
 The objectives of Discriminant Analysis are to determine if predefined groups 
differ significantly on a set of observed characteristics, to develop a profile of group 
members based on distinguishing characteristics, and to produce a Function that can be 
used to predict to which group newly discovered members may belong.  The results of 
exploratory analysis suggest that the Central Staff differs from the Rest of Al Qaeda on a 
subset of characteristics in the Sageman data set.  This section discusses the results of the 
confirmatory Discriminant Analysis performed to test the hypotheses developed through 
exploratory analysis.  The Discriminant Analysis performed followed the following steps: 
  Step 1:  Coding of Categorical Variables 
  Step 2:  Imputation of Missing Data 
  Step 3:  Creation of Test and Validation Sets 
  Step 4:  Execution of Discriminant Analysis Calculations 
  Step 5:  Hypothesis Testing—Group Discrimination 
  Step 6:  Interpretation of Discriminant Loadings—Profiling 
  Step 7:  Validation of Classifier—Prediction  
 
4.5.1. Coding Categorical Variables 
 Exploratory analysis of the Sageman data revealed the possibility that four 
categorical variables could be used to discriminate between the Central Staff and the Rest 
of Al Qaeda.  Categorical variables, however, should not be used in a Discriminant 
Analysis unless they are “coded.”  For the purposes of this demonstration a “Dummy 
Coding” scheme was employed (Neter et al., 1996: 455-457).  Dummy coding is used 
when categorical variables are of interest in prediction (Neter et al., 1996: 455-457).    
Table 4-3 shows the coding scheme used for this analysis.  A code of all zeros are 
referred to as the baseline for that variable. 
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Table 4-3:  Categorical Variable Coding Scheme 
 
Education Type Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Occupation Type Column 1 Column 2
HS or Vocational 0 0 0 Unskilled 0 0
Humanities 1 0 0 Semi-Prof 1 0
Soc Sciences 0 1 0 Professional 0 1
Technical 0 0 1
Criminal Background Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Place of Birth Column 1
None 0 0 0 Core Leadership Country 1
Criminal 1 0 0 Other 0
Political Activism 0 1 0
Both 0 0 1  
4.5.2. Imputation of Missing Data 
 Missing data is a common problem in statistical analysis. This condition will only 
be exacerbated by attempting to model clandestine networks.  Exploratory analysis 
revealed missing data in the continuous and categorical variables that appear capable of 
distinguishing between the Central Staff and the Rest of Al Qaeda.  For the purposes of 
this demonstration, it is being assumed that the affiliation data was complete, although 
this almost certainly not the case in a real world analysis. 
 There are a number of alternatives for dealing with missing data.  The alternatives 
can be reduced to two simple categories; deletion of the exemplar with missing data, and 
missing data imputation.  Deletion of subjects with missing data may be practical in 
clinical situations, despite the induced bias, but data collected on clandestine networks is 
much harder to attain and potentially too valuable to discard.  For this reason it was 
deemed more appropriate to consider a data imputation technique.   
 All data imputation techniques are subject to bias, and typically lower the power 
of ones statistical tests.  The power of a statistical test is determined by the amount of 
Type II error (false positives) in the test.  Type II error in Discriminant Analysis is the 
proportion of false positives; for this demonstration it would represent the number of 
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previously identified non-Central Staff members classified as Central Staff. Advanced 
data imputation techniques are focused on reducing bias and Type II error.   False 
positives, however, may be an acceptable outcome when modeling clandestine networks, 
and therefore a simple imputation technique was chosen for this analysis.  For a complete 
discussion, the reader is referred to Statistical Analysis with Missing Data, Second 
Edition, by Little and Rubin.  In addition, further research and testing is recommended to 
determine appropriate data imputation techniques for modeling clandestine networks. 
 Al Qaeda members with missing values on continuous variables were assigned 
their groups’ mean value for that variable.  Table 4-4 summarizes the values imputed for 
the continuous variables: 
Table 4-4:  Imputed Values for Missing Continuous Data 
 
Central Staff Rest of Al Qaeda
Year Joined 1990 1995
Age Joined 31 25  
Categorical variables were also imputed by coding missing values as the baseline 
for their category.  Table 4-5 summarizes the data imputation used for the categorical 
variables: 
Table 4-5:  Imputed Values for Missing Categorical Variables 
 
Missng Data Coding Scheme Level
Education Type 0 0 0 HS or Vocational
Occupation Type 0 0 Unskilled
Criminal Background 0 0 0 None
Place of Birth 0 Other  
Referring to Table 4-3, coding Education Type as [0, 0, 0] is equivalent to saying all 
members with missing data for this variable received a high school or vocational 
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education type.  Each of the coding schemes can be interpreted similarly by comparing 
the imputation scheme in Table 4-5 with the coding scheme in Table 4-3. 
4.5.3. Creation of Test and Validation Sets 
One of the most important characteristics of a Discriminant Function is its ability 
classify members into the correct categories.  Splitting the data into two samples, one to 
create the classification rule and one to validate the classification rule, enables the analyst 
to develop a consistent and unbiased estimate of classification error rate.  For this 
demonstration ¾ of the data was randomly assigned to the creation set, and ¼ was 
randomly assigned to the validation set.  Table 4-6 summarizes the separation: 
Table 4-6:  Number of Al Qaeda Members Assigned to Creation and Validation Sets 
 
Creation Set Validation Set
Central Staff 28 10
Rest of AQ 246 82  
4.5.4. Discriminant Analysis Calculations 
This section identifies the variables used to perform the Discriminant Analysis.  
The creation data set was divided into two groups G1 (Central Staff) and G2 (Rest of Al 
Qaeda).  Define n1 for the creation data set as the size of G1, n1 = 28.  Define n2 as the 
size of G2, n2 = 246.  Exploratory analysis highlighted 14 variables with the potential to 
discriminate between G1 and G2.  Table 4-7 lists the characteristics considered in this 
section: 
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Table 4-7:  Continuous and Categorical Variables Considered for Discriminant Analysis 
 
Demographic Data Social Network Measures
Place of Birth Betweenness Friendship
Date of Birth Betweenness Friend-Relative
Year Joined Jihad Closeness Acq-NucFam-Rel
Age Joined Jihad Eigenvector Acq-NucFam-Rel
Education Type Betweeness Religious Leader
Occupation Type Eigenvectore Religious Leader
Criminal Background Closenss Student/Teacher  
The matrix, X1, is a matrix, and contains the characteristic measurements of G1 
on the 14 characteristics.  The categorical variable coding scheme increases the number 
of columns from 14 to 19.  X2 is defined as the characteristic measurements of G2 on the 
14 characteristics, X2 is a matrix. 
)1928( ×
)19246( ×
 The Discriminant Analysis calculations, as described in Multivariate Analysis 
(Dillon and Goldstein, 1984), were performed in order to build a model that can 
discriminate between G1 and G2 with %95)1( =−α confidence.  To maintain a 
simultaneous 95% confidence for all variables included in the model, Bonferroni’s 
inequality was used.  Bonferroni’s inequality states that 
∑
=
−≥
m
j
jConfidence
1
1 α , 
where m is the number of variables included in the model and jα is the confidence level 
of characteristic j (Wackerly, Mendenhall, and Scheaffer, 2002: 666-667).  Table 4-8 
summarizes the characteristics selected for inclusion in the Discriminant Function with 
their associated jα levels: 
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Table 4-8:  Variables Included In Discriminant Function with Associated Confidence Levels 
 
Characteristic p-value
X1-- Place of Birth 0.0000
X2-- Educataion Type (Technical) 0.0075
X3-- Criminal Background (Both) 0.0000
X4-- Year Joined Jihad 0.0000
X5-- Age Joined Jihad 0.0037
X6-- Closeness Acq-NucFam-Rel 0.0000
X7-- Eigenvector Religious-Leader 0.0001
Simultaneous Confidence Level 98.9%
Imputation Method 1
 
The Discriminant Function developed for the Sageman data is: 
7654321 1748.05948.42226.05599.04646.61494.17685.7 XXXXXXXy +++−++=  
The Discriminant Function was developed to produce a classifier that can 
distinguish between the Central Staff and the Rest of Al Qaeda with 95% confidence.  In 
addition, this Function has helped to validate Closeness and Eigenvector Centrality 
measures for specific social networks as potentially identifying group leaders.  Implicitly, 
however, the Discriminant Function also suggests that the SNA measures of individual 
importance for other networks (e.g. Friendship, Student-Teacher, etc.) do not help to 
distinguish the Central Staff.  The next analysis step is to test the ability of the 
Discriminant Function to discriminate between groups through hypothesis testing. 
4.5.5. Hypothesis Testing—Group Discrimination 
The first objective of Discriminant Analysis is to determine if G1 and G2 differ 
significantly on the characteristics measured.  To determine if the Discriminant Function 
produces a significant difference between the average discriminant scores of G1 and G2, 
Hotelling’s T-test is performed as discussed in Analyzing Multivariate Data (Lattin et al., 
4-16 
2003: 447-448).  The null hypothesis for this test is that the mean of G1 is equal to the 
mean of G2; the alternative is that they are different: 
21
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The hypothesis test results are summarized in Figure 4-7: 
0.3080F   367.84 (7,358)05;. =>>=obsF  
Figure 4-7:  Hypothesis Testing F-test Results 
 
The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence level because the observed 
value of the F-statistic is larger than the expected value of the F-statistic. 
 The results of hypothesis testing indicate that the Discriminant Function is 
capable of distinguishing between the Central Staff and the Rest of Al Qaeda at the 95% 
confidence level.  Since it has been determined that there is a significant difference 
between the groups it is appropriate to begin developing a group profile. 
4.5.6. Interpretation of Discriminant Loadings—Profiling 
 The second objective of Discriminant Analysis is to create a profile for the groups 
under study.  Profiling is done by considering the contribution of the characteristic 
variables to the differences between the groups.  Variable contributions are determined 
by comparing the Discriminant Loadings; Table 4-9 summarizes the Discriminant 
Loadings for the Sageman data: 
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Table 4-9:  Discriminant Loadings Highlighting Variable Contribution to Discrimination 
 
Characteristic Discriminant Loading
Place of Birth 0.5683
Education Type (Technical) 0.2338
Criminal Background (Both) 0.4651
Year Joined Jihad -0.3866
Age Joined Jihad 0.2808
Closeness Acq-NucFam-Rel 0.1554
Eigenvector Religious Leader 0.0691  
 The magnitude of the Discriminant Loadings indicates a variables importance to 
the Discriminant Function.  The loadings for the Sageman data set indicate that Place of 
Birth, Education Type, and Year Joined Jihad are the most important variables for 
discriminating between the Central Staff and the Rest of Al Qaeda.  A very simple 
Central Staff profile could be developed from these three variables.  The profile would 
suggest that Al Qaeda members born in the Core Middle East countries, with Technical 
Education backgrounds that joined the Jihad early (1989-1990) are likely to be Central 
Staff members.  Obviously, if more detailed data were available for these groups, an 
improved profile might be developed 
 The Discriminant Loadings also provide insight into the social network topology 
of Al Qaeda.  Although their respective loadings are the smallest, Closeness Centrality 
for the Acquaintance-Nuclear Family-Relative network and Eigenvector Centrality for 
the Religious Leader network suggest by their presence that network topology can be 
used to distinguish between group members.  In addition, for this example, because the 
values are positive, the Discriminant Loadings suggest the Central Staff has higher values 
for these SNA measures.  This information could also be used to support profiling of Al 
Qaeda members. 
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The Discriminant Loadings have enabled the development of a Central Staff 
profile.  To adequately discuss the implications of the Discriminant Analysis performed 
thus far, however, it is critical to understand the quality of the results obtained. 
4.5.7. Validation of Classifier—Prediction 
 One of the most important characteristics of a Discriminant Function is its ability 
to classify members into the appropriate groups.  The quality of a Discriminant Function 
can be assessed by evaluating its ability as a classifier.  Figure 4-8 compares the expected 
accuracy of a Discriminant Function , based on the proportional chance criterion (Lattin 
et al., 2003: 450), with the observed accuracy of the calculated Discriminant Function on 
the Validation Set: 
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Figure 4-8:  Classification Accuracy of Discriminant Function on Validation Set 
 
The observed classification accuracy of the Discriminant Function appears to perform 
much better than expected based on the confusion matrices and hit rates.  A t-statistic for 
the classifier was also calculated: 
645.19117.3 89,5.0 =>= ttobs  
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The result of the t-test confirms that the Discriminant Function classifies better than is 
expected based on the proportional chance criterion with 95% confidence, suggesting that 
the quality of the results obtained were good.   
4.6. Analysis Results and Implications 
 The analysis to this point has shown that the Central Staff is statistically different 
from the Rest of Al Qaeda on a subset of characteristics measured in the Sageman data 
set.  In addition, it has been shown that a profile of the Central Staff can be developed 
based on these characteristics.  Throughout the demonstration a 95% level of confidence 
in the results was maintained through statistical testing. 
4.6.1. Analysis of Misclassifications 
 Seven characteristics were used to build the final Discriminant Function which 
had 96.7% prediction accuracy.  The high prediction accuracy suggests that the 
characteristics identified are “good” discriminators for predicting membership in the 
Central Staff or the Rest of Al Qaeda.  While the classification accuracy of the 
Discriminant Function is high, it is not perfect suggesting that there is more to learn about 
Al Qaeda.  Figure 4-9 shows the confusion matrix and prediction accuracy for all Al 
Qaeda members in the Sageman data set: 
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Figure 4-9:  Overall Prediction Accuracy of Discriminant Function Including Creation and 
Validation Set 
 
The overall confusion matrix shows 15 misclassifications, 6 false positives and 9 false 
negatives.  False positives are non-Central Staff members classified as Central Staff; false 
negatives are Central Staff members classified as non-Central Staff.  Table 4-10 lists the 
misclassified members: 
Table 4-10:  Al Qaeda Members Misclassified by Discriminant Function 
 
Central Staff Rest of Al Qaeda
Zain al-Abidin Mohammed Hussein Ali Abd el-Suud Mohamed Mustafa
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim
Omar ibn Mahmoud abu Omar Othman Mohammad Hamdi al-Ahdal
Hamid al-Fakhiri Mohammad Jaman Saluk al-Mutayri
Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl Mohamed Zinedine
Osama Siddiq Ali Ayyub Muntasir Abdelilah Ziyad
Sulayman Abu Ghayth
Sabri Ibrahim al-Attar
Saad bin Laden  
The members misclassified by the Discriminant Function offer a great deal of potential 
for further analysis; however it should be clear that this Discriminant Function 
misclassified Central Staff members (9 of 38) at a much higher rate than the Rest of Al 
Qaeda (6 of 328).  Further analysis revealed that the disproportionate misclassifications 
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are affected by the data imputation method chosen for missing categorical variables.  
Missing data was given the baseline coding for each categorical variable.  The 
Discriminant Analysis results, however, revealed that members of the Central Staff 
possessed characteristics that were statistically different than the baseline for Place of 
Birth, Education Type, and Criminal Background.  For comparison purposes missing 
categorical variables were recoded as shown in Table 4-11: 
Table 4-11: New Values Imputed for Missing Categorical Data 
 
Missng Data Coding Scheme Level
Education Type 0 0 1 Technical
Occupation Type 0 1 Professional
Criminal Background 0 0 1 Both
Place of Birth 1 Core Leadership Country  
The implication of this coding scheme is that missing data will now be given the coding 
associated with the majority of the Central Staff.  Referring to Table 4-3, coding 
Education Type coded as [0, 0, 1] is equivalent to saying all members with missing data 
for this variable received a Technical or Natural Sciences education.  The Discriminant 
Function produced using this coding scheme improved overall classification accuracy by 
reducing both false positives and false negatives, however there is no statistically 
significant difference in the quality of the classifiers.  Figure 4-10 summarizes the results 
of the new classifier: 
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Figure 4-10:  Classification Accuracy of Modified Missing Data Imputation Method 
 
The improved classifier still misclassified 10 members, but did have less actual Central 
Staff members misclassified than the previous coding scheme.  Table 4-12 lists the 
misclassified members: 
Table 4-12:  Al Qaeda Members Misclassified by New Discriminant Function 
 
Central Staff Rest of Al Qaeda
**Omar ibn Mahmoud abu Omar Othman **Ali Abd el-Suud Mohamed Mustafa
**Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl **Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim
**Sulayman Abu Ghayth Abdal Rahim al-Nashiri
**Saad bin Laden **Mohammad Hamdi al-Ahdal
Omar al-Faruq
Abdel Qader Mahmud Es Sayed
** indicates misclassifed by both discriminanat functions  
Seven of the Al Qaeda members were misclassified by both classifiers, and warrant a 
much closer look.  For demonstration purposes, Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Karim 
(alias—Ramzi Yousef) are examined in greater detail. 
 Ramzi Yousef was classified by Sageman as a member of the Core Arab group; 
however he possesses many characteristics in common with the Central Staff.  Ramzi 
Yousef was born in Kuwait, a Core Middle East country, has a Technical Education, no 
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Criminal Background, and Joined the Jihad in 1989.  In addition to his similar 
demographic characteristics, Ramzi Yousef is more closely associated with members of 
the Central Staff (circles) than with the Core Arab (squares) group on the basis of his 
informal social networks.  Figure 4-11 highlights Ramzi Yousef in the network of 
affiliations: 
 
Figure 4-11:  Network Representation of Al Qaeda based on Acquaintance, Nuclear Family, 
and Other Relative Ties Highlighting Ramzi Yousef; created in Ucinet 6 
 
 The focused analysis of Ramzi Yousef supports the classification produced by the 
Discriminant Function, that is, Yousef was likely misclassified by Sageman.  Based on 
open source data, Ramzi Yousef appears to be a top-level planner for Al Qaeda.  Ramzi 
Yousef was convicted on September 11, 1996 of masterminding the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing (Mylroie, 1995; CNN, 1996; MSNBC, 2004).  Ramzi has also been 
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linked to assassination plots against the Pope and former President William J. Clinton 
(Mairesse, 2005; CNN, 1996; MSNBC, 2004).    In addition, Yousef’s “Project Bojinka” 
plan laid the groundwork for the September 11, 2001 attacks (CNN, 1996; Mairesse, 
2005).  If it is assumed that the Central Staff represents the leadership of Al Qaeda, the 
results of this analysis could have many implications.  Yousef appears to have all the 
characteristics of the Central Staff; however he was not identified with them, suggesting 
that Discriminant Functions may be able to identify up and coming leaders, yet to be 
identified leaders, or passed over non-leaders.  Each of these possibilities suggests a 
potential for exploitation. 
4.6.2. Potential Pitfalls of Discriminant Analysis 
 Discriminant Analysis results are based on the assumption that one’s data is 
continuous, and specifically multivariate normal.  This demonstration, however, 
produced a Discriminant Function using both continuous and categorical predictor 
variables.  Though a linear Discriminant Function can be developed from categorical 
variables, as in this demonstration, there is no guarantee of its optimality or even that 
good results are obtained (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984:  381).   
The following example adapted from Dillon and Goldstein (1984: 382) highlights 
a situation in which a linear Discriminant Function performs poorly.  Consider a group G, 
divided into two groups G1 and G2, and two categorical predictor variables X1 and X2 
with three levels each.  Let the observed values for the members of G1 and G2 on the 
predictor variables be as shown in Figure 4-12: 
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Figure 4-12:  A situation in which the linear Discriminant Function performs poorly (Dillon 
and Goldstein, 1984: 382) 
 
Discriminant Analysis was used to build the linear Discriminant Function, denoted as Y 
in Figure 4-12, to discriminate between G1 and G2.  The optimal cutoff line however will 
not do a good job of assigning members to either group (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984: 
382). 
 If, however, one views the space defined by X1 and X2 in terms of the nine 
independent regions formed by the combination of the categorical variables, “the 
separation and assignment of observations are much improved” (Dillon and Goldstein, 
1984:  383).  The dummy coding scheme used in this study views that categorical 
variables in terms of regions and may be able to capture the distinguishing characteristics.  
For this example, {X1 = 2, X2 = 2} could be represented by a dummy coding scheme, 
and would completely describe the observed values of G2 (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984:  
384).   
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The reader is also cautioned about model building for small data sets.  A general 
rule of thumb is that one candidate characteristic can be investigated for every 10 
network members.  In this demonstration seven characteristics were used in the final 
model of the 38 member Central Staff.  The 10:1 rule is simply a rule of thumb, and it is 
possible to build appropriate models when one does not meet this condition (ITCSR, 
2005). Each analysis is unique, however, and the reader is cautioned to check the validity 
of underlying assumptions before drawing conclusions based on Discriminant Analysis 
results. 
4.6.3. Section Summary 
 The results of this analysis indicate that the Central Staff was different from the 
Rest of Al Qaeda on a subset of characteristics collected by Sageman.  In addition, a 
statistically significant Discriminant Function for the Sageman data was produced that 
was able to provide a profile for the Central Staff as well as accurately predict group 
membership.  It was also shown that misclassifications, if there are few, can be very 
important to an analysis.  Further analysis of Ramzi Yousef, a Core Arab classified as 
Central Staff by the Discriminant Function, revealed a potential error in Yousef’s initial 
classification.  Yousef possesses many of the traits associated with the Central Staff, and 
he is also more closely connected to the Central Staff in the network of affiliations than 
he is to the Core Arabs.  The in depth analysis of Ramzi Yousef highlighted the potential 
of a Discriminant Function to possibly uncover previously unidentified leaders in the Al 
Qaeda network.  The final section summarizes the demonstration provided in Chapter 4. 
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4.7. Summary 
 This chapter has demonstrated the potential of Discriminant Analysis to support 
the modeling and analysis of clandestine networks.  It was shown that Discriminant 
Analysis could be used to determine the underlying differences between two groups.  In 
addition, a Discriminant Function was developed that could be used to both profile and 
classify group members.  The ability of a Discriminant Function to validate SNA 
measures of individual importance was also shown. Further it was shown that these 
measures could be used to distinguish between group members.  The identification of 
distinguishing demographic and social network characteristics that enable profiling and 
classification could prove to be a vulnerability for clandestine networks that can be 
exploited by operators.  The analysis of misclassified members highlights the ability of a 
Discriminant Analysis to uncover previously unknown group members.  The result of 
detailed analysis of misclassified members also provides an opportunity for exploitation.  
Given sufficient data, this methodology could be applied to various groups of interest to 
support operations against clandestine networks, aiding an analysts search for key 
pressure points and vulnerabilities. 
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5. Methodology Demonstration and Analysis Results II 
5.1. Introduction 
 The Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM) developed in this thesis 
provides a unique capability for analysts to evaluate interpersonal influence within a 
clandestine network based on individual characteristics and multiple social network 
relations.  Further, the measurement theory properties of the HIIM are appropriate for use 
with techniques such as Operations Research (OR) Network Flow models.  Through 
these tools, analysts are able to provide prescriptive results that focus on specific actions 
and their outcomes which is a new capability for SNA analysts. 
In this chapter, the methodology developed in Chapter 3 is applied using the open 
source data on the Al Qaeda terrorist network collected by Marc Sageman (Sageman, 
2004).  A subset of 48 Al Qaeda members were identified as members of the Jemaah 
Islamiah terrorist network by appropriate subject matter experts (SMEs).  Special thanks 
are due to Dr. Sageman for graciously allowing the use of his data set.  The following 
steps are followed in this implementation: 
Step 1:  Description of Sageman’s Jemaah Islamiah Data 
Step 2:  Statement of Analysis Objectives 
Step 3:  Create Individual Influence Measures with Discriminant Analysis 
Step 4:  Create Pair-wise Interpersonal Influence Measures for Each Network 
Step 5:  Develop Network Weights to Enable Simultaneous Network Analysis 
Step 6:  Create the Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM) Network 
Step 7:  Demonstrate Network Flow Application of HIIM Network 
Step 8:  Demonstrate Fuzzy Clique Analysis Application of HIIM Network 
 
5.2. Jemaah Islamiah 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) is a terrorist group based in Southeast Asia.  The attack by JI 
on a nightclub in Bali in 2002 brought the group to the world’s attention and forced 
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increased concern with Southeast Asian governments.  Their primary goal is to establish 
an Islamic government throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and parts of the 
Philippines and Thailand.  The two most important reasons to focus time and resources 
on the elimination of the threat from JI are 1) their links to Al Qaeda and the role they 
play in global terrorism; and 2) the threat they pose to the governments and economies of 
Southeast Asia. 
JI is primarily important to the U.S. military because there exist multiple links 
between JI and Al Qaeda dating back to the war between Afghanistan and the former 
Soviet Union.  The relationships between JI leadership and Al Qaeda leadership have 
given JI a more global focus, and as such they have supported many Al Qaeda operations 
including the Sept 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in the United States.  In 
addition, JI is an extension of Al Qaeda’s global reach, providing training, safe haven, 
and recruits to a global terror network.  Finally, they are a major threat in the Pacific 
Region, an major area of responsibility for the DOD. 
JI is also important to the United States military, in the long term, because they 
endeavor to violently replace democracy in Southeast Asia with an Islamic extremist 
government and disenfranchise over 400 million people.  Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and Thailand are emerging economic powers in Southeast Asia that 
interact heavily with the economies of the United States and Japan.  Conversely, U.S. and 
Japanese economies rely on these nations for inexpensive imported goods.  The threat 
that JI poses to the economies of these Southeast Asian nations can have a direct impact 
on the economies of the U.S. and Japan. 
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 JI is clearly a dangerous terrorist organization with the capability of inflicting 
significant damage to the governments, economies, and populous of Southeast Asia.  The 
increased focus on JI over the last three years by local governments, the United States, 
and Australia, has led to the arrest of over 200 JI members including its two most high 
profile leaders; Abu Bakar Baasyir—JI’s spiritual leader, and Riduan Isamuddin a.k.a. 
Hambali—JI’s operational mastermind and reportedly its strongest link to Al Qaeda.  To 
this point authorities are not certain of the effect of these arrests on JI; however, JI targets 
have been limited to soft targets since the arrest of Hambali. 
 Because of the uncertainty surrounding the current operational capabilities of JI, it 
is important for the U.S. military to continue to develop and exploit JI susceptibilities and 
vulnerabilities until we are certain they no longer pose a threat to the nation and our 
allies. 
5.3. Description of JI Data 
 The Jemaah Islamiah (JI) data used in this demonstration is a subset of 48 
terrorists from Sageman’s (Sageman, 2004) Al Qaeda data set described in Chapter 4.  
Terrorists were identified as JI members by appropriate Department of Defense (DOD) 
subject matter experts (SMEs).  Further, because this study focuses on influence based 
partly on leadership characteristics, the SMEs also developed a leadership classification 
scale to which they assigned JI members.  The leadership classifications are summarized 
in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1:  Jemaah Islamiah Member Classifications 
 
Leadership 
Level Description of Members
1 Emir Types (Senior Leaders/Founders)
2 Trusted Second Tier/ Key Counselors and Facilitators / Leadership Council
3 Regional/District Leaders / Key Operatives / Unit Commanders / Liaisons
4
Operatives who provide support or followers who often 
risk arrest, physical injury or death; i.e.. execute 
missions / foot soldiers  
For the remainder of this chapter JI members classified as Level 1 (6 members) are 
referred to as the “Emirs”, Level 2 JI (6 members) are referred to as the “Colonels”, 
Level 3 JI (19 members) are referred to as the “Captains”, and the Level 4 (17 members) 
are referred to as “Troops”. 
Sageman’s data set consists of demographic data, affiliation data from pre-
existing informal networks, and affiliation data from networks formed after “joining the 
Jihad” for 48 JI members.  Sageman, however, was unable to gather complete 
information for every JI member in his data set.  Incomplete demographic data for JI 
members are referred to as Missing Data.  Table 4-1 summarizes the data categories 
collected by Sageman: 
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Table 5-2:  Data Categories Collected by Sageman (2004) 
 
Social Network
Continuous Categorical Affiliations
Age joining the jihad Children Acquaintance 
Date of birth Country Joined the Jihad Friendship
Year joined the jihad Educational achievement Links Post Joining
Family Socioeconomic Status Nuclear Family
Marital Status Operation involvement
Occupation Place joined the jihad
Place of birth Relatives (not Nuclear Fam)
Religious Background Teacher-Student Network
Role in Organization Religious Leader
Social background Ties not in sample
Type of education
Youth National Status
Demographic Data
 
The JI dataset contains 94 predictor variables, 3 continuous, 12 categorical (23 
columns when Dummy Coded), and 17 networks and network combinations (4 centrality 
measures for each) which must each be evaluated for their potential to discriminate 
between groups.  The Dummy Variable coding scheme applied to the categorical JI data 
is shown in Table 5-3. 
The large number of variables makes Forward Stepwise Variable Selection 
(FSVS) an attractive exploratory analysis tool.  FSVS is the most widely used automatic 
search technique, and is recommended when there are 40 or more predictor variables 
under consideration (Neter, et al., 1996: 347).  In order to quickly perform an exploratory 
analysis of the JI data to identify potential variables for inclusion in a Discriminant 
Function, a FSVS was employed.   
FSVS has several weaknesses; it only identifies a single “best” model instead of 
several “good” models, it can potentially identify a poor model, and it can overestimate 
the significance of variable coefficients (Neter, et al., 1996: 348).    FSVS should only be 
used as exploratory analysis tool to identify potential variables for inclusion in ones 
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model.  The potential variables should then be used in a confirmatory analysis to verify 
their importance in discriminating between groups.  During this analysis FSVS was used 
strictly as an exploratory analysis tool. 
Table 5-3:  Dummy Variable Coding Scheme for Sageman JI Data 
 
Youth National Status Column 1 Column 2 Socio-Eco Status Column 1 Column 2
Native 0 0 Lower 0 0
2nd Generation/Minority 1 0 Middle 1 0
Immigrant 0 1 Upper 0 1
Religious Background Column 1 Column 2 School Column 1 Column 2
non-Muslim 0 0 Christian 0 0
Secular 1 0 Secular 1 0
Religious 0 1 Madrassa 0 1
Occupation Column 1 Column 2 Married Column 1
Unskilled 0 0 Not Married 0
Semi-prof 1 0 Married 1
Profesional 0 1
Education Type Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Kids Column 1
HS or Vocational 0 0 0 No 0
Hum 1 0 0 Yes 1
Soc Sci 0 1 0
Tech/Nat Sci 0 0 1
Criminal Background Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
None 0 0 0
Criminal 1 0 0
Political Activism 0 1 0
Both 0 0 1
Education Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
Less than High School 0 0 0 0 0
High School Grad 1 0 0 0 0
Some College 0 1 0 0 0
Bachelor's 0 0 1 0 0
Master's 0 0 0 1 0
Doctorate 0 0 0 0 1
Dummy Variable Coding Scheme for JI Data
 
It should be noted that Sageman’s JI data set only contains data for 48 members, 
many of whom have been arrested or killed.  Further, the data set was last updated in 
2003.  The reader is cautioned against the extension of these results to current operations 
directed against the JI network based on the small sample size and age of the data.  The 
results presented in this chapter are done so strictly for the purpose of demonstration. The 
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approach outlined here, however, could be applied to a current data set if and when 
available. 
5.4. Analysis Objectives 
  The analysis in this chapter is presented to demonstrate the application of the 
HIIM to improve ones understanding of clandestine networks.  The primary objectives of 
the analysis conducted this chapter are to determine: 
• Which JI “Emir”  is most influential 
• Which JI members (non-“Emir” ) are likely to succeed the current leaders 
• How JI subgroups are interrelated 
In addition to the primary objectives, the secondary objectives were develop: 
• Operational profile for JI leaders 
• Operational profile for JI rank and file 
  
5.5. Development of Individual Influence Measure 
 In this section, Discriminant Analysis is used to develop a measure of individual 
influence for JI members based on individual characteristics.  The reader is reminded that 
in addition to developing a measure of influence, Discriminant Analysis can also be used 
to differentiate between groups, build an operational profile of a group, and build a 
classifier that can be used to determine to which group newly identified members belong.   
5.5.1. Discriminant Analysis of “Emir” Group 
To perform a Discriminant Analysis of the “Emir” group, the JI data was divided 
into two groups, G1 (“Emirs”) and G2 (Rest of JI).  The Discriminant Function built for 
the “Emirs” required only two predictor variables, Acquaintance Network degree 
centrality and Religious Leader Network degree centrality, to produce a statistically 
significant classifier.  To determine if the Discriminant Function produced a significant 
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difference between the average discriminant scores of G1 and G2, Hotelling’s T-test was 
performed (Lattin et al., 2003: 447-448).  The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
mean of G1 is equal to the mean of G2; the alternative is that they are different: 
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The hypothesis test results are summarized in Figure 5-1. 
0.0514F   4497.31 (2,29)05;. =>>=obsF  
Figure 5-1: Hotelling's T-test results for JI “Emir” Discriminant Function 
 
Based on Hotelling’s T-test, the Discriminant Function was determined to be 
significant at the 5.0=α  level. In addition to the T-test, overall classification accuracy of 
the Discriminant Function was evaluated to determine its quality.  Table 5-4 shows the 
classification accuracy of the Discriminant Function.  The two misclassified leaders, 
Iqbal and Rusdan are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.   
Table 5-4: Classification Accuracy of Discriminant Function Built for “Emirs” 
 
Level 1 Other
Actual Level 1 4 2
Membership Other 0 42
Predicted Membership
Classification Accuracy for Predicting Level 1 
Overall Classification Accuracy 95.8%  
Figure 5-2 shows the Operating Characteristic (OC) curve for the Discriminant Function.  
The OC curve can enable decision makers to perform risk tradeoffs based on the number 
of correctly classified “Emirs” to the number of incorrectly classified non-“Emirs” by 
changing the membership threshold.  Based on this example, one could adjust the 
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membership threshold such that the Discriminant Function correctly classifies all “Emirs” 
with 2% of non-“Emirs” misclassified. 
 
 
Figure 5-2:  Operating Characteristic Curve of “Emir” Discriminant Function 
 
Based on the T-test results and the overall classification accuracy of the 
Discriminant Function one is justified in developing an operational profile of the “Emirs” 
based on the beta coefficients and Discriminant Loadings for the predictor variables.  
However, based on the sample size and age of the data set it is not recommended that 
these profiles be extended for use in current operations.  Table 5-5 shows the 
Discriminant Function coefficients and Discriminant Loadings for the two significant 
predictor variables. 
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Table 5-5:  Beta Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings of Significant Predictor Variables 
 
Characteristic beta Discriminant Loading p-value
Acquaintance--Degree 0.3095 0.6551 < 0.0001
Religious Leader--Degree 0.1505 0.6858 < 0.0001
Variable Contribution for Level 1 Members
 
Positive coefficients in the Discriminant Function indicate that the “Emirs” degree 
centrality values for both networks were larger than the remainder of JI, indicating that 
the “Emirs” in general have more direct contact with network members than other JI 
members.  Figure 5-3 graphically depicts the “Religious Leader” network for JI.  “Emirs” 
are indicated by circles, “Colonels” are indicated by squares, “Captains” are indicated by 
triangles, and “Troops” are indicated by diamonds.  Figure 5-3 clearly shows the 
importance of Baasyir and Sungkar, the founders of JI, because they are the religious 
leaders of the majority of JI. 
 
Figure 5-3:  JI Religious Leader Network created in UCINET 6 
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 The Discriminant Function produced to discriminate between the “Emir” group 
and the Rest of JI was ultimately used to produce posterior probabilities of membership 
in the leadership group.  Because the individual influence measure developed in this 
thesis is based on ones possession of leadership characteristics, the posterior probabilities 
listed in Table 5-6 serve as a proxy measure of individual influence that are used in the 
final development of the HIIM network.  Remembering that the elements of H = [hij] are 
defined as: 
iijij ewh = , 
the posterior probabilities form the vector E = [ei], where ei is the posterior probability of 
member i.  Because probabilities are ratio type numbers the influence measures can be 
easily interpreted, for example Baaysir (0.8236) has approximately twice as much 
individual influence as Iqbal (0.4189)  
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Table 5-6:  Posterior Probability of Membership in “Emir” Group 
Member Classification a priori group
Predicted 
Group
Posterior 
Probabililty
Baasyir 1 1 1 0.8236
Sungkar 1 1 1 0.5557
Hambali 1 1 1 0.7325
Mukhlas 2 0 0 0.0509
Iqbal** 1 1 0** 0.4189
Faruq 3 0 0 0.0142
Syawal 4 0 0 0.0362
Ghozi 3 0 0 0.0038
Samudra 2 0 0 0.0038
Jabir 4 0 0 0.2789
Amrozi 4 0 0 0.0038
Imron 4 0 0 0.0038
Sufaat 3 0 0 0.0038
Dwikarna 3 0 0 0.0074
Mobarok 3 0 0 0.0142
Yunos 3 0 0 0.027
Mistooki 4 0 0 0.0073
Faiz 2 0 0 0.0053
Hasyim 4 0 0 0.0053
Sulaeman 3 0 0 0.0073
Hussein 3 0 0 0.0073
Ayub 3 0 0 0.0265
Azahari 2 0 0 0.0139
Zulkarnaen 1 1 1 0.5072
Ghoni 4 0 0 0.0073
Top 2 0 0 0.0139
Idris 3 0 0 0.0139
Mustofa 3 0 0 0.0501
WanMin 3 0 0 0.0501
Maidin 3 0 0 0.0256
Sani 4 0 0 0.0038
Dulmatin 3 0 0 0.0038
Farik 4 0 0 0.0074
Lillie 4 0 0 0.0074
Yunos2 4 0 0 0.0038
Naharudin 4 0 0 0.0038
Gungun 3 0 0 0.0038
Marzuki 2 0 0 0.0038
Kastari 3 0 0 0.0053
Hafidh 4 0 0 0.0101
Setiono 4 0 0 0.0073
BinHir 3 0 0 0.0038
Rusdan** 1 1 0** 0.0688
Mustaqim 3 0 0 0.0509
Fathi 4 0 0 0.0053
Khalim 3 0 0 0.0053
Roche 4 0 0 0.0073
Thomas 4 0 0 0.0053
** indicates misclassified by Discriminant Function  
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5.5.2. Discriminant Analysis of the “Troops” 
 Because this analysis has been focused on measuring influence based on 
leadership characteristics, Discriminant Analysis has only been used to discriminate the 
leadership group from other subgroups.  Discriminant Analysis, however, is a flexible 
analysis technique that can be used to develop a profile for any subgroup of interest.  This 
section briefly highlights the results of a Discriminant Analysis performed to illustrate the 
creation of a profile of the “Troops” in JI. 
 The Discriminant Function built was significant at the 5.0=α level.  Table 5-7 
shows the classification accuracy of the Discriminant Function. 
Table 5-7:  Classification Accuracy of Discriminant Function built for “Troops” 
 
Level 4 Other
Actual Level 4 15 2
Membership Other 1 30
Overall Classification Accuracy 93.75%
Predicted Membership
Classification Accuracy for Predicting Level 4
 
The quality of the Discriminant Function makes building an operational profile 
appropriate, however the reader is cautioned against extending these results based on the 
size and age of the data set.  Table 5-8 contains the Discriminant Function coefficients 
and Discriminant Loadings for the key variables used to discriminate between the 
“Troops” and the Rest of JI. 
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Table 5-8:  Discriminant Function Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings for “Troops” 
 
Characteristic beta Discriminant Loading p-value
Youth National 
Status--Immigrant 7.285 0.2409 0.023
Occupation--
SemiProfessional -11.6518 -0.2067 < 0.0001
Occupation--
Professional -8.8457 -0.2887 < 0.0001
Year Joined JI 0.593 0.2553 0.029
Friendship--
Closeness 3.1366 0.1296 <0.0001
Variable Contribution for Level 4 Members
 
In general, “Troops” were immigrants who grew up in countries that they did not 
call home.  The negative coefficients on Occupation indicate that the “Troops” tend to 
have non-professional jobs.  Further, the “Troops” joined JI later than the other groups.  
The positive coefficient for Friendship Network closeness centrality indicates that the 
“Troops” are generally groups of friends.  Figure 5-4 graphically displays the 
“Friendship” network for JI. “Emirs” are indicated by circles, “Colonels” are indicated by 
squares, “Captains” are indicated by triangles, and “Troops” are indicated by diamonds.  
Figure 5-4 highlights the various pre-existing friendship groups within JI.  The graph 
reveals that about two-thirds of the “Troops” permeate the Friendship network.  Further, 
Figure 5-4 reveals that Jabir (Troop) is a common friend to both Hambali (“Emir”) and 
Iqbal (“Emir”); the potential importance of Jabir is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Figure 5-4:  Graphical Representation of JI Friendship Network created in UCINET 6 
5.5.3. Section Summary 
The Discriminant Analysis results presented in this section highlighted the 
development of a proxy measure of individual influence for the members of JI.  The 
development of a meaningful measure of non-network influence is critical to the 
development of the HIIM network and the modeling of network influence in general.  
The influence measures produced in this section are used to develop the final HIIM 
network in Section 5.8.  In addition, the Discriminant Analysis results presented in this 
section satisfied the secondary analysis objectives of developing operational profiles of 
the “Emirs” and “Troops” of JI.  The development of the HIIM network requires both 
non-network and network measures of influence.  The next section describes the 
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development of pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence based solely on network 
topology. 
5.6. Development of Interpersonal Influence Measures 
 By definition clandestine networks are organizations that must operate in secrecy.  
Erickson (Erickson, 1981: 188) states that “risk enforces recruitment along lines of trust,” 
which causes clandestine networks to use pre-existing networks of relationships.  The 
trust premium paid by clandestine organizations is their reliance on pre-existing 
networks.  In this section, pair-wise measures of interpersonal influence are developed for 
each of JI’s informal networks based on Sageman’s data.  The networks considered were 
the Acquaintance Network (I1), Nuclear Family Network (I2), Relative Network (I3), 
Friendship Network (I4), Teacher-Student Network (I5), and Religious Leader Network 
(I6).  For the purposes of this demonstration it was assumed that the affiliation data is 
complete and correct.  For a discussion on the impacts of missing affiliation data, the 
reader is referred to Sterling (Sterling, 2004: 133-146). 
5.6.1. Analysis of Individual Networks 
 Pair-wise measures of individual influence based on network topology were 
developed for each informal social network using the Information Centrality 
methodology developed in Chapter 3.  This section briefly discusses the results of 
applying the Information Centrality methodology to three informal JI networks.  Due to 
the size of the resultant matrices )4848( × , only a small portion of each network is 
highlighted.  The results highlighted, however, are representative of the results for the 
entire network.  The complete results are available in Appendix A. 
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 Information Centrality accounts for all direct and indirect connections between 
network members, and larger scores indicate more connections.  Table 5-9 contains the 
pair-wise interpersonal influence measures for a )55( ×  subset of JI members based on 
the Acquaintance Network.  The values in each cell are ratio numbers and can easily be 
interpreted.  The influence between Baasyir and Hambali (1.73) is approximately three 
times larger than the influence between Baasyir and Sungkar (0.64), based on Sageman’s 
data for this particular network.  In addition, because it was assumed that each network 
was based on undirected arcs, the resultant matrix of interpersonal influence values is 
symmetric.   
Table 5-9: Subsection of Acquaintance Network Pair-wise Influence Measures based on 
Information Centrality 
 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal
Baasyir 0.00 0.64 1.73 1.24 1.78
Sungkar 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.56 1.00
Hambali 1.73 0.64 0.00 2.32 1.75
Mukhlas 1.24 0.56 2.32 0.00 1.28
Iqbal 1.78 1.00 1.75 1.28 0.00
Acquaintance Network
 
Figure 5-5 provides a graphical representation of the interpersonal influences within the 
Acquaintance Network for the subgroup in Table 5-9.  The thickness of the arcs 
represented in Figure 5-5 represent the level of influence, thicker arcs imply greater 
influence. 
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Baasyir
Iqbal
Mukhlas Hambali
Sungkar
1.78 0.64
1.24 1.73
1.00
1.75
1.28
0.56
2.32
0.64
Emir
Colonel  
Figure 5-5:  Network Representation of Acquaintance Network Interpersonal Influence 
 The Acquaintance Network was shown to be an indicator of JI leadership based 
on Discriminant Analysis, and as such, analysis of this network may provide a reasonable 
representation of the network.  However, a tenet of this study is that multiple networks 
should be considered simultaneously.  Analysis of JI’s Friendship Network provides a 
very different picture of JI’s interpersonal influence.  Table 5-10 contains the pair-wise 
interpersonal influence measures for the same )55( ×  subset of JI members based on the 
Friendship Network.   
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Table 5-10:  Subsection of Friendship Network Pair-wise Influence Measures based on 
Information Centrality 
 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal
Baasyir 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sungkar 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hambali 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50
Mukhlas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iqbal 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.00
Friendship Network
 
Table 5-10 and Figure 5-6 offer a very different representation of influence among the 
subset if JI highlighted.  In this network there are much fewer connections, as well as 
dramatic changes in the amount of influence between members.  The difference in these 
network structures highlights the very real possibility that an analysis focused on a single 
network context can result in inappropriate conclusions about influence within a 
clandestine network. 
Baasyir
Iqbal
Mukhlas Hambali
Sungkar
1.00
1.5
Emir
Colonel
 
Figure 5-6:  Network Representation of Friendship Network of Interpersonal Influence 
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 Finally, the results based on the Teacher-Student Network are offered to highlight 
the vastly different relationship structures that exist in multiple network levels.  Table 
5-11 contains the pair-wise interpersonal influence measures for the  subset of JI 
members based on the Teacher-Student Network. 
)55( ×
Table 5-11:  Subsection of Teacher-Student Network Pair-wise Influence Measures based 
on Information Centrality 
 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal
Baasyir 0.00 6.50 0.44 1.86 0.44
Sungkar 6.50 0.00 0.44 1.86 0.44
Hambali 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.36 1.00
Mukhlas 1.86 1.86 0.36 0.00 0.36
Iqbal 0.44 0.44 1.00 0.36 0.00
Teacher-Student Network
 
Table 5-11 and Figure 5-7, again offer a different view of interpersonal influence among 
JI members. 
Baasyir
Iqbal
Mukhlas Hambali
Sungkar
0.44 6.50
1.86 0.44
0.44
1.00
0.36
1.86
0.36
0.44
Emir
Colonel  
Figure 5-7:  Network Representation of Teacher-Student Network of Interpersonal 
Influence 
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5.6.2. Section Summary 
 This section has highlighted the results of computing pair-wise measures of 
interpersonal influence for the informal networks of JI based on the Sageman data.  The 
results clearly show the differences in influence relationships between network members 
in different contexts.  While it may be possible to accurately model a clandestine network 
on the basis of a single network context, these results indicate that it may be more 
appropriate to consider each network simultaneously. 
5.7. Development of Network Weights 
 The combined network of interpersonal influences was defined in Chapter 3 as a 
linear combination of the interpersonal influences from each informal network to which 
clandestine network members belong.  The multi-layered influence measure for JI is 
represented by: 
665544332211 IIIIIIW λλλλλλ +++++=  
∑
=
=
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1
1
i
iλ  
where Ii is the matrix of pair-wise interpersonal influences from network i as defined in 
the previous section, and wi is the perceived importance of network context i in 
determining influence within JI. 
 Proper weighting of each network is critical; however an analysis of appropriate 
weighting techniques is beyond the scope of this research.  Analysts are cautioned to 
carefully consider the impact and appropriateness of network weights and weighting 
techniques for their decision problem.  For the purposes of this demonstration the 
networks were assigned equal weights, iλ  = 1/6.  Based on this weighting scheme the 
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combined network of interpersonal influences was created.  Table 5-12 contains the pair-
wise interpersonal influence measures for the )55( ×  subset of JI members based on the 
linear combination of each informal network. 
Table 5-12:  Subsection of Combined Network Pair-wise Influence Measures based on 
Information Centrality 
 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal
Baasyir 0.00 2.46 0.67 0.52 0.78
Sungkar 2.46 0.00 0.49 0.40 0.62
Hambali 0.67 0.49 0.00 0.45 0.90
Mukhlas 0.52 0.40 0.45 0.00 0.27
Iqbal 0.78 0.62 0.90 0.27 0.00
Combined Network
 
The combined influence measures wij in each cell represent the average overall 
influence between JI members based solely on network topology.  The values are ratio 
type numbers, and can be interpreted as such.  For example, the influence between 
Baasyir and Sungkar (2.46) is approximately four times larger than the influence between 
Baasyir and Hambali (0.67).  Figure 5-8 provides a graphical representation of combined 
interpersonal influence based on each informal JI network in Sageman’s data. 
The combined network, W, provides an average measure of influence between JI 
network members based on each informal network to which they belong.  This measure 
is limited however, because it is based on connections within undirected networks.  The 
implication of these undirected connections is that members will have equal influence 
over one another as shown in Figure 5-9. 
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Baasyir
Iqbal
Mukhlas Hambali
Sungkar
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0.40 0.67
0.62
0.90
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Emir
Colonel  
Figure 5-8:  Network Representation of Combined Network Interpersonal Influence 
 
Influence Flow
 
Figure 5-9: Implication of Undirected Influence Arcs 
 
Further, this symmetry will hold for all network members.  To provide greater insight 
into the network, the interpersonal influence measures must be considered with the 
individual influence measures. 
5.8. Creation of the Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure 
 The Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM) was defined in Chapter 3 as 
the matrix H = [hij] = [wijei] where hij represents the average pair-wise interpersonal 
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influence of member i over member j.  A portion of the HIIM network calculated for JI is 
shown in Table 5-13. 
Table 5-13:  Subsection of Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM) Network for JI 
 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal
Baasyir 0.00 2.03 0.55 0.43 0.64
Sungkar 1.37 0.00 0.27 0.22 0.34
Hambali 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.33 0.66
Mukhlas 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Iqbal 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.11 0.00
HIIM Network
 
The HIIIM network is a directed network of ratio type numbers that offer simple 
interpretations, where larger numbers indicate greater influence.  Baasyir’s influence over 
Iqbal (0.64) is approximately twice Iqbal’s influence over Baasyir (0.33).  Further, 
Baasyir’s influence over Sungkar (2.03) is approximately four times greater than 
Baasyir’s influence over Hambali (0.55).   
The implication of the directed arcs in the HIIM network, as shown in Figure 
5-10, suggest that it is possible to accurately represent both network topology based 
influence as well as individual characteristic based influence.  The HIIM network enables 
a more accurate picture of influence than either network or non-network measures alone.   
Influence Flow
 
Figure 5-10:  Implication of Directed Arcs in the HIIM Network 
 
Figure 5-11 provides a graphical representation of the HIIM network calculated for JI 
based on Sageman’s data for the discussed subgroup. 
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Figure 5-11:  Network Representation of the HIIM Network 
 The HIIM network provides the analyst insight into the influence relationships 
between JI members.  In addition, because of the measurement properties of the influence 
arcs, the HIIM network is appropriate for use in a variety of analysis techniques.  The 
next two sections will demonstrate applications of the HIIM network using various 
analysis techniques.  Individual importance is considered in a Single Commodity 
Network Flow model, and cohesive subgroups are analyzed using Fuzzy Clique analysis 
techniques. 
5.9. Single Commodity Flow Model Example 
 One of the primary goals of SNA is the identification of the “most important” 
actors within a social network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 169).  SNA results, 
however, are limited due to the “lack of advantageous properties” of the relationship 
measures applied to the arcs in a social network (Renfro, 2001; Renfro and Deckro, 
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2004).  Renfro and Deckro (Renfro, 2001; Renfro and Deckro, 2004) state that 
Operations Research (OR) techniques can extend and refine SNA with results that are 
“measurable, quantifiable, and organized in a manner that allows for specific courses of 
action to be evaluated.”   
The HIIM network offers an alternative to traditional SNA techniques by enabling 
simultaneous consideration of multiple network and non-network characteristics.  
Further, the relationship arcs within the HIIM network are appropriate for Operations 
Research (OR) Network Flow models.  To identify the “Emir” with the most influence 
over JI operations, the HIIM network was mapped to a Single Commodity Network Flow 
model.  This section highlights the results of calculating the maximum flow of influence 
from each JI “Emir” to the “Troops”. 
5.9.1. Maximum Flow Mapping 
Renfro (Renfro, 2001: 95) offers a taxonomy of social network concepts mapped 
to network flow modeling; the mapping offered in this section is based on Renfro’s work.  
In a capacitated network, a maximum flow problem attempts to send as much flow as 
possible between a source node, s, and a sink node t (Ahuja et al., 1993: 166).  Let arc xij 
represent the magnitude of potential influence flow between members i and j.  Let hij 
represent the capacity of arc xij such that 
ijij hx ≤≤0 . 
The maximum flow problem can formally be stated as follows: 
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5.9.2. Maximum Flow Results 
To determine which of the six “Emirs” has the most potential influence over the 
“Troops”, six separate maximum flow problems were solved.  In each of the problems 
one of the “Emirs” was identified as the source node, s.  Further, because the maximum 
influence flow to all “Troops” was desired a super sink node, t, was created along with 
infinite capacity arcs emanating from each Troop and terminating at node t.  The greatest 
maximum flow from a source node found in these problems will correspond to the 
“Emir” able to exert the greatest potential influence over the “Troops” based on 
Sageman’s data.    
Table 5-14  shows the maximum flows from the “Emirs” to the “Troops” for the 
JI network. 
Table 5-14:  Maximum Flow from “Emirs” to “Troops” 
 
Leader Flow
Baasyir 9.00
Sungkar 6.15
Hambali 5.86
Iqbal 3.74
Zulkarnaen 4.47
Rusdan 0.55
Maximum Potential Influence Flow from Level 1 
Emirs to Level 4 Troops
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The maximum flow results reveal that Baasyir has the most potential influence 
over the “Troops” based on Sageman’s data.  In general, maximum flow results will 
identify persons to neutralize or marginalize.  Further, because of strong duality, by 
solving the maximum flow problem from s to t, one has solved the complementary 
minimum s-t cut problem (Ahuja et al., 1993: 167).  An s-t cut separates a network into 
two components such that s and t are in different components; a minimum s-t cut is the s-
t cut whose capacity is the minimum among all s-t cuts.  The arcs identified in the s-t cut 
represent the set of connections that, when removed, will isolate the “Emir” from the 
“Troops”. 
5.9.3. Parametric Analysis of Maximum Flow 
To determine the influence of the “Emirs” over the “Troops” based on different 
weightings of network and non-network influences, Θ (theta), was varied from 0 to 1; 
= 0 will consider influence based solely on network topology, while Θ = 1 will 
consider influence based solely on individual characteristics.  Figure 5-12 shows the 
results of a parametric analysis of the maximum flow from the “Emirs” to the “Troops” 
for Θ = 0, 0.1. 0.2,…, 1. 
Θ
The results of the parametric analysis offer more insight into the importance of 
each “Emir” in JI.  Baasyir has the greatest potential influence over the “Troops” across 
all levels of .  As the problem transitions from considering strictly network based 
influence to non-network influence Hambali becomes more influential than Sungkar.  
This shift helps to indicate the nature of Hambali’s and Sungkar’s power base.  The 
results could be interpreted by inferring that Sungkar is better connected, but Hambali is 
more revered.  Further, if current intelligence estimates indicated Hambali was more 
Θ
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influential within JI, these results would suggest choosing a value a Θ  greater than 0.5 to 
accurately model influence within JI. 
Parametric Analysis of Maximum Flow from Leader to Level 4 Operatives
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Figure 5-12:  Parametric Analysis of Maximum Flow from “Emirs” to “Troops” 
 The “Emir” identified as least influential, Rusdan, stands out because his profile is 
very different from the others.  Rusdan’s maximum flow profile has many possible 
operational interpretations.  First, his profile could suggest that there is inadequate 
information available to accurately model his influence.  Second, he may have been 
misclassified originally as an “Emir”, and these results in combination with the 
Discriminant Analysis performed earlier could be used to change his classification.  
Finally, if Rusdan is an “Emir”, his profile suggests he may be the least revered in the 
group.  If one wanted to neutralize an “Emir” without creating a martyr, the results of the 
analysis indicate that Rusdan may be the appropriate target.  Again, the results would be 
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used by knowledgeable intelligence analysts and other knowledgeable operators to focus 
their efforts. 
5.9.4. Section Summary 
This section has highlighted the results of mapping the HIIM network created for 
JI into a single commodity maximum flow problem.  The results indicate that Baasyir is 
the most influential “Emir”.  These results could easily be extended to identify the 
minimum arc, node, or mixed cut set that would separate each “Emir” from the “Troops”.  
Further, post optimality analysis of the results could be performed to determine the 
changes in hij that would change the results, that is someone other than Baasyir being 
most influential.  The parametric analysis offers further insight into the JI network.  
Baasyir was shown to be the most influential “Emir” across all values of .  It was also 
shown, however, that as network characteristics or non-network characteristics are 
weighed more heavily, the level of influence of Sungkar and Hambali flip.  Given a 
complete and up to date data set, cut-sets and post optimality analysis results could be 
utilized as a part of a campaign to neutralize or marginalize any of the “Emirs”.   
Θ
Although no explicit comparison has been made to traditional SNA measures, it 
has been shown implicitly that key individuals identified based on analysis of the HIIM 
network are more likely to be representative of actual leadership within the group of 
interest.  Discriminant Analysis results from Section 5.5 identified degree centrality in the 
Acquaintance and Religious Leader networks as discriminating characteristics for JI 
“Emirs”.  Other networks and centrality measures, however, by their absence from the 
Discriminant Function suggest they are not likely to identify the leaders of JI.  Analysts 
attempting to identify JI leadership using traditional SNA measures are more likely 
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produce inaccurate pictures of the influence within JI than if they based their results on 
the HIIM network. 
5.10. Fuzzy Clique Analysis 
 One of the major concerns of SNA is the identification and analysis of cohesive 
subgroups (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 249).  The traditional graph theoretic subgroup 
detection techniques discussed in Chapter 2 are all limited to binary undirected networks.  
Further, each of the traditional techniques are limited to evaluating a single network.  It 
has been argued throughout this paper that informal networks should be evaluated 
simultaneously.  Traditional SNA subgroup analysis techniques applied to JI for this 
demonstration, however, produce results with limited applicability; for example a 3-
clique within JI produces a single group with 42 (of 48) members, and a 3-plex identifies 
16762 subgroups. 
The fuzzy clique analysis techniques developed by Yan (Yan, 1987), however, 
enable analysts to evaluate subgroups based on the interpersonal influence measures 
developed in the HIIM.  To evaluate the relationships between the SME identified 
subgroups in JI, Yan’s fuzzy clique analysis techniques were employed.   This section 
highlights the results of the fuzzy clique analysis of JI.  Note that the SME classifications 
do not satisfy the mathematical definition of clique; however, the subgroups are 
appropriate for Yan’s measures.  For further discussion on creation of subgroups when 
SMEs are not able to provide them, the reader is referred to Aggregation Techniques to 
Characterize Social Networks (Sterling, 2004).  
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5.10.1. Node Membership Value 
 The membership value of a node, mi, is a measure of how important a node is 
within its own clique.  Yan’s definition of membership value is based on distance, and 
therefore members who are close to many members will have a higher membership value.  
Yan’s definition can be modified to model influence by changing to definition of n’ to the 
number of nodes in the clique over whom i’s influence is greater than some threshold D.  
Define A  as the number of directed edges in a particular clique. For the purposes of this 
demonstration D is defined as the average influence flow between subgroup members: 
A
h
D ji
ij∑
= ),( . 
 Table 5-15 shows the membership values for each member of the “Emir” group.  
Based on these results Baasyir and Hambali are the most important members of the 
“Emir” group, followed by Sungkar.  This implies that Baasyir and Hambali have above 
average influence over four out of the 5 other members in the “Emir” group, while 
Sungkar has above average influence over only one other “Emir”.  Operationally, these 
results suggest that Baasyir and Hambali are the core of JI’s leadership. 
Table 5-15:  Membership Values for Members of the “Emir” Group 
 
Baasyir 0.8
Sungkar 0.2
Hambali 0.8
Iqbal 0
Zulkarnaen 0
Rusdan 0
Node Membership Value for Emir 
Group
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5.10.2. Clique-Clique Coefficient 
 The clique-clique coefficient, cmn is a measure of the relationship between two 
separate cliques. Yan’s clique-clique coefficient definition, again, is based on distance, 
however, the definition can be modified to model influence by defining Qij as the 
influence of node i, in clique m, over a node j in clique n.  The node-clique formulation 
then becomes 
nm
ci cj
ij
mn cc
Q
c m n
∑∑
∈ ∈=  
ijij hQ = . 
 shows the clique-clique coefficients between JI groups based on influence 
outflow.  These results indicate that the “Emirs” are the key operational players in the JI 
network because they have the predominant amount of influence over every other 
subgroup.  The identified influence structure is surprising, because the relationships are 
counter to traditional military or hierarchical network relationships.  A traditional 
influence flow would be from the “Emirs” to the “Colonels”, from the “Colonels” to the 
“Captains”, and then from the “Captains” to the “Troops”.  Table 5-16 shows the clique-
clique coefficient scores between each pair of JI subgroups.  Figure 5-13 provides a 
graphical representation of the between group influences within JI based on the clique-
clique coefficient. 
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Table 5-16:  Clique-Clique Coefficients for JI Subgroups 
 
From Level To Level Clique-Clique Coefficient
1 2 0.1277
1 3 0.1250
1 4 0.1254
2 3 0.0044
2 4 0.0054
3 4 0.0047
Clique-Clique Coefficients for JI Levels
 
 
Emirs
Troops
CaptainsColonels
.1277
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Influence Flow in Network based on Clique Clique Coeffients
 
Figure 5-13:  Network Representation of JI Influence Structure Based on Clique-Clique 
Coefficients 
 
5.10.3. Node-Clique Coefficient 
 The node-clique coefficient, nic, is a measure of node i’s relationship to a clique c 
of which i is not a member.  Yan’s node-clique coefficient definition is again based on 
distance; however, the definition can be modified to model influence by defining Qij as 
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the influence of node i, not in clique c, over a node j in c.  The node-clique formulation 
then becomes 
cQn
m
j
ijic /)(
1
∑
=
=  
ijij hQ = . 
 Table 5-17 shows the non-”Emirs” with the highest node-clique coefficients for 
the “Emir” group.  These results suggest that the six identified members have the most 
influence with the “Emir” group based on Sageman’s data.  Jabir, identified as a friend to 
both Hambali and Iqbal in Figure 5-6, has the highest node-clique coefficient.  There are 
several interpretations of these results.  Each of these individuals clearly warrant closer 
inspection based on their relationships with the “Emir” group.  Further, these results may 
indicate that these individuals are key deputies outside of the “Emir” subgroup. For the 
remainder of this study, the JI members identified in Table 5-17 are referred to as the Up-
and-Comers. 
Table 5-17:  Node-Clique Coefficients for non-“Emirs” to the “Emir” Group 
 
Name Classification Node-Clique Coefficient
Jabir 4 0.3548
Syawal 4 0.3112
Mustaqim 3 0.2692
Mustofa 3 0.2503
Mukhlas 2 0.2366
Yunos 3 0.2057
Node-Clique Coefficients for non-Level 1 
Members
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5.10.4. Parametric Analysis of Node-Clique Coefficient 
The fuzzy clique analysis results from the previous section were each analyzed 
parametrically, however only the node-clique coefficient results are highlighted in this 
section.  Parametric analysis results for Node Membership Value and Clique-Clique 
Coefficient are provided in Appendix A.  To determine the node-clique coefficients of JI 
members to the “Emir”  group based on different weightings of network and non-network 
influences, Θ (theta), was varied from 0 to 1; Θ = 0 will consider influence based solely 
on network topology, while = 1 will consider influence based solely on individual 
characteristics.  Figure 5-14 shows the results of a parametric analysis of node-clique 
coefficients for = 0, 0.1. 0.2,…, 1. 
Θ
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Figure 5-14:  Parametric Analysis of Node-Clique Coefficients for JI members to the 
“Emirs” 
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 Figure 5-14 reveals that Jabir has the most influence with the “Emir”  group 
across all values of .  Jabir’s higher node-clique coefficient value is likely based on his 
pre-existing friendships with Hambali and Iqbal as shown in Figure 5-6.  Further, as 
transitions from zero to one, the node-clique coefficient values of the other five Up-
and-Comers identified converge.  When only non-network characteristics are considered, 
these five members have identical node-clique coefficient values.  This result suggests 
that the Up-and-Comers have similar personal characteristics. 
Θ
Θ
 A Discriminant Function was built for the Up-and-Comers to determine if there 
were individual characteristics that distinguished them from the Rest of JI; Table 5-18 
shows the classification accuracy. 
Table 5-18:  Classification Accuracy of Discriminant Function for Up-and-Comers 
 
Up-and-Comer Other
Actual U-&-C 4 2
Membership Other 1 41
Classification Accuracy for Predicting Up-and-Comers
Predicted Membership
Overall Classification Accuracy 95.8%  
Table 5-19 shows the misclassified JI members based on the Discriminant Function built 
for the Up-and-Comers.  The classification of Rusdan (“Emir”) as an Up-and-Comer 
suggests that his individual characteristics are more similar to the Up-and-Comers than 
the Rest of JI. 
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Table 5-19:  Misclassifications of Up-and-Comers 
 
Name SME Classification
Rusdan 1
Yunos 3
Syawal 4
Misclassified Members
 
All of the previous analysis suggested that Rusdan was the least influential 
“Emir”.  These results suggest, however, that Rusdan may be part of a new generation of 
JI leadership.  According to Agence France-Presse, Rusdan was appointed acting JI 
“Emir” after the arrests of Baasyir and Hambali (Agence, 2003).  The results of this 
analysis indicate that it may be possible to build a profile of the next group of JI leaders. 
Table 5-20 shows the Discriminant Function coefficients as well as the 
discriminant loadings for the Up-and-Comers.  The discriminant loadings suggest that the 
Up-and-Comers were political activists prior to joining JI.  In addition, the coefficients 
for the social networks indicate that the Up-and-Comers are connected to central 
members in the Acquaintance and Friendship networks, whereas they posses fewer direct 
connections themselves.  In short, it appears that the Up-and-Comers are outspoken 
individuals connected to the right people. 
Table 5-20: Beta Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings for Up-and-Comers 
 
Characteristic beta Discriminant Loading p-value
Criminal Background--Political 
Activisim 10.8921 0.37 0.036
Acq-Friend--Eigenvector 0.6047 0.6566 < 0.0001
Acquaintance--Degree -1.5081 0.3917 0.0005
Variable Contribution for Up-and-Comers
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5.10.5. Section Summary 
 This section has highlighted the results of analyzing JI subgroups.  Based 
on node membership value, Baasyir and Hambali were identified as the core members of 
the “Emir” group.  In addition, the relationships between each JI subgroup was evaluated 
using the clique-clique coefficient.  The clique-clique coefficient revealed that the 
influence of the “Emir” group dominates JI relationships.  This may suggest that JI 
operations are run directly from the top.   
The node-clique coefficient was used to identify JI members with the most 
influence with the “Emir” group.  Jabir, who is the friend of both Hambali and Iqbal, was 
shown to have the most influence with the “Emir” group across all values of Θ , which 
may indicate that he is in line to be promoted to a leadership position within JI.  The 
node-clique coefficients of the other Up-and-Comers were shown to be identical when 
only non-network characteristics were considered.  A Discriminant Function was 
developed to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the Up-and-Comers.  The least 
influential “Emir”, Rusdan, was misclassified as an Up-and-Comer, suggesting that he 
may have been the first of the Up-and-Comers to be promoted.  These Up-and-Comers 
warrant further investigation based on their relationships with the leadership group.  In 
addition, the node-clique coefficient values may indicate that the Up-and-Comers are the 
key deputies and potential future leaders of JI. 
The results from the section have highlighted the influence within, between, and 
amongst JI subgroups.  Given a complete and up to date data set, as well as key 
intelligence analysis and SMEs, these techniques could be used to support operations 
against any clandestine network.  
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5.11. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated the potential of the HIIM to support the modeling 
and analysis of clandestine networks.  It was shown that the elements of the HIIM 
network could be mapped to a maximum flow formulation to identify key individuals 
within a clandestine network.  Mapping the HIIM network to Operations Research (OR) 
Network Flow models enables researchers to provide prescriptive analysis focused on 
specific operational outcomes.  Further, because network flow models enable analysts to 
quickly identify alternate optimal solutions and perform post optimality analysis, the 
HIIM network will provide added utility to traditional SNA analysis that provides single 
point solutions.   
In addition, the HIIM network was used to perform a fuzzy clique analysis, 
providing measures of influence within, amongst, and between subgroups.  It was shown 
that these techniques could highlight the core group leaders, potentially identify the next 
generation of leaders, and uncover the influence relationships between the various 
subgroups within a clandestine network.   
Finally, Figure 5-15 is offered to demonstrate the nature of influence within JI 
that was captured by the HIIM, in reference to the definition of influence provided in 
Chapter 1.  The x-axis represents the ratio of each members topology based influence to 
the maximum influence within the network.  The y-axis represents the ratio each 
members non-network based influence to the maximum influence within the network.   
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Jemaah Islamiah--Influence Space
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Figure 5-15: Jemaah Islamiah Influence Space 
 
The majority of JI is clustered in the bottom left (least influential) corner of the 
chart.  The operational interpretation of Figure 5-15 is that the JI members who stand out 
warrant continued and perhaps increased attention.  These “most influential” members 
should represent an initial candidate set of JI personnel to be targeted through a 
neutralization or marginalization campaign.  Due to the size and age of this data set, the 
results produced in this chapter are not intended for operational use and are provided only 
as a demonstration.  Given sufficient data, however, this methodology could be applied to 
various groups of interest to support operations against clandestine networks, aiding an 
analysts search for key pressure points and vulnerabilities.
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6. Summary and Recommendations 
6.1. Introduction 
 This chapter will summarize the academic and operational contributions of the 
research conducted for this thesis.  In addition, this chapter summarizes the analysis 
results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, and suggests recommendations for future research. 
6.2. Contributions of the Research 
 The major contribution of this research is the development of a meaningful 
measure of interpersonal influence within clandestine networks, which considers both the 
personal characteristics of individuals and the topology of each informal network to 
which clandestine network members belong.  The Discriminant Analysis methodology 
provides one of the first adequate discussions of the development of a non-network 
measure of influence compatible with Social Influence Network (SIN) theory.  The linear 
combination of multiple network contexts provides an original, yet simple way to 
simultaneously evaluate influence from multiple network layers.  Finally, because the 
influence measure is a ratio number it can be extended for use in a variety of analysis 
techniques. 
The numeric properties of the Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measure (HIIM) 
are appropriate for use in a variety of analysis tools including Operations Research 
Network Flow models.  Analysis of clandestine networks using Network Flow models 
enables analysts to provide prescriptive analysis results focused on specific actions and 
their outcomes, in contrast to traditional Social Network Analysis (SNA) descriptive 
results.   
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The capability to identify key leaders with the HIIM was implicitly compared to 
traditional SNA individual centrality measures.  Typical SNA studies focus on a single 
informal social network; those studies that consider multiple networks consider each 
network independently.  By considering each informal social network simultaneously the 
HIIM is much less likely to inappropriately identify non-leaders as leaders.  In addition, it 
was shown that the Discriminant Analysis methodology can be used to validate the 
results of traditional SNA centrality measures. 
The analysis methodology in this thesis provides a robust alternative to traditional 
SNA techniques.  In general, the HIIM introduces no new data requirements over 
traditional SNA studies.  In addition, because the intermediate steps required to develop 
the HIIM for a clandestine network are relatively straight forward to perform, the HIIM 
will provide a relatively firm basis to develop a user-friendly analysis tool, or can be 
easily integrated into tools currently in use by military and intelligence analysts. 
6.3. Results of the Research 
 The HIIM analysis provides potentially meaningful operational results.  It 
develops leadership profiles, identifies key leaders and potential next generation leaders.  
The HIIM methodology was applied to open source Al Qaeda data graciously provided 
by Dr. Marc Sageman (Sageman, 2004).  The analysis was conducted in two phases.  
First, a Discriminant Analysis of Al Qaeda was used to develop an operational profile of 
Al Qaeda leadership.  Second, the complete HIIM methodology was applied to the 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terror network. 
 Analysis results indicate that the leadership of Al Qaeda can be distinguished 
from the rank and file members.  In addition, a statistically significant Discriminant 
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Function for the Sageman data was produced that was able to provide a profile for Al 
Qaeda leadership and accurately predict group membership.  Further, analysis of 
misclassifications highlighted the ability of the Discriminant Function to uncover 
previously unidentified leaders within Al Qaeda.  These results suggest that given 
appropriate data, one could develop an operational profile for any group of interest. 
The JI analysis highlighted the broad spectrum of operational questions that could 
the HIIM could support.  First, Discriminant Analysis was used to develop statistically 
significant operational profiles of both the top-level leadership group and the low-level 
operatives of JI.  Mapping the HIIM to a Network Flow model and computing maximum 
flows from the top-level leadership to the low-level operatives identified the most 
influential JI leaders.  Based on the maximum flow results, minimum arc-, node-, and 
mixed-cut-sets could quickly be identified that would isolate any JI leader from the low-
level operatives.  Further, using fuzzy clique analysis techniques, it was possible to 
identify the core of JI’s leadership group.  Fuzzy clique analysis also enabled the 
identification of potential next-generation leaders of JI.  Parametric analysis of the results 
provided further insight into the nature of interpersonal influence within JI using non-
network based influence, network topology based influence, and mixtures of non-network 
and network influences.  The potential outputs produced using the HIIM methodology are 
summarized in Table 6-1.  While provided for illustrative purposes only, the examples do 
indicate that the approach developed in this thesis can assist intelligence and counter 
terrorist analysts in identifying key factors and personnel for further analysis. 
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Table 6-1:  Overview of HIIM Potential Outputs 
Measure of interpersonal influence based on 
individual characteristics and network topology
Holistic Interpersonal Influence 
Measure (HIIM)
Identify members with greatest potential influence;
Post optimality analysis; Alternate optimals
Network Flow (Maximum Flow)
Consideration of each informal network 
simultaneously
Linear Combination, Network 
Weighting
Operational profiles; 
Classification rule (prediction);
Measure of individual influence
Validation of SNA Centrality Measures
Discriminant Analysis
Identify core of subgroup; 
Identify members with influence over key subgroups; 
Highlight relationships between groups
Fuzzy Clique Analysis
Measure of Interpersonal Influence based on 
network topologyInformation Centrality
 
6.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research offers a starting point for the modeling and analysis of clandestine 
networks based on interpersonal influence between members.  There are, however, many 
fruitful areas of future research.  Since two year old open source data was used to 
demonstrate the methodology, most of these terrorists have been captured or killed; it 
would be useful to test the methodology on current, operationally relevant data. 
 The HIIM is appropriate for use in Network Flow models, however, only a 
maximum flow solution was presented in this thesis.  There remain many Network Flow 
problem classes such as cut-sets, minimum cost network flow, and p-centers that are also 
applicable.  Mapping Network Flow problem classes to specific operational problems 
involving clandestine networks could prove very beneficial. 
 Network topology based measures of influence may be improved by applying 
General Linear Modeling (GLM) theory.  GLM and Designs of Experiments (DOE) can 
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provide a convenient structure to evaluate social networks.  GLM concepts such as the 
Hat Matrix, H = [hij], can provide a statistics based measure of influence with confidence 
bounds (Neter, et al., 1996: 203).  DOE can be used to improve the modeling of multiple 
network contexts by directly accounting for interactions between networks.  Further, the 
aliasing structure in Designed Experiments may be useful in evaluating the impact of 
missing information. 
 The network topology based measures of influence discussed in this thesis 
considered the impact of all direct and indirect connections.  The techniques considered 
all paths, dependent and independent.  There are many cases, however, when only 
independent paths should be considered.  Graph Theory provides techniques to identify 
all pair-wise independent paths.  Measures of influence based on pair-wise independent 
paths may provide a more accurate representation of topology based influence. 
 Simultaneous evaluation of multiple network contexts will require a robust 
methodology to appropriately assign network importance weightings.    A variety of 
techniques are available to facilitate solicitation of weights from subject matter experts 
(SME).  The network weights will likely vary based on group culture.  The field of 
Anthropology offers a rich discussion of the impacts of culture on group activities.  
Researchers are encouraged to consider the works of Anthropologists in addition to 
traditional value modeling literature. 
 Finally, there are a variety of software packages that support social network 
visualization.  Network visualization is a powerful aid when performing exploratory 
analysis.  In general, current network visualization tools are designed to display only a 
single network context.  Social networks, as shown in this thesis, must be considered in 
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multiple contexts simultaneously.  Development of a multi-layered network visualization 
tool will be critical to future analysis.  The images produced by any network visualization 
tool must be useful to analysts.  An optimization study focused on maximizing desirable 
qualities within a graph while minimizing undesired qualities would be beneficial for 
single and multi-layered networks.  
6.5. Conclusions 
 Modeling and analysis of clandestine networks using the HIIM provides a robust 
alternative to traditional SNA techniques.  The research in this thesis can be used by 
military and intelligence analysts as an aid in understanding the influence relationships 
within a clandestine network, as well as aid in the planning and implementing of 
influence campaigns designed to disrupt clandestine network operations. 
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Appendix A:  Jemaah Islamiah Outputs 
A.1. Introduction 
 The analysis of Jemaah Islamiah presented in Chapter 5 was limited to a subset of 
the network because of the size of the resultant matrices.  This appendix contains the 
complete Jemaah Islamiah analysis results performed during this study. 
A.2. Topology Based Influence Measures 
 Information Centrality (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989) was used to calculate pair-
wise measures of interpersonal influence for each of the six informal networks provided 
in the Sageman data.  This section contains the complete (48x48) matrices created during 
this analysis. 
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A.2.1. Acquaintance Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0.0000 0.6404 1.7276 1.2420 1.7808 0.8483 0.8483 0.0000 0.0000 1.7276 0.0000
Sungkar 0.6404 0.0000 0.6365 0.5612 1.0000 0.4606 0.4606 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.0000
Hambali 1.7276 0.6365 0.0000 2.3249 1.7508 1.4286 1.2500 0.0000 0.0000 3.3333 0.0000
Mukhlas 1.2420 0.5612 2.3249 0.0000 1.2787 0.9708 0.9708 0.0000 0.0000 2.3249 0.0000
Iqbal 1.7808 1.0000 1.7508 1.2787 0.0000 0.8539 0.8539 0.0000 0.0000 1.7508 0.0000
Faruq 0.8483 0.4606 1.4286 0.9708 0.8539 0.0000 1.4286 0.0000 0.0000 1.2500 0.0000
Syawal 0.8483 0.4606 1.2500 0.9708 0.8539 1.4286 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4286 0.0000
Ghozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 1.7276 0.6365 3.3333 2.3249 1.7508 1.2500 1.4286 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Amrozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.6404 0.5000 0.6365 0.5612 1.0000 0.4606 0.4606 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.0000
Mobarok 0.6500 0.4025 0.7867 0.7040 0.6736 0.5344 0.5344 0.0000 0.0000 0.7867 0.0000
Yunos 1.3402 0.6436 2.1577 1.3879 1.8056 0.9403 0.9403 0.0000 0.0000 2.1577 0.0000
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.3939 0.2870 0.4403 0.4131 0.4025 0.3483 0.3483 0.0000 0.0000 0.4403 0.0000
Azahari 0.3565 0.2644 0.4115 0.5000 0.3594 0.3300 0.3300 0.0000 0.0000 0.4115 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 1.8571 0.6736 3.6879 2.3780 2.0635 1.1479 1.1479 0.0000 0.0000 3.6879 0.0000
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 0.3565 0.2644 0.4115 0.5000 0.3594 0.3300 0.3300 0.0000 0.0000 0.4115 0.0000
Idris 0.2826 0.2230 0.3057 0.2924 0.2870 0.2583 0.2583 0.0000 0.0000 0.3057 0.0000
Mustofa 1.2420 0.5612 2.3249 1.5000 1.2787 0.9708 0.9708 0.0000 0.0000 2.3249 0.0000
WanMin 0.5540 0.3594 0.6992 1.0000 0.5612 0.4926 0.4926 0.0000 0.0000 0.6992 0.0000
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.6334 0.3889 1.0000 0.6992 0.6365 0.5882 0.5556 0.0000 0.0000 0.7692 0.0000
Lillie 0.6334 0.3889 1.0000 0.6992 0.6365 0.5882 0.5556 0.0000 0.0000 0.7692 0.0000
Yunos2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.6404 0.5000 0.6365 0.5612 1.0000 0.4606 0.4606 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.0000
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 1.9403 0.6103 2.6396 1.6318 1.5663 1.0216 1.0216 0.0000 0.0000 2.6396 0.0000
Mustaqim 1.9403 0.6103 2.6396 1.6318 1.5663 1.0216 1.0216 0.0000 0.0000 2.6396 0.0000
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
A-2 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0.0000 0.0000 0.6404 0.6500 1.3402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3939 0.3565
Sungkar 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.4025 0.6436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 0.2644
Hambali 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.7867 2.1577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4403 0.4115
Mukhlas 0.0000 0.0000 0.5612 0.7040 1.3879 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4131 0.5000
Iqbal 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.6736 1.8056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4025 0.3594
Faruq 0.0000 0.0000 0.4606 0.5344 0.9403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3483 0.3300
Syawal 0.0000 0.0000 0.4606 0.5344 0.9403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3483 0.3300
Ghozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.7867 2.1577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4403 0.4115
Amrozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4025 0.6436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 0.2644
Mobarok 0.0000 0.0000 0.4025 0.0000 0.6599 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2924
Yunos 0.0000 0.0000 0.6436 0.6599 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3976 0.3676
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 1.0000 0.3976 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2262
Azahari 0.0000 0.0000 0.2644 0.2924 0.3676 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2262 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.0000 0.0000 0.6736 1.0000 1.9403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.4131
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 0.0000 0.0000 0.2644 0.2924 0.3676 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2262 0.5000
Idris 0.0000 0.0000 0.2230 0.5000 0.2845 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.1845
Mustofa 0.0000 0.0000 0.5612 0.7040 1.3879 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4131 0.3750
WanMin 0.0000 0.0000 0.3594 0.4131 0.5812 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2924 1.0000
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.4403 0.6833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3057 0.2915
Lillie 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.4403 0.6833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3057 0.2915
Yunos2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.4025 0.6436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 0.2644
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.7345 1.5663 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4235 0.3827
Mustaqim 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.7345 1.5663 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4235 0.3827
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
A-3 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 1.8571 0.0000 0.3565 0.2826 1.2420 0.5540 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6334 0.6334 0.0000
Sungkar 0.6736 0.0000 0.2644 0.2230 0.5612 0.3594 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.3889 0.0000
Hambali 3.6879 0.0000 0.4115 0.3057 2.3249 0.6992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Mukhlas 2.3780 0.0000 0.5000 0.2924 1.5000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6992 0.6992 0.0000
Iqbal 2.0635 0.0000 0.3594 0.2870 1.2787 0.5612 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.6365 0.0000
Faruq 1.1479 0.0000 0.3300 0.2583 0.9708 0.4926 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5882 0.5882 0.0000
Syawal 1.1479 0.0000 0.3300 0.2583 0.9708 0.4926 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5556 0.5556 0.0000
Ghozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 3.6879 0.0000 0.4115 0.3057 2.3249 0.6992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7692 0.7692 0.0000
Amrozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.6736 0.0000 0.2644 0.2230 0.5612 0.3594 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.3889 0.0000
Mobarok 1.0000 0.0000 0.2924 0.5000 0.7040 0.4131 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4403 0.4403 0.0000
Yunos 1.9403 0.0000 0.3676 0.2845 1.3879 0.5812 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6833 0.6833 0.0000
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.5000 0.0000 0.2262 1.0000 0.4131 0.2924 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3057 0.3057 0.0000
Azahari 0.4131 0.0000 0.5000 0.1845 0.3750 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2915 0.2915 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.0000 0.0000 0.4131 0.3333 2.3780 0.7040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7867 0.7867 0.0000
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 0.4131 0.0000 0.0000 0.1845 0.3750 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2915 0.2915 0.0000
Idris 0.3333 0.0000 0.1845 0.0000 0.2924 0.2262 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2341 0.2341 0.0000
Mustofa 2.3780 0.0000 0.3750 0.2924 0.0000 0.6000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6992 0.6992 0.0000
WanMin 0.7040 0.0000 1.0000 0.2262 0.6000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4115 0.4115 0.0000
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.7867 0.0000 0.2915 0.2341 0.6992 0.4115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000
Lillie 0.7867 0.0000 0.2915 0.2341 0.6992 0.4115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.6736 0.0000 0.2644 0.2230 0.5612 0.3594 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.3889 0.0000
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 2.7660 0.0000 0.3827 0.2975 1.6318 0.6200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7252 0.7252 0.0000
Mustaqim 2.7660 0.0000 0.3827 0.2975 1.6318 0.6200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7252 0.7252 0.0000
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
A-4 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6404 0.0000 0.0000 1.9403 1.9403 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sungkar 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hambali 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.0000 0.0000 2.6396 2.6396 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mukhlas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5612 0.0000 0.0000 1.6318 1.6318 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iqbal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5663 1.5663 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faruq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4606 0.0000 0.0000 1.0216 1.0216 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Syawal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4606 0.0000 0.0000 1.0216 1.0216 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ghozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6365 0.0000 0.0000 2.6396 2.6396 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Amrozi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mobarok 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4025 0.0000 0.0000 0.7345 0.7345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6436 0.0000 0.0000 1.5663 1.5663 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2870 0.0000 0.0000 0.4235 0.4235 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Azahari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2644 0.0000 0.0000 0.3827 0.3827 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6736 0.0000 0.0000 2.7660 2.7660 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2644 0.0000 0.0000 0.3827 0.3827 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Idris 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2230 0.0000 0.0000 0.2975 0.2975 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mustofa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5612 0.0000 0.0000 1.6318 1.6318 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
WanMin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3594 0.0000 0.0000 0.6200 0.6200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.0000 0.0000 0.7252 0.7252 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Lillie 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3889 0.0000 0.0000 0.7252 0.7252 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mustaqim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6103 0.0000 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-5 
A.2.2. Friendship Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 1.5 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6
Jabir 0 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0.6
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 1
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
A-6 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
A-7 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Samudra 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-8 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-9 
A.2.3. Nuclear Family Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-10 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-11 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-12 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-13 
A.2.4. Relative Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 2.142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 2.142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-14 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.142857 2.142857 0 0 2.5
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 2.142
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 2.142
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.142857 2.142857 0 0 0
Zulkarnae
857
857
n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.142857 2.142857 0 0 2.5
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-15 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 2.142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 2.142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-16 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-17 
A.2.5. Teacher-Student Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 6.5 0.436975 1.857143 0.436975 0 0.65 1.857143 1.857143 1.857143 1.857143
Sungkar 6.5 0 0.436975 1.857143 0.436975 0 0.65 1.857143 1.857143 1.857143 1.857143
Hambali 0.436975 0.436975 0 0.363636 1 0 1.333333 0.363636 0.363636 0.363636 0.363636
Mukhlas 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 0 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Iqbal 0.436975 0.436975 1 0.363636 0 0 1.333333 0.363636 0.363636 0.363636 0.363636
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0.65 0.65 1.333333 0.5 1.333333 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ghozi 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 0 1 1 1
Samudra 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 0 1 1
Jabir 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 0 1
Amrozi 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 0
Imron 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Sufaat 0.393939 0.393939 1.333333 0.333333 1.333333 0 1 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Yunos 0.776119 0.776119 0.666667 0.571429 0.666667 0 1.333333 0.571429 0.571429 0.571429 0.571429
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 1.857143 1.857143 0.571429 1 0.571429 0 1 1 1 1 1
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Dulmatin 0.776119 0.776119 0.666667 0.571429 0.666667 0 1.333333 0.571429 0.571429 0.571429 0.571429
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Naharudin 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Gungun 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Marzuki 1 0.866667 0.304094 0.65 0.304094 0 0.393939 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 1.857143 1.857143 0.363636 1 0.363636 0 0.5 1 1 1 1
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-18 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 1.857143 0.393939 0 1.857143 0.776119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 1.857143 0.393939 0 1.857143 0.776119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0.363636 1.333333 0 0.363636 0.666667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0.363636 1.333333 0 0.363636 0.666667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0.5 1 0 0.5 1.333333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0.333333 0 0 0.333333 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 1 0.333333 0 0 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0.571429 0.571429 0 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 1 0.5 0 1 1.333333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0.571429 0.571429 0 0.571429 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0.65 0.282609 0 0.65 0.436975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 1 0.333333 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-19 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 1.857142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.857143 0.776119 0 0 1.857143
Sungkar 1.857142857 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.857143 0.776119 0 0 1.857143
Hambali 0.571428571 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.363636 0.666667 0 0 0.363636
Mukhlas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Iqbal 0.571428571 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.363636 0.666667 0 0 0.363636
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1.333333 0 0 0.5
Ghozi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Samudra 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Jabir 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Amrozi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Imron 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Sufaat 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333333 0.571429 0 0 0.333333
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Yunos 1.333333333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.571429 1 0 0 0.571429
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.333333 0 0 1
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.571429 0 0 1
Dulmatin 1.333333333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.571429 0 0 0 0.571429
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 0
Naharudin 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Gungun 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Marzuki 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0.436975 0 0 0.65
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0 0 1
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
A-20 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 1.857142857 1.857143 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.857143 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 1.857142857 1.857143 0.866667 0 0 0 0 0 1.857143 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0.363636364 0.363636 0.304094 0 0 0 0 0 0.363636 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0.363636364 0.363636 0.304094 0 0 0 0 0 0.363636 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0.5 0.5 0.393939 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Samudra 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Jabir 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Imron 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0.333333333 0.333333 0.282609 0 0 0 0 0 0.333333 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0.571428571 0.571429 0.436975 0 0 0 0 0 0.571429 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0.571428571 0.571429 0.436975 0 0 0 0 0 0.571429 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Gungun 1 0 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0.65 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 1 1 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-21 
A.2.6. Religious-Leader Network 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 6.615385 1.859459 0 2.457143 0 1.859459 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 6.615385 0 1.859459 0 2.263158 0 1.859459 0 0 0 0
Hambali 1.859459 1.859459 0 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 2.457143 2.263158 1.127869 0 0 0 1.127869 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 1.622642 1.34375 0.875318 0 1.162162 0 0.875318 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0.868687 1 0.650284 0 0.693548 0 0.650284 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0.68254 0.637037 0.50514 0 0.646617 0 0.50514 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Hussein 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ayub 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Azahari 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen0.394044 0.394044 0.333333 0 0.346425 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Top 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Idris 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
WanMin 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Maidin 2.15 1.755102 1.020772 0 1.829787 0 1.020772 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0.710744 0.693548 0.530046 0 1 0 0.530046 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0.868687 1 0.650284 0 0.693548 0 0.650284 0 0 0 0
Setiono 0.650284 0.650284 0.5 0 0.530046 0 1 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0.868687 1 0.650284 0 0.693548 0 0.650284 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0.68254 0.637037 0.50514 0 0.646617 0 0.50514 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0.68254 0.637037 0.50514 0 0.646617 0 0.50514 0 0 0 0
Roche 1.859459 1.859459 1 0 1.127869 0 1 0 0 0 0
Thomas 1 0.868687 0.650284 0 0.710744 0 0.650284 0 0 0 0  
A-22 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0 0 0 0 0 1.622642 0.868687 0.68254 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459
Sungkar 0 0 0 0 0 1.34375 1 0.637037 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459
Hambali 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 0 0 1.162162 0.693548 0.646617 1.127869 1.127869 1.127869 1.127869
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.573333 0.618705 0.875318 0.875318 0.875318 0.875
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0.573333 0 0.38914 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0.618705 0.38914 0 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 0 1 1 1
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 0 1 1
Ayub 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 0 1
Azahari 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 0
Zulkarnae
318
n 0 0 0 0 0 0.318224 0.282662 0.251278 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Top 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Idris 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Mustofa 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
WanMin 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 1.622642 0.637037 1 1.020772 1.020772 1.020772 1.020772
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0.5375 0.409524 0.392694 0.530046 0.530046 0.530046 0.530046
Hafidh 0 0 0 0 0 0.573333 0.5 0.38914 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0.466757 0.394044 0.33561 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0 0.573333 0.5 0.38914 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0.618705 0.38914 0.5 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0.618705 0.38914 0.5 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0.875318 0.650284 0.50514 1 1 1 1
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0.618705 0.464865 0.40566 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284  
A-23 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0.394043528 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 2.15 0 0 0 0 0
Sungkar 0.394043528 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.859459 1.755102 0 0 0 0 0
Hambali 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0.346424975 1.127869 1.127869 1.127869 1.127869 1.127869 1.829787 0 0 0 0 0
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0.318223867 0.875318 0.875318 0.875318 0.875318 0.875318 1.622642 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0.282662284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.637037 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0.251278305 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Azahari 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.33561 0 0 0 0 0
Ghoni 0.333333333 0 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0.333333333 1 0 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Idris 0.333333333 1 1 0 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Mustofa 0.333333333 1 1 1 0 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
WanMin 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 0 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Maidin 0.335609756 1.020772 1.020772 1.020772 1.020772 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0.257292446 0.530046 0.530046 0.530046 0.530046 0.530046 0.646617 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0.282662284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.637037 0 0 0 0 0
Setiono 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50514 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0.282662284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.637037 0 0 0 0 0
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0.251278305 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 1 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0.251278305 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 0.50514 1 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0.333333333 1 1 1 1 1 1.020772 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0.282662284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.650284 0.68254 0 0 0 0 0  
A-24 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0 0 0 0.710744 0.868687 0.650284 0 0.868687 0 0.68254 0.68254 1.859459 1
Sungkar 0 0 0 0.693548 1 0.650284 0 1 0 0.637037 0.637037 1.859459 0.868687
Hambali 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Mukhlas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0 0 0 1 0.693548 0.530046 0 0.693548 0 0.646617 0.646617 1.127869 0.710744
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 1 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Ghozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0.5375 0.573333 0.466757 0 0.573333 0 0.618705 0.618705 0.875318 0.618705
Faiz 0 0 0 0.409524 0.5 0.394044 0 0.5 0 0.38914 0.38914 0.650284 0.464865
Hasyim 0 0 0 0.392694 0.38914 0.33561 0 0.38914 0 0.5 0.5 0.50514 0.40566
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Hussein 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Ayub 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Azahari 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Zulkarnaen 0 0 0 0.257292 0.282662 1 0 0.282662 0 0.251278 0.251278 0.333333 0.282662
Ghoni 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Top 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Idris 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Mustofa 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
WanMin 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 1 0.650284
Maidin 0 0 0 0.646617 0.637037 0.50514 0 0.637037 0 1 1 1.020772 0.68254
Sani 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0.409524 0.346425 0 0.409524 0 0.392694 0.392694 0.530046 0.415459
Hafidh 0 0 0 0.409524 0 0.394044 0 0.5 0 0.38914 0.38914 0.650284 0.464865
Setiono 0 0 0 0.346425 0.394044 0 0 0.394044 0 0.33561 0.33561 0.5 0.394044
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0.409524 0.5 0.394044 0 0 0 0.38914 0.38914 0.650284 0.464865
Mustaqim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0.392694 0.38914 0.33561 0 0.38914 0 0 0.5 0.50514 0.40566
Khalim 0 0 0 0.392694 0.38914 0.33561 0 0.38914 0 0.5 0 0.50514 0.40566
Roche 0 0 0 0.530046 0.650284 0.5 0 0.650284 0 0.50514 0.50514 0 0.650284
Thomas 0 0 0 0.415459 0.464865 0.394044 0 0.464865 0 0.40566 0.40566 0.650284 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-25 
A.3. Combined Topology Based Influence Measures 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0.0000 2.4593 0.6707 0.5165 0.7792 0.1414 0.5596 0.3095 0.3095 0.5975 0.3095
Sungkar 2.4593 0.0000 0.4888 0.4030 0.6167 0.0768 0.6617 0.3095 0.3095 0.4156 0.3095
Hambali 0.6707 0.4888 0.0000 0.4481 0.8965 0.2381 0.5972 0.0606 0.0606 0.8662 0.0606
Mukhlas 0.5165 0.4030 0.4481 0.0000 0.2737 0.1618 0.2451 0.1667 0.1667 0.5541 0.4167
Iqbal 0.7792 0.6167 0.8965 0.2737 0.0000 0.1423 0.5525 0.0606 0.0606 0.6024 0.0606
Faruq 0.1414 0.0768 0.2381 0.1618 0.1423 0.0000 0.2381 0.0000 0.0000 0.2083 0.0000
Syawal 0.5596 0.6617 0.5972 0.2451 0.5525 0.2381 0.0000 0.0833 0.0833 0.3214 0.0833
Ghozi 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.0000 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Samudra 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.0000 0.1667 0.2667
Jabir 0.5975 0.4156 0.8662 0.5541 0.6024 0.2083 0.3214 0.1667 0.1667 0.0000 0.1667
Amrozi 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.4167 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.2667 0.1667 0.0000
Imron 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.4167 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.5000 0.1667 0.1667 0.4167
Sufaat 0.0657 0.0657 0.2222 0.0556 0.2222 0.0000 0.1667 0.0556 0.0556 0.0556 0.0556
Dwikarna 0.1067 0.0833 0.1061 0.0935 0.1667 0.0768 0.2434 0.0000 0.0000 0.1061 0.0000
Mobarok 0.4179 0.3766 0.1917 0.2840 0.1729 0.0891 0.1724 0.5000 0.1667 0.2978 0.1667
Yunos 0.3527 0.2366 0.4707 0.3266 0.4120 0.1567 0.3789 0.0952 0.0952 0.4549 0.0952
Mistooki 0.2704 0.2240 0.1459 0.0000 0.1937 0.0000 0.1459 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.1448 0.1667 0.1084 0.0000 0.1156 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 0.1000
Hasyim 0.1138 0.1062 0.0842 0.3571 0.1078 0.0000 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.3099 0.3099 0.1667 0.3571 0.1880 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.3099 0.3099 0.1667 0.0000 0.1880 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.3756 0.3577 0.2401 0.0689 0.2551 0.0580 0.2247 0.0000 0.0000 0.0734 0.0000
Azahari 0.3693 0.3540 0.2353 0.5000 0.2479 0.0550 0.2217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0686 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.6847 0.4875 0.7655 0.5630 0.4969 0.1913 0.6913 0.1667 0.1667 0.7813 0.1667
Ghoni 0.3099 0.3099 0.1667 0.0000 0.1880 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 0.1667
Top 0.3693 0.3540 0.2353 0.5000 0.2479 0.0550 0.2217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0686 0.0000
Idris 0.3570 0.3471 0.2176 0.0487 0.2358 0.0431 0.2097 0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0000
Mustofa 0.5169 0.4034 0.5541 0.5833 0.4011 0.1618 0.3285 0.0000 0.0000 0.3875 0.0000
WanMin 0.4022 0.3698 0.2832 0.1667 0.2815 0.0821 0.2488 0.0000 0.0000 0.1165 0.0000
Maidin 0.3583 0.2925 0.1701 0.0000 0.3050 0.0000 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Dulmatin 0.1294 0.1294 0.1111 0.0952 0.1111 0.0000 0.2222 0.4286 0.0952 0.0952 0.0952
Farik 0.1056 0.0648 0.1667 0.1165 0.1061 0.0980 0.0926 0.0000 0.0000 0.1282 0.0000
Lillie 0.1056 0.0648 0.1667 0.1165 0.1061 0.0980 0.0926 0.0000 0.0000 0.1282 0.0000
Yunos2 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Naharudin 0.3095 0.3095 0.0606 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Gungun 0.3095 0.3095 0.2273 0.1667 0.0606 0.0000 0.0833 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Marzuki 0.1667 0.1444 0.0507 0.1083 0.0507 0.0000 0.0657 0.1083 0.1083 0.1083 0.1083
Kastari 0.1185 0.1156 0.0883 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0883 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.2515 0.2500 0.2145 0.0935 0.2823 0.0768 0.4351 0.0000 0.0000 0.1061 0.0000
Setiono 0.1084 0.1084 0.0833 0.0000 0.0883 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.4682 0.2684 0.5483 0.6053 0.3766 0.1703 0.2786 0.0000 0.0000 0.4399 0.0000
Mustaqim 0.6329 0.4112 0.5005 0.7720 0.3217 0.1703 0.2536 0.1667 0.1667 0.6066 0.1667
Fathi 0.1138 0.1062 0.0842 0.0000 0.1078 0.0000 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.1138 0.1062 0.0842 0.0000 0.1078 0.0000 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.3099 0.3099 0.1667 0.0000 0.1880 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.1667 0.1448 0.1084 0.0000 0.1185 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
A-26 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0.3095 0.0657 0.1067 0.4179 0.3527 0.2704 0.1448 0.1138 0.3099 0.3099 0.3756 0.3693
Sungkar 0.3095 0.0657 0.0833 0.3766 0.2366 0.2240 0.1667 0.1062 0.3099 0.3099 0.3577 0.3540
Hambali 0.0606 0.2222 0.1061 0.1917 0.4707 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.2401 0.2353
Mukhlas 0.4167 0.0556 0.0935 0.2840 0.3266 0.0000 0.0000 0.3571 0.3571 0.0000 0.0689 0.5000
Iqbal 0.0606 0.2222 0.1667 0.1729 0.4120 0.1937 0.1156 0.1078 0.1880 0.1880 0.2551 0.2479
Faruq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0768 0.0891 0.1567 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0580 0.0550
Syawal 0.0833 0.1667 0.2434 0.1724 0.3789 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.2247 0.2217
Ghozi 0.5000 0.0556 0.0000 0.5000 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.1667 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 0.1667 0.0556 0.1061 0.2978 0.4549 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0734 0.0686
Amrozi 0.4167 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.0000 0.0556 0.0000 0.5000 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0556 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0671 0.1073 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0478 0.0441
Mobarok 0.5000 0.0556 0.0671 0.0000 0.2052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0487
Yunos 0.0952 0.0952 0.1073 0.2052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0663 0.0613
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0956 0.3531 0.1459 0.1459 0.1459 0.1459
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0956 0.0000 0.0649 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3531 0.0649 0.0000 0.5009 0.0842 0.0842 0.4413
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1459 0.1084 0.5009 0.0000 0.1667 0.1667 0.5238
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.0000 0.3333 0.1667
Ayub 0.0000 0.0000 0.0478 0.1667 0.0663 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.3333 0.0000 0.2044
Azahari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0441 0.0487 0.0613 0.1459 0.1084 0.4413 0.5238 0.1667 0.2044 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.1667 0.0833 0.2123 0.3333 0.5456 0.0530 0.0471 0.0419 0.0556 0.0556 0.1389 0.1244
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1459 0.3584 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Top 0.0000 0.0000 0.0441 0.0487 0.0613 0.1459 0.1084 0.4413 0.5238 0.1667 0.2044 0.6667
Idris 0.0000 0.0000 0.0372 0.0833 0.0474 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.3333 0.1974
Mustofa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0935 0.1173 0.2313 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.2355 0.2292
WanMin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0599 0.0689 0.0969 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.2154 0.3333
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2704 0.1062 0.1667 0.1701 0.1701 0.1701 0.1701
Sani 0.1667 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.4286 0.0952 0.0000 0.4286 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0734 0.1139 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0486
Lillie 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0734 0.1139 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0486
Yunos2 0.1667 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.1667 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.1667 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.1083 0.0471 0.0000 0.1083 0.0728 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0896 0.0683 0.0654 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883
Hafidh 0.0000 0.0000 0.1833 0.0671 0.1073 0.0956 0.0833 0.0649 0.1084 0.1084 0.1562 0.1524
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0778 0.0657 0.0559 0.2500 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.0000 0.0000 0.1017 0.1224 0.2610 0.0956 0.0833 0.0649 0.1084 0.1084 0.1790 0.1722
Mustaqim 0.1667 0.0556 0.1017 0.2891 0.3563 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0706 0.0638
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3531 0.2315 0.3333 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1031 0.0649 0.0833 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1459 0.1084 0.0842 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1031 0.0775 0.0676 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084  
A-27 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0.6847 0.3099 0.3693 0.3570 0.5169 0.4022 0.3583 0.3095 0.1294 0.1056 0.1056 0.3095
Sungkar 0.4875 0.3099 0.3540 0.3471 0.4034 0.3698 0.2925 0.3095 0.1294 0.0648 0.0648 0.3095
Hambali 0.7655 0.1667 0.2353 0.2176 0.5541 0.2832 0.1701 0.0606 0.1111 0.1667 0.1667 0.0606
Mukhlas 0.5630 0.0000 0.5000 0.0487 0.5833 0.1667 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.1165 0.1165 0.1667
Iqbal 0.4969 0.1880 0.2479 0.2358 0.4011 0.2815 0.3050 0.0606 0.1111 0.1061 0.1061 0.0606
Faruq 0.1913 0.0000 0.0550 0.0431 0.1618 0.0821 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0980 0.0980 0.0000
Syawal 0.6913 0.1667 0.2217 0.2097 0.3285 0.2488 0.1701 0.0833 0.2222 0.0926 0.0926 0.0833
Ghozi 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.4286 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Samudra 0.1667 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Jabir 0.7813 0.0000 0.0686 0.0510 0.3875 0.1165 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.1282 0.1282 0.1667
Amrozi 0.1667 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Imron 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.4286 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Sufaat 0.0833 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0556 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0556
Dwikarna 0.2123 0.0000 0.0441 0.0372 0.0935 0.0599 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0648 0.0000
Mobarok 0.3333 0.0000 0.0487 0.0833 0.1173 0.0689 0.0000 0.1667 0.4286 0.0734 0.0734 0.1667
Yunos 0.5456 0.0000 0.0613 0.0474 0.2313 0.0969 0.0000 0.0952 0.1667 0.1139 0.1139 0.0952
Mistooki 0.0530 0.1459 0.1459 0.1459 0.1459 0.1459 0.2704 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Faiz 0.0471 0.3584 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hasyim 0.0419 0.0842 0.4413 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sulaeman 0.0556 0.1667 0.5238 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hussein 0.0556 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ayub 0.1389 0.1667 0.2044 0.3333 0.2355 0.2154 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0510 0.0510 0.0000
Azahari 0.1244 0.1667 0.6667 0.1974 0.2292 0.3333 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0486 0.0486 0.0000
Zulkarnaen 0.0000 0.0556 0.1244 0.1111 0.4519 0.1729 0.0559 0.1667 0.2222 0.1311 0.1311 0.1667
Ghoni 0.0556 0.0000 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Top 0.1244 0.1667 0.0000 0.1974 0.2292 0.3333 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0486 0.0486 0.0000
Idris 0.1111 0.1667 0.1974 0.0000 0.2154 0.2044 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0390 0.0390 0.0000
Mustofa 0.4519 0.1667 0.2292 0.2154 0.0000 0.2667 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.1165 0.1165 0.0000
WanMin 0.1729 0.1667 0.3333 0.2044 0.2667 0.0000 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0686 0.0686 0.0000
Maidin 0.0559 0.1701 0.1701 0.1701 0.1701 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sani 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Dulmatin 0.2222 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0952
Farik 0.1311 0.0000 0.0486 0.0390 0.1165 0.0686 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000
Lillie 0.1311 0.0000 0.0486 0.0390 0.1165 0.0686 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos2 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Gungun 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667
Marzuki 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1083 0.0728 0.0000 0.0000 0.1083
Kastari 0.0429 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883 0.1078 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hafidh 0.4094 0.1084 0.1524 0.1455 0.2019 0.1683 0.1062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0648 0.0000
Setiono 0.1667 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.5081 0.1084 0.1722 0.1580 0.7137 0.2117 0.1062 0.0000 0.0000 0.1209 0.1209 0.0000
Mustaqim 0.6277 0.0000 0.0638 0.0496 0.6053 0.1033 0.0000 0.1667 0.0952 0.1209 0.1209 0.1667
Fathi 0.0419 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Khalim 0.0419 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Roche 0.0556 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Thomas 0.0471 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1084 0.1138 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
A-28 
Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0.3095 0.3095 0.1667 0.1185 0.2515 0.1084 0.0000 0.4682 0.6329 0.1138 0.1138 0.3099 0.1667
Sungkar 0.3095 0.3095 0.1444 0.1156 0.2500 0.1084 0.0000 0.2684 0.4112 0.1062 0.1062 0.3099 0.1448
Hambali 0.0606 0.2273 0.0507 0.0883 0.2145 0.0833 0.0000 0.5483 0.5005 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Mukhlas 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0935 0.0000 0.0000 0.6053 0.7720 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Iqbal 0.0606 0.0606 0.0507 0.1667 0.2823 0.0883 0.0000 0.3766 0.3217 0.1078 0.1078 0.1880 0.1185
Faruq 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0768 0.0000 0.0000 0.1703 0.1703 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Syawal 0.0833 0.0833 0.0657 0.0883 0.4351 0.1667 0.0000 0.2786 0.2536 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Ghozi 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Samudra 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Jabir 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.1061 0.0000 0.0000 0.4399 0.6066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Amrozi 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Imron 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sufaat 0.0556 0.0556 0.0471 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dwikarna 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1833 0.0000 0.0000 0.1017 0.1017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mobarok 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0671 0.0000 0.0000 0.1224 0.2891 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos 0.0952 0.0952 0.0728 0.0000 0.1073 0.0000 0.0000 0.2610 0.3563 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mistooki 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0896 0.0956 0.0778 0.0000 0.0956 0.0000 0.3531 0.1031 0.1459 0.1031
Faiz 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0683 0.0833 0.0657 0.0000 0.0833 0.0000 0.2315 0.0649 0.1084 0.0775
Hasyim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0654 0.0649 0.0559 0.0000 0.0649 0.0000 0.3333 0.0833 0.0842 0.0676
Sulaeman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1084 0.2500 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Hussein 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1084 0.0833 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Ayub 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1562 0.0833 0.0000 0.1790 0.0706 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Azahari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1524 0.0833 0.0000 0.1722 0.0638 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Zulkarnaen 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0429 0.4094 0.1667 0.0000 0.5081 0.6277 0.0419 0.0419 0.0556 0.0471
Ghoni 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1084 0.0833 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Top 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1524 0.0833 0.0000 0.1722 0.0638 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Idris 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1455 0.0833 0.0000 0.1580 0.0496 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Mustofa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.2019 0.0833 0.0000 0.7137 0.6053 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
WanMin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1683 0.0833 0.0000 0.2117 0.1033 0.0842 0.0842 0.1667 0.1084
Maidin 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1078 0.1062 0.0842 0.0000 0.1062 0.0000 0.1667 0.1667 0.1701 0.1138
Sani 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Dulmatin 0.0952 0.0952 0.0728 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0952 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Farik 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0000 0.0000 0.1209 0.1209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Lillie 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0000 0.0000 0.1209 0.1209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Yunos2 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Naharudin 0.0000 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gungun 0.1667 0.0000 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Marzuki 0.1083 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Kastari 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0683 0.0577 0.0000 0.0683 0.0000 0.0654 0.0654 0.0883 0.0692
Hafidh 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0683 0.0000 0.0657 0.0000 0.1851 0.1017 0.0649 0.0649 0.1084 0.0775
Setiono 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0577 0.0657 0.0000 0.0000 0.0657 0.0000 0.0559 0.0559 0.0833 0.0657
BinHir 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Rusdan 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0683 0.1851 0.0657 0.0000 0.0000 0.6667 0.0649 0.0649 0.1084 0.0775
Mustaqim 0.1667 0.1667 0.1083 0.0000 0.1017 0.0000 0.0000 0.6667 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Fathi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0654 0.0649 0.0559 0.0000 0.0649 0.0000 0.0000 0.0833 0.0842 0.0676
Khalim 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0654 0.0649 0.0559 0.0000 0.0649 0.0000 0.0833 0.0000 0.0842 0.0676
Roche 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0883 0.1084 0.0833 0.0000 0.1084 0.0000 0.0842 0.0842 0.0000 0.1084
Thomas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0692 0.0775 0.0657 0.0000 0.0775 0.0000 0.0676 0.0676 0.1084 0.0000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-29 
A.4. Holistic Interpersonal Influence Measures 
Baasyir Sungkar Hambali Mukhlas Iqbal Faruq Syawal Ghozi Samudra Jabir Amrozi
Baasyir 0 2.025479 0.552389 0.425389 0.641749 0.116457 0.460887 0.254904 0.254904 0.492101 0.254904
Sungkar 1.366633 0 0.271626 0.223947 0.3427 0.042678 0.367707 0.171989 0.171989 0.230949 0.171989
Hambali 0.491288 0.358046 0 0.328233 0.656686 0.174408 0.437449 0.04439 0.04439 0.634492 0.04439
Mukhlas 0.02629 0.020513 0.022808 0 0.013931 0.008236 0.012476 0.008485 0.008485 0.028204 0.02121
Iqbal 0.326407 0.258336 0.375544 0.114653 0 0.059609 0.231442 0.025385 0.025385 0.252345 0.025385
Faruq 0.002008 0.001091 0.003381 0.002298 0.002021 0 0.003381 0 0 0.002958 0
Syawal 0.020258 0.023954 0.021619 0.008873 0.020001 0.008619 0 0.003015 0.003015 0.011635 0.003015
Ghozi 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633
Samudra 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0 0.000633 0.001013
Jabir 0.166643 0.115911 0.241583 0.154538 0.168009 0.058095 0.089638 0.046493 0.046493 0 0.046493
Amrozi 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.001583 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0.001013 0.000633 0
Imron 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.001583 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.0019 0.000633 0.000633 0.001583
Sufaat 0.00025 0.00025 0.000844 0.000211 0.000844 0 0.000633 0.000211 0.000211 0.000211 0.000211
Dwikarna 0.00079 0.000616 0.000785 0.000692 0.001234 0.000568 0.001801 0 0 0.000785 0
Mobarok 0.005934 0.005348 0.002722 0.004033 0.002455 0.001265 0.002448 0.0071 0.002367 0.004229 0.002367
Yunos 0.009523 0.006388 0.012709 0.008818 0.011124 0.004231 0.01023 0.00257 0.00257 0.012282 0.00257
Mistooki 0.001974 0.001635 0.001065 0 0.001414 0 0.001065 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0.000767 0.000884 0.000575 0 0.000613 0 0.000575 0 0.001325 0 0.00053
Hasyim 0.000603 0.000563 0.000446 0.001893 0.000571 0 0.000446 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0.002262 0.002262 0.001217 0.002607 0.001372 0 0.001217 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0.002262 0.002262 0.001217 0 0.001372 0 0.001217 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0.009953 0.009479 0.006363 0.001826 0.00676 0.001537 0.005955 0 0 0.001945 0
Azahari 0.005133 0.004921 0.003271 0.00695 0.003446 0.000765 0.003082 0 0 0.000954 0
Zulkarnaen 0.34728 0.24726 0.388262 0.285554 0.252028 0.097027 0.350627 0.08455 0.08455 0.396275 0.08455
Ghoni 0.002262 0.002262 0.001217 0 0.001372 0 0.001217 0 0.001825 0 0.001217
Top 0.005133 0.004921 0.003271 0.00695 0.003446 0.000765 0.003082 0 0 0.000954 0
Idris 0.004962 0.004825 0.003025 0.000677 0.003278 0.000599 0.002915 0 0 0.000709 0
Mustofa 0.025897 0.02021 0.02776 0.029223 0.020095 0.008106 0.016458 0 0 0.019414 0
WanMin 0.02015 0.018527 0.014188 0.008352 0.014103 0.004113 0.012465 0 0 0.005837 0
Maidin 0.009172 0.007488 0.004355 0 0.007808 0 0.004355 0 0 0 0
Sani 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633
Dulmatin 0.000492 0.000492 0.000422 0.000362 0.000422 0 0.000844 0.001629 0.000362 0.000362 0.000362
Farik 0.000781 0.00048 0.001234 0.000862 0.000785 0.000725 0.000685 0 0 0.000949 0
Lillie 0.000781 0.00048 0.001234 0.000862 0.000785 0.000725 0.000685 0 0 0.000949 0
Yunos2 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633
Naharudin 0.001176 0.001176 0.00023 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633
Gungun 0.001176 0.001176 0.000864 0.000633 0.00023 0 0.000317 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633 0.000633
Marzuki 0.000633 0.000549 0.000193 0.000412 0.000193 0 0.00025 0.000412 0.000412 0.000412 0.000412
Kastari 0.000628 0.000613 0.000468 0 0.000884 0 0.000468 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0.00254 0.002525 0.002166 0.000944 0.002851 0.000776 0.004395 0 0 0.001072 0
Setiono 0.000791 0.000791 0.000608 0 0.000645 0 0.001217 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0.032212 0.018466 0.037723 0.041645 0.02591 0.011717 0.019168 0 0 0.030265 0
Mustaqim 0.032215 0.02093 0.025475 0.039295 0.016375 0.008668 0.012908 0.008485 0.008485 0.030876 0.008485
Fathi 0.000603 0.000563 0.000446 0 0.000571 0 0.000446 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0.000603 0.000563 0.000446 0 0.000571 0 0.000446 0 0 0 0
Roche 0.002262 0.002262 0.001217 0 0.001372 0 0.001217 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0.000884 0.000767 0.000575 0 0.000628 0 0.000575 0 0 0 0  
A-30 
Imron Sufaat Dwikarna Mobarok Yunos Mistooki Faiz Hasyim Sulaeman Hussein Ayub Azahari
Baasyir 0.254904 0.054111 0.087878 0.344182 0.290484 0.222701 0.119257 0.093726 0.255234 0.255234 0.309344 0.304155
Sungkar 0.171989 0.036509 0.04629 0.209277 0.131479 0.124477 0.092635 0.059015 0.172211 0.172211 0.198774 0.196718
Hambali 0.04439 0.162762 0.077718 0.14042 0.344788 0.106872 0.079403 0.061677 0.122108 0.122108 0.175873 0.172357
Mukhlas 0.02121 0.00283 0.004759 0.014456 0.016624 0 0 0.018176 0.018176 0 0.003507 0.02545
Iqbal 0.025385 0.09308 0.069831 0.072428 0.172587 0.081141 0.048425 0.045157 0.078753 0.078753 0.106861 0.103845
Faruq 0 0 0.001091 0.001265 0.002225 0 0 0 0 0 0.000824 0.000
Syawal 0.003015 0.006035 0.008811 0.006241 0.013716 0.005282 0.003924 0.003048 0.006035 0.006035 0.008134 0.008026
Ghozi 0.0019 0.000211 0 0.0019 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0.000633 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0.00095 0 0 0 0 0
Jabi
781
r 0.046493 0.015507 0.029591 0.083056 0.126872 0 0 0 0 0 0.020471 0.019
Amrozi 0.001583 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0.00038 0 0 0 0 0
Imron 0 0.000211 0 0.0019 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0.000211 0 0 0.000211 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0.000497 0.000794 0 0 0 0 0 0.000354 0.000
Mobarok 0.0071 0.00079 0.000953 0 0.002914 0 0 0 0 0 0.002367 0.000
Yunos 0.00257 0.00257 0.002897 0.00554 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00179 0.001
Mistooki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000698 0.002578 0.001065 0.001065 0.001065 0.001
Faiz 0 0 0 0 0 0.000507 0 0.000344 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575
Hasyim 0 0 0 0 0 0.001871 0.000344 0 0.002655 0.000446 0.000446 0.002339
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0 0 0.001065 0.000791 0.003657 0 0.001217 0.001217 0.003824
Hussein 0 0 0 0 0 0.001065 0.000791 0.000615 0.001217 0 0.002433 0.001217
Ayub 0 0 0.001267 0.004418 0.001757 0.003866 0.002873 0.002231 0.004418 0.008832 0 0.005417
Azahari 0 0 0.000613 0.000677 0.000852 0.002028 0.001507 0.006134 0.007281 0.002317 0.002841 0
Zulkarnae
133
326
692
655
065
n 0.08455 0.04225 0.107679 0.16905 0.276728 0.026882 0.023889 0.021252 0.0282 0.0282 0.07045 0.063096
Ghoni 0 0 0 0 0 0.001065 0.002616 0.000615 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217
Top 0 0 0.000613 0.000677 0.000852 0.002028 0.001507 0.006134 0.007281 0.002317 0.002841 0.009267
Idris 0 0 0.000517 0.001158 0.000659 0.002028 0.001507 0.00117 0.002317 0.002317 0.004633 0.002744
Mustofa 0 0 0.004684 0.005877 0.011588 0.00731 0.005431 0.004218 0.008352 0.008352 0.011799 0.011483
WanMin 0 0 0.003001 0.003452 0.004855 0.00731 0.005431 0.004218 0.008352 0.008352 0.010792 0.016698
Maidin 0 0 0 0 0 0.006922 0.002719 0.004268 0.004355 0.004355 0.004355 0.004355
Sani 0.000633 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0.001629 0.000362 0 0.001629 0.000633 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0.00048 0.000543 0.000843 0 0 0 0 0 0.000377 0.000
Lillie 0 0 0.00048 0.000543 0.000843 0 0 0 0 0 0.000377 0.000
Yunos2 0.000633 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naharudi
36
36
n 0.000633 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0.000633 0.000211 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0.000412 0.000179 0 0.000412 0.000277 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0 0.000475 0.000362 0.000347 0.000468 0.000468 0.000468 0.000468
Hafidh 0 0 0.001851 0.000678 0.001084 0.000966 0.000841 0.000655 0.001095 0.001095 0.001578 0.001539
Setiono 0 0 0 0 0 0.000568 0.00048 0.000408 0.001825 0.000608 0.000608 0.000608
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0.006997 0.008421 0.017957 0.006577 0.005731 0.004465 0.007458 0.007458 0.012315 0.011847
Mustaqim 0.008485 0.00283 0.005177 0.014715 0.018136 0 0 0 0 0 0.003594 0.003
Fathi 0 0 0 0 0 0.001871 0.001227 0.001766 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446
Khalim 0 0 0 0 0 0.000546 0.000344 0.000441 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446
Roche 0 0 0 0 0 0.001065 0.000791 0.000615 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 0.000546 0.000411 0.000358 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575
247
 
A-31 
Zulkarnaen Ghoni Top Idris Mustofa WanMin Maidin Sani Dulmatin Farik Lillie Yunos2
Baasyir 0.56391892 0.255234 0.304155 0.294025 0.425719 0.331252 0.295096 0.254904 0.106574 0.086972 0.086972 0.254904
Sungkar 0.27090375 0.172211 0.196718 0.192883 0.224169 0.205498 0.162542 0.171989 0.071908 0.036009 0.036009 0.171989
Hambali 0.56072875 0.122108 0.172357 0.159392 0.405878 0.207444 0.124598 0.04439 0.081381 0.122108 0.122108 0.04439
Mukhlas 0.0286567 0 0.02545 0.002479 0.02969 0.008485 0 0.008485 0.004846 0.00593 0.00593 0.008485
Iqbal 0.20815141 0.078753 0.103845 0.098777 0.168021 0.11792 0.127765 0.025385 0.04654 0.044445 0.044445 0.025385
Faruq 0.00271646 0 0.000781 0.000612 0.002298 0.001166 0 0 0 0.001392 0.001392 0
Syawal 0.02502506 0.006035 0.008026 0.007591 0.011892 0.009007 0.006158 0.003015 0.008044 0.003352 0.003352 0.003015
Ghozi 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.001629 0 0 0.000633
Samudra 0.00063346 0.00095 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0.000633
Jabir 0.21790457 0 0.019133 0.014224 0.108074 0.032492 0 0.046493 0.026551 0.035755 0.035755 0.046493
Amrozi 0.00063346 0.000633 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0.000633
Imron 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.001629 0 0 0.000633
Sufaat 0.00031654 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000211 0.000362 0 0 0.000211
Dwikarna 0.00157102 0 0.000326 0.000275 0.000692 0.000443 0 0 0 0.00048 0.00048 0
Mobarok 0.00473286 0 0.000692 0.001183 0.001666 0.000978 0 0.002367 0.006086 0.001042 0.001042 0.002367
Yunos 0.0147312 0 0.001655 0.00128 0.006245 0.002616 0 0.00257 0.004501 0.003075 0.003075 0.00257
Mistooki 0.0003869 0.001065 0.001065 0.001065 0.001065 0.001065 0.001974 0 0 0 0 0
Faiz 0.00024963 0.0019 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000563 0 0 0 0 0
Hasyim 0.00022207 0.000446 0.002339 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000884 0 0 0 0 0
Sulaeman 0.00040588 0.001217 0.003824 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001242 0 0 0 0 0
Hussein 0.00040588 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001242 0 0 0 0 0
Ayub 0.00368085 0.004418 0.005417 0.008832 0.006241 0.005708 0.004508 0 0 0.001352 0.001352 0
Azahari 0.00172916 0.002317 0.009267 0.002744 0.003186 0.004633 0.002364 0 0 0.000676 0.000676 0
Zulkarnaen 0 0.0282 0.063096 0.05635 0.229204 0.087695 0.028352 0.08455 0.1127 0.066494 0.066494 0.08455
Ghoni 0.00040588 0 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001242 0 0 0 0 0
Top 0.00172916 0.002317 0 0.002744 0.003186 0.004633 0.002364 0 0 0.000676 0.000676 0
Idris 0.00154429 0.002317 0.002744 0 0.002994 0.002841 0.002364 0 0 0.000542 0.000542 0
Mustofa 0.02264019 0.008352 0.011483 0.010792 0 0.013362 0.008522 0 0 0.005837 0.005837 0
WanMin 0.00866229 0.008352 0.016698 0.01024 0.013362 0 0.008522 0 0 0.003437 0.003437 0
Maidin 0.00143104 0.004355 0.004355 0.004355 0.004355 0.004355 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sani 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000362 0 0 0.000
Dulmatin 0.00084436 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000362 0 0 0 0.000362
Farik 0.00097014 0 0.00036 0.000289 0.000862 0.000508 0 0 0 0 0.00185 0
Lillie 0.00097014 0 0.00036 0.000289 0.000862 0.000508 0 0 0 0.00185 0 0
Yunos2 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0
Naharudi
633
n 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0.000633
Gungun 0.00063346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0.000362 0 0 0.000633
Marzuki 0.00041154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000412 0.000277 0 0 0.000412
Kastari 0.00022737 0.000468 0.000468 0.000468 0.000468 0.000468 0.000571 0 0 0 0 0
Hafidh 0.00413494 0.001095 0.001539 0.00147 0.002039 0.0017 0.001073 0 0 0.000654 0.000654 0
Setiono 0.00121691 0.000608 0.000608 0.000608 0.000608 0.000608 0.000615 0 0 0 0 0
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0.03495728 0.007458 0.011847 0.01087 0.049103 0.014565 0.007307 0 0 0.008318 0.008318 0
Mustaqim 0.03194993 0 0.003247 0.002525 0.03081 0.005258 0 0.008485 0.004846 0.006154 0.006154 0.008485
Fathi 0.00022207 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000884 0 0 0 0 0
Khalim 0.00022207 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000446 0.000884 0 0 0 0 0
Roche 0.00040588 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001217 0.001242 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas 0.00024963 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000575 0.000603 0 0 0 0 0  
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Naharudin Gungun Marzuki Kastari Hafidh Setiono BinHir Rusdan Mustaqim Fathi Khalim Roche Thomas
Baasyir 0.2549042 0.254904 0.137294 0.097597 0.207135 0.089278 0 0.38561 0.521256 0.093726 0.093726 0.255234 0.137294
Sungkar 0.17198915 0.171989 0.080243 0.064239 0.138925 0.060238 0 0.14915 0.228504 0.059015 0.059015 0.172211 0.080465
Hambali 0.0443895 0.166497 0.037138 0.06468 0.157121 0.061017 0 0.40163 0.366616 0.061677 0.061677 0.122108 0.079403
Mukhlas 0.00848503 0.008485 0.005512 0 0.004759 0 0 0.03081 0.039295 0 0 0 0
Iqbal 0.02538534 0.025385 0.021238 0.069831 0.118255 0.036989 0 0.157758 0.13476 0.045157 0.045157 0.078753 0.04964
Faruq 0 0 0 0 0.001091 0 0 0.002418 0.002418 0 0 0 0
Syawal 0.00301546 0.003015 0.002378 0.003196 0.015751 0.006035 0 0.010085 0.00918 0.003048 0.003048 0.006035 0.003924
Ghozi 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Samudra 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Jabir 0.04649263 0.046493 0.030205 0 0.029591 0 0 0.122688 0.169181 0 0 0 0
Amrozi 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Imron 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Sufaat 0.00021128 0.000211 0.000179 0 0 0 0 0 0.000211 0 0 0 0
Dwikarna 0 0 0 0 0.001356 0 0 0.000753 0.000753 0 0 0 0
Mobarok 0.00236714 0.002367 0.001538 0 0.000953 0 0 0.001738 0.004105 0 0 0 0
Yunos 0.0025704 0.00257 0.001966 0 0.002897 0 0 0.007047 0.00962 0 0 0 0
Mistooki 0 0 0 0.000654 0.000698 0.000568 0 0.000698 0 0.002578 0.000753 0.001065 0.000753
Faiz 0 0 0 0.000362 0.000441 0.000348 0 0.000441 0 0.001227 0.000344 0.000575 0.000411
Hasyim 0 0 0 0.000347 0.000344 0.000296 0 0.000344 0 0.001766 0.000441 0.000446 0.000358
Sulaeman 0 0 0 0.000645 0.000791 0.001825 0 0.000791 0 0.000615 0.000615 0.001217 0.000791
Hussein 0 0 0 0.000645 0.000791 0.000608 0 0.000791 0 0.000615 0.000615 0.001217 0.000791
Ayub 0 0 0 0.00234 0.004139 0.002207 0 0.004744 0.001871 0.002231 0.002231 0.004418 0.002873
Azahari 0 0 0 0.001227 0.002118 0.001158 0 0.002394 0.000887 0.00117 0.00117 0.002317 0.001507
Zulkarnaen0.08455024 0.08455 0.05493 0.021759 0.207648 0.08455 0 0.257708 0.318369 0.021252 0.021252 0.0282 0.023889
Ghoni 0 0 0 0.000645 0.000791 0.000608 0 0.000791 0 0.000615 0.000615 0.001217 0.000791
Top 0 0 0 0.001227 0.002118 0.001158 0 0.002394 0.000887 0.00117 0.00117 0.002317 0.001507
Idris 0 0 0 0.001227 0.002022 0.001158 0 0.002196 0.000689 0.00117 0.00117 0.002317 0.001507
Mustofa 0 0 0 0.004424 0.010115 0.004173 0 0.035756 0.030326 0.004218 0.004218 0.008352 0.005431
WanMin 0 0 0 0.004424 0.008432 0.004173 0 0.010606 0.005175 0.004218 0.004218 0.008352 0.005431
Maidin 0 0 0 0.00276 0.002719 0.002156 0 0.002719 0 0.004268 0.004268 0.004355 0.002913
Sani 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Dulmatin 0.00036176 0.000362 0.000277 0 0 0 0 0 0.000362 0 0 0 0
Farik 0 0 0 0 0.00048 0 0 0.000895 0.000895 0 0 0 0
Lillie 0 0 0 0 0.00048 0 0 0.000895 0.000895 0 0 0 0
Yunos2 0.00063346 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Naharudin 0 0.000633 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Gungun 0.00063346 0 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0.000633 0 0 0 0
Marzuki 0.00041154 0.000412 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000412 0 0 0 0
Kastari 0 0 0 0 0.000362 0.000306 0 0.000362 0 0.000347 0.000347 0.000468 0.000367
Hafidh 0 0 0 0.00069 0 0.000664 0 0.00187 0.001027 0.000655 0.000655 0.001095 0.000783
Setiono 0 0 0 0.000421 0.00048 0 0 0.00048 0 0.000408 0.000408 0.000608 0.00048
BinHir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rusdan 0 0 0 0.004699 0.012735 0.00452 0 0 0.045869 0.004465 0.004465 0.007458 0.005332
Mustaqim 0.00848503 0.008485 0.005512 0 0.005177 0 0 0.033935 0 0 0 0 0
Fathi 0 0 0 0.000347 0.000344 0.000296 0 0.000344 0 0 0.000441 0.000446 0.000358
Khalim 0 0 0 0.000347 0.000344 0.000296 0 0.000344 0 0.000441 0 0.000446 0.000358
Roche 0 0 0 0.000645 0.000791 0.000608 0 0.000791 0 0.000615 0.000615 0 0.000791
Thomas 0 0 0 0.000367 0.000411 0.000348 0 0.000411 0 0.000358 0.000358 0.000575 0  
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A.5. Fuzzy Clique Parametric Analysis 
 This section contains the results of the fuzzy clique parametric analysis of the 
Jemaah Islamiah terrorist network. 
A.5.1. Node Membership Value 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Baaysir 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sungkar 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4
Hambali 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iqbal 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4
Zulkarnaen 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4
Rusdan 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Theta
 
A.5.2. Clique-Clique Coefficient 
From To 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Emir Colonel 1786.732 1765.114 1805.752 1909.347 2080.002 2325.448 2657.543 3093.068 3654.908 4373.71 5330.5
Emir Captain 1751.561 1736.985 1780.065 1881.656 2045.672 2279.284 2593.347 3003.096 3529.144 4198.89 5348.412
Emir Troop 1605.949 1600.291 1656.37 1774.619 1959.572 2220.089 2569.945 3028.817 3623.743 4391.197 5415.539
Colonel Captain 735.9033 626.0168 537.2387 465.1891 406.4635 358.4055 318.9343 286.4136 259.5517 237.3254 323.2456
Colonel Troop 775.9103 642.625 540.4923 462.3347 402.8744 358.2491 325.6643 303.1442 289.3555 283.4863 390.3725
Captain Troop 576.1588 492.87 427.9529 377.4519 338.436 308.7421 286.7933 271.4679 262.0098 257.9665 408.2848
Theta
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Appendix B: Multidimensional Centrality 
B.1. Introduction 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, multidimensional centrality (MDC) can be used to 
evaluate individual importance across multiple social networks based solely on network 
topology.  This appendix details the calculation of MDC for a simple example. 
B.2. Multidimensional Centrality Sample Problem 
An example situation in which MDC can provide added insight is given in Figure 
B-0-1.  Consider three individuals A, B, and C, in three separate network contexts; work 
(1), members on same sports teams (2), and members of same professional society (3).   
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
1 2
3
 
Figure B-0-1: Multiple Network Contexts--Example Situation 
 
This situation can be represented by a hypergraph using a node-arc incidence matrix.  
Create the matrix, E, where the rows represent arcs and the columns represent the nodes 
and the network contexts.  There are six columns in this matrix, 3 for nodes A, B, and C, 
and 3 for the three network contexts, as shown in Table B-1 
B-1 
Table B-1:  Node-Arc Incidence Matrix with Hyperedges 
 
A B C 1 2 3
arc a-b 1 1 0 1 0 1
arc a-c 1 0 1 1 1 1
arc b-c 0 1 1 1 1 0
Node Network
 
This yields the following node-arc incidence matrix: 
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
011110
111101
101011
E  
 Once a hypergraph has been represented in a node-arc incidence matrix, MDC 
can be calculated.  MDC is an extension of eigenvector centrality applied to hypergraphs.  
To calculate, let EEM T= , then solve the eigenvector-eigenvalue problem for M.  Node 
and network multidimensional centrality scores are given by the eigenvector associated 
with the largest eigenvalue of M. 
 For the sample situation in Figure B-0-1,  
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
==
212112
122211
223222
122211
112121
212112
EEM T  
Table B-2 gives the MDC scores for the three network contexts: 
Table B-2:  Individual Multidimensional Centrality Scores 
 
Node MDC
A 0.3816
B 0.3381
C 0.3816  
B-2 
As expected, with this simple network, the scores are very similar.  The MDC scores for 
the individuals do highlight the difference between node B and nodes A and C.  It is clear 
to see that across the three networks node B is the least connected, while nodes A and C 
have the same number of connections. 
B.3. Limitations 
The reader is reminded that MDC can be misleading.  When analyzing 
clandestine networks it is likely that individuals for whom we have the most data may be 
of little importance to the network under study.  If one assumes key network members are 
practicing better OPSEC, it is likely less data will be available.  Nodes with more 
connections identified, however, will score highly on multidimensional centrality.  This 
“easy” to monitor individual, however, may be of little importance to the question under 
consideration for the clandestine network.  In addition, MDC is only shown to work for 
undirected networks.  Therefore, results of multidimensional centrality must be carefully 
considered with regards to the situation before recommending further action. 
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